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TELLING STORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND WORK:
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SEX SEGREGATION
IN THE WORKPLACE IN TITLE VII CASES RAISING
THE LACK OF INTEREST ARGUMENT
Vicki Schultz*
Twenty-five years after title VII prohibited sex discrimination in employ-
ment, most women continue to work in low-paying, low-status, traditionally
female jobs. Employers have avoided liability for sex segregation by arguing
that women lack interest in more highly rewarded nontraditional jobs. In
this analysis of title VII decisions addressing the lack of interest argument,
Professor Schultz contends that courts have failed to recognize the role of
employers in shaping women's work aspirations. Courts attribute sex segre-
gation either to women's choice or to employer coercion. Both these expla-
nations, however, incorrectly assume that women form stable preferences for
traditional or nontraditional jobs before they begin working. Sociological
research confirms that women develop their job preferences instead in re-
sponse to changing structural and cultural features of work organizations.
Professor Schultz draws on this research to propose a new way of under-
standing sex segregation that will enable courts to fulfill title VII's unrealized
promise to working women.
I. INTRODUCTION
H ow do we make sense of that most basic feature of the world of
work, sex segregation on the job? That it exists is part of our
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. Although it is not traditional to do
so in a scholarly article, I wish to express my gratitude to my mother and father, who have
worked hard in sometimes unrewarding jobs to give me opportunities they never had. In
keeping with my argument in this Article, I acknowledge also the powerful influence of the
women and men with whom I have had the good fortune of working in my formative years as
a scholar and lawyer. My appreciation goes to my colleagues at the University of Wisconsin,
where a culture of support for intellectually ambitious scholarship still thrives. I am particularly
indebted to Dirk Hartog, David Trubek, Martha Fineman, Neil Komesar, Carin Clauss, Jim
Jones, and Bill Clune, whose unfailing faith, constructive commentary, and inspiring example
have sustained me throughout this project. I have been blessed also with talented research
assistants from the Law School and the Sociology Department, including Kate Kruse Livermore,
Sue Bonitz, Lisa Serebin, Cate Snow, Lucy Brown, Amy Scarr, Stephen Petterson, Paula Lantz,
and Julia Adams. I appreciate, in addition, the thoughtful comments of Paul Burstein and
Peter Siegelman. Finally, I thank my former colleagues at the United States Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, especially David L. Rose, for teaching me what people can make
of title VII through their collective vision and labor. Support for my research was provided by
the University of Wisconsin Law School and Graduate School and by the Smongeski Bequest
administered by the University of Wisconsin Foundation.
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common understanding. Social science research has documented, and
casual observation confirmed, that men work mostly with men, doing
"men's work," and women work mostly with women, doing "women's
work."' We know also the serious negative consequences segregation
has for women workers. Work traditionally done by women has lower
wages, less status, and fewer opportunities for advancement than
work done by men.2 Despite this shared knowledge, however, we
remain deeply divided in our attitudes toward sex segregation on the
job. What divides us is how we interpret this reality, the stories we
tell about its origins and meaning. Why does sex segregation on the
job exist? Who is responsible for it? Is it an injustice, or an inevi-
tability?
I Although the degree of sex segregation declined modestly during the 1970's, work remains
highly segregated by sex. Throughout the i98o's, for example, roughly 6o% of all men and
women workers would have been required to switch to occupations atypical for their sex to
achieve sex integrated occupations. See, e.g., J. JACOBS, REVOLVING DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION
AND WOMEN'S CAREERS 20, 28-29 (i989); Beller, Trends in Occupational Segregation by Sex
and Race z96o-198r, in SEx SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS, EXPLANATIONS,
REMEDIES ii (B. Reskin ed. 1984) [hereinafter SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE]. As
recently as 1985, over two-thirds of working women were employed in occupations in which at
least 70% of the workers were female. See Jacobs, Long-Term Trends in Occupational Segre-
gation by Sex, 95 AM. J. Soc. i6o, i6o (i989). These estimates of occupational segregation
understate the degree of sex segregation, because even workers employed in apparently sex-
neutral occupations often work in industries, firms, departments, and jobs that are highly
segregated by sex. See, e.g., Bielby & Baron, A Woman's Place Is with Other Women: Sex
Segregation Within Organizations, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE, supra, at 27, 35
(finding that in a random sample of 393 California firms, 90% of the workers were in job titles
to which only one sex was assigned); Gutek & Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and
Sexual Harassment of Women at Work, J. Soc. ISSUES, Winter 1982, at 55, 61-62 (finding that
in a representative sample of 1232 Los Angeles workers, 42% of the women in male-dominated
occupations were nonetheless in female-dominated jobs). For general discussions of sex segre-
gation at work, see B. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN (1986); P. ENG-
LAND & G. FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT, AND GENDER: A SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND
DEMOGRAPHIC VIEW 121-96 (1986); J. JACOBS, supra; WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX
SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (B. Reskin & H. Hartmann eds. 1986) [hereinafter WOMEN'S WORK,
MEN'S WORK].
2 The most serious problem associated with segregation is its effect on women's earning
power. A substantial portion of the male-female wage disparity is attributable to women's
concentration in lower-paying, female-dominated occupations and jobs. See, e.g., BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, HOUSEHOLD ECO-
NOMIC STUDIES, SERIES P-7o, No. IO, MALE-FEMALE DIFFERENCES IN WORK EXPERIENCE,
OCCUPATION, AND EARNINGS: 1984, at 9-IO (1987); WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY
FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 33-38 (D. Treiman & H. Hartmann eds. I98I). Entry-level female
jobs are often on short mobility ladders that offer little or no opportunity for advancement, see
infra note 317, and the jobs women do tend to have less prestige than the jobs men do. Even
when women work in male-dominated jobs, segregation creates a context in which they are
perceived to have significantly less prestige than their male counterparts. See, e.g., Powell &
Jacobs, Gender Differences in the Evaluation of Prestige, 25 Soc. Q. 173 (1984). For a discussion
of these and other negative consequences of sex segregation for working women, see WOMEN'S
WORK, MEN'S WORK, supra note I, at 9-17.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,3 the district court interpreted
sex segregation as the expression of women's own choice. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Sears under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 The EEOC claimed that Sears
had engaged in sex discrimination in hiring and promotion into com-
mission sales jobs, reserving these jobs mostly for men while relegating
women to much lower-paying noncommission sales jobs.5 Like most
employment discrimination plaintiffs, the EEOC relied heavily on
statistical evidence to prove its claims. The EEOC's statistical studies
showed that Sears had significantly underhired women sales applicants
for the more lucrative commission sales positions, 6 even after con-
trolling for potential sex differences in qualifications. 7
Although the statistical evidence exposed a long-standing pattern
of sex segregation in Sears' salesforce, the judge refused to attribute
this pattern to sex discrimination. The judge concluded that the
EEOC's statistical analyses were "virtually meaningless," because they
were based on the faulty assumption that female sales applicants were
as "interested" as male applicants in commission sales jobs.8 Indeed,
the EEOC had "turned a blind eye to reality,"9 for Sears had proved
that women sales applicants preferred lower-paying noncommission
3 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
4 Title VII is the major federal statute prohibiting discrimination in employment. It prohibits
employers with 15 or more employees from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to 2000e-,7 (1982).
s Between 1973 and 198o the median hourly wages for first-year commission salesworkers
were about twice as high as those for all noncommission salesworkers. See Plaintiff's Pretrial
Brief - Commission Sales Issues at 27, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (No. 79-C-4373).
6 Between 1973 and 198o, for example, women constituted 61% of all full-time sales appli-
cants at Sears, but only 27% of the newly hired full-time commission salesworkers. In contrast,
women made up approximately 75% of Sears' noncommission salesforce. See Brief for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n as Appellant at 7, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 86-I5i9 and 86-x621) [hereinafter EEOC Brief].
7 Sears conceded that it had established no objective qualifications for the commission sales
job. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 129o. Nonetheless, the EEOC performed two types of multiple
regression analyses that controlled for any differences between the male and female sales appli-
cants on various characteristics that may have influenced their selection into commission sales,
including age, education, job applied for, job type experience, product line experience, and
expanded commission sales experience. See id. at 1296-98; EEOC Brief, supra note 6, at 20-
26.
8 See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1305. The EEOC could not reconstruct a precise pool of
applicants who specifically preferred commission sales, because Sears' application form did not
provide separate boxes for commission and noncommission sales jobs. See EEOC Brief, supra
note 6, at 7-8. The EEOC's regression analyses did control for any preferences the applicants
had written in by hand, see id. at 22-23, 128-29, even though fewer than half of those hired
for commission sales had written in a preference for that job, see Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1296
& n.21; EEOC Brief, supra note 6, at 27-28.
9 Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1324.
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sales jobs. 10 The judge credited various explanations for women's
"lack of interest" in commission sales, all of which rested on conven-
tional images of women as "feminine" and nurturing, unsuited for the
vicious competition in the male-dominated world of commission sell-
ing." In the court's eyes, Sears had done nothing to segregate its
salesforce; it had merely honored the preexisting employment prefer-
ences of working women themselves.
Few recent cases have received more attention - or provoked
more controversy - than Sears. 12 The extraordinary attention given
the case suggests that it was somehow unusual and therefore note-
worthy. Indeed, some commentators' sense of shock rests on an as-
sumption that Sears represented a sharp break from the past, a giant
step backward in an otherwise uninterrupted path of progress in
dismantling sex segregation through title VII litigation. 13 At best,
10 See id. at 1324-25. The judge reached this conclusion despite evidence that women who
worked at Sears needed to maximize their incomes. For example, a 1981 survey of married
women employed in noncommission sales jobs showed that 28% had unemployed husbands,
35% had husbands who earned below the $20,26o national median income for men, and an
additional 19% had husbands who earned below $25,000 per year. See Written Testimony of
Eileen Appelbaum at I8-ig & n.27, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. X264 (N.D.
Ill. 1986) (No. 79-C-4373).
11 According to the judge, women shunned the "big ticket," "hard" lines of merchandise,
such as home improvements, hardware, and men's clothing, which were more likely to be sold
on commission at Sears; they felt more comfortable with the "small ticket," "soft" lines, such as
jewelry, cosmetics, and women's clothing, which were sold on a noncommission basis. See
Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 23o6. In addition, women "disliked the perceived dog-eat-dog compe-
tition" and "financial risk" of commission sales, preferring the "security" and "more enjoyable
and friendly" nature of noncommission sales. See id. at 1307.
12 The news media reported developments in the case from its inception and speculated
about its effect on the future of title VII enforcement. See, e.g., Hunter, U.S. Files Five Suits
Charging Sears with Job Bias, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1979, at Ai, col. 4; Williams, Despite
Class-Action Doubts, EEOC Presses Sears Bias Case, Wash. Post, July 9, I985, at Ai, col. i;
Pear, Changes Weighed in Federal Rules on Discrimination, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2984, at Ai,
col. 6; Greenhouse, Federal Judge Rules for Sears in Sex Bias Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1986,
at A21, col. 2; Lewin, Statistics Have Become Suspect in Sex Discrimination Cases, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 9, 1986, § 4, at E8. Two prominent women's historians testified on opposite sides
of the issue of women's "interest" in nontraditional work, and both sought to vindicate their
positions publicly after the suit was resolved. Compare Kessler-Harris, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck and Company: A Personal Account, I986 RADICAL
HIST. REv. 57 (defending her testimony for the EEOC) with Rosenberg, What Harms Women
in the Workplace, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at A23, col. r (defending her testimony for
Sears). In addition, numerous scholars have analyzed the Sears case, discussing its significance
for the contemporary debate about gender difference in our society. See Finley, Choice and
Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914, 937-40 (1987);
Milkman, Women's History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STUD. 375 (2986); Scott, Decon-
structing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14
FEMINIST STUD. 33, 38-47 (I988); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797,
824 (2989).
13 See, e.g., Lewin, supra note i2; Pear, supra note 12. One legal scholar stated this
assumption explicitly, arguing that the Sears court's acceptance of the lack of interest argument
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commentators have analyzed Sears in isolation, creating the impres-
sion that it is the first case in which an employer has dared to argue
- or a court has deigned to affirm - that workplace segregation is
attributable to women's own choice.
In fact, neither the issues nor the outcome in Sears are new. For
almost two decades, employers have argued successfully that they had
no role in creating sex segregation in their workforces. "It's not our
fault," they say. "We don't exclude women from men's jobs. In fact,
we've been trying to move women into those jobs. The trouble is,
women won't apply for them - they just aren't interested. They
grow up wanting to do women's work, and we can't force them to do
work they don't want to do."1 4 Almost half the courts to consider the
issue have accepted this explanation and attributed women's disad-
vantaged place in the workplace to their own lack of interest in more
highly valued nontraditional jobs. '5
This Article places the Sears case in historical and theoretical
context. It studies all published title VII decisions since 1965 in which
employers have sought to justify sex segregation as the expression of
women's own lack of interest in nontraditional jobs. An analysis of
the results, evidentiary approaches, and reasoning in these cases shows
that there has been a continuing (if not always conscious) sexism in
the way working women have been envisioned within the law. The
women who predominate in these cases are working-class women.16
Many are women of color, 17 seeking jobs traditionally held by men
represented "a dramatic reversal of existing Title VII law," Williams, Deconstructing Gender,
supra note 12, at 8ig, which succeeded for the first time in "enshrining gender stereotypes at
the core of Title VII," id. at 814.
14 Employers also resort to this argument to justify sex segregation outside the litigation
context. As one researcher summarized managers' views: "The conclusion is: 'It's not our fault'
.... . [E]veryone places the blame, far away from the workplace. A unanimous chorus repeats:
it's the parents' fault, it's the teachers' fault, it's the fault of the career advisers. And, of course,
fundamentally, it's women's fault: 'they are their own worst enemies.'" C. CoCEBURN, MA-
CHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN AND TECHNICAL KNow-How 165 (1985). For similar
descriptions of how managers have rationalized segregation, see V. BEECHEY & T. PERKINS, A
MATTER OF HouRs: WOMEN, PART-TIME WORK AND THE LABOUR MARKET 102-19 (1987); and
L. HowE, PINK COLLAR WORKERS: INSIDE THE WORLD OF WOMEN'S WORK 90-91 (1977).
Is By "nontraditional" jobs, I refer to the jobs in which women workers are significantly
underrepresented in the particular establishments they are suing. I also refer to such jobs as
"male-dominated," "traditionally male," or "male" jobs, throughout this Article. By contrast, I
use the terms "traditional," "traditionally female," "female-dominated," or "female" jobs to refer
to the jobs in which women workers are overrepresented in the particular establishments they
are suing. I use these terms only as convenient labels; I do not mean to suggest that there is
any historical consistency, cross-cultural agreement, or even uniformity across or within firms
about which jobs are appropriate for men and women.
16 See infra notes 8o-8i and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 74 and 82 and accompanying text. Faced with the intersecting disadvan-
tage of racial and sexual discrimination, women of color have often been excluded from work
deemed appropriate for white women. For accounts of labor market discrimination against
1754 [VOL. IX:749
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rather than jobs held by white women.18 Working-class women have
shared the experience of being marginalized at work, but being unable
to opt out.19 They have made a high priority of ending job segrega-
tion, 20 for they want work that will enable them to support themselves
and their families with security while providing challenge, a sense of
accomplishment, and control over their own lives. Our society, how-
ever, has long viewed these women as inauthentic workers, uncom-
mitted to wage work as an important life interest and source of
African-American, Hispanic, and Chinese-American women, see, for example, J. JONES, LABOR
OF LOVE, LABOR OF SoRRow: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, -AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO
THE PRESENT (1985); P. ZAVELLA, WOMEN'S WORK AND CHIcANO FAMILIES: CANNERY WORK-
ERS OF THE SANTA CLARA VALLEY (1987); Glenn, Racial Ethnic Women's Labor: The Intersec-
tion of Race, Gender, and Class Oppression, in HIDDEN ASPECTS OF WOMEN'S WORK 46 (C.
Bose, R. Feldberg & N. Sokoloff eds. 1987); and Malveaux & Wallace, Minority Women in the
Workplace, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 265 (K. Koziara, M. Moskow & L.
Tanner eds. 1987).
18 Without intending to deny or ignore the unique discrimination experienced by women of
color, this Article analyzes the courts' treatment of sex discrimination claims brought by working
women of various racial and ethnic groups in an effort to obtain jobs traditionally done by
men. Since the enactment of title VII, women of color have made more progress entering
occupations traditionally held by white women than they (or white women) have made in
entering occupations traditionally held by men. Researchers typically estimate the extent of
occupational segregation with a construct called the index of dissimilarity, which measures the
proportion of workers who would have to switch to occupations atypical for their sex or race
in order for occupations to be integrated. While the index of race segregation between minority
women and white women workers declined substantially from 46.8% in 196o to 17.2% in 1981,
the index of sex segregation between minority women and minority men declined much more
modestly during the same period from 54.0 to 47.9. See Albelda, Occupational Segregation by
Race and Gender, Z958-81, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 404, 405-06 (1986). Similarly, while
the index of race segregation between minority men and white men declined from 38.4 in 196o
to 23.8 in 1981, the index of sex segregation between white women and white men declined
more modestly from 59.6 to 53.0. See id. The greatest difference in occupational distribution
between any two groups was, of course, between minority women and white men. The index
of segregation began at 67.2 in 196o and declined to only 58.1 in I981. See id. 'For other
studies reporting similar findings, see J. JONES, cited above in note 17, at 301-03; WOMEN'S
WORK, MEN'S WORK, cited above in note I, at i9; and Beller, cited above in note 1, at 20.
19 Historically, African-American women, immigrant women, and low-income native-born
white women have engaged in wage work in large numbers, despite being relegated to undesir-
able jobs. See, e.g., J. JONES, supra note 17; S. KENNEDY, IF ALL WE DID WAS To WEEP
AT HOME: A HISTORY OF WHITE WORKING-CLASS WOMEN IN AMERICA (1979); A. KESSLER-
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
(1982); Milkman, A Statistical Portrait, in 2 N. HEwITT, WOMEN, FAMILIES, AND COMMU-
NITIES: READINGS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 249 (199o). Estimates of women's historical labor
force participation are known to be too low because of the U.S. Census Bureau's practices of
undercounting work done by women. See, e.g., Bose, Devaluing Women's Work: The Under-
count of Women's Employment in 9oo and 198o, in HIDDEN ASPECTS OF WOMEN'S WORK,
supra note 17, at 95.
20 See, e.g., Working Women's 198o Platform, reprinted in P. FoNER, WOMEN AND THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT: FROM THE FIRST TRADE UNIONS TO THE PRESENT 497 (1980)




identity. This view has justified relegating them to dead-end, female-
dominated jobs at the lowest rung of the economic ladder.
Title VII promised working women change. But, consciously or
unconsciously, courts have interpreted the statute with some of the
same assumptions that have historically legitimated women's economic
disadvantage. Most centrally, courts have assumed that women's as-
pirations and identities as workers are shaped exclusively in private
realms that are independent of and prior to the workworld. 21 By
assuming that women form stable job aspirations before they begin
working, courts have missed the ways in which employers contribute
to creating women workers in their images of who "women" are
supposed to be. Judges have placed beyond the law's reach the struc-
tural features of the workplace that gender jobs and people, 22 and
disempower women from aspiring to higher-paying nontraditional em-
ployment.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II shows that the Supreme
Court has delegated to lower courts the discretion to determine
whether and when to accept the lack of interest argument. I then
describe my methods of collecting and analyzing the lower court de-
cisions that form the basis for the two-part study in Parts Im and IV.
Part Ill examines how the courts have created a framework for
interpreting sex segregation that posits two mutually exclusive expla-
21 1 use the term "workworld" to refer to all aspects of wage work as a sphere of activity or
interest. People's experiences in the workworld include both the experience of searching for
work in particular labor markets and the experience of working in jobs in particular workplaces.
In stating that courts assume that women form their work aspirations in private realms that
are "prior to" the workworld, I mean to suggest a definition that captures a dimension of both
temporal and metaphysical priority. The temporal dimension is reflected in the view that women
form stable work aspirations through early sex-role socialization that is completed long before
they ever begin working or searching for work. This in turn implies an almost metaphysical
dimension: women's job preferences are "fixed" in advance, so that they constitute predetermined
inputs to the labor market. Throughout this Article, I refer to the realms in which courts
imagine women's job preferences to be formed as "pre-work," "pre-workworld," or "pre-labor
market" realms. I refer to the view that women form stable job preferences in such realms as
the "pre-labor market" explanation for sex segregation. See infra Part V.
22 Throughout this Article, I use the term "gender" as a noun to refer not to the biological
sex of a human being, but rather to the complex of social and cultural differences the dominant
society attributes to biological men and women. See 6 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 428 (2d
ed. 1989) (recognizing the modern feminist distinction between sex and gender by defining
gender as the "social and cultural, as opposed to the biological, distinctions between the sexes");
cf. 15 id. 1n7-io (defining sex). Similarly, I use gender as a verb to refer to the processes of
attributing social and cultural differences to biological men and women and, by extension, to
the activities commonly associated with them. A major theme of this Article is that the
workworld is a central site where people's social identities as men and women are created and
contested. Thus, when I state that gender is constructed at work or that work processes gender
people and jobs, I mean that employers structure labor markets, work, and workplaces in ways
that assign and actually create differences between biological men and women as well as the
work they do.
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nations: women's "choice" and employers' "coercion." I trace how the
courts have developed this framework and have decided in particular
cases which of these competing explanations to adopt through stan-
dardized approaches to evaluating the evidence. Part IV analyzes the
choice and coercion explanations as separate "stories" that justify dif-
ferent legal results. Although these two explanations lead to different
outcomes, both assume that women bring to the labor market fixed
preferences for traditional or nontraditional jobs. This judicial frame-
work has created an unduly narrow definition of sex discrimination
and an overly restrictive role for the law in dismantling sex segrega-
tion.
Part V draws on recent sociological research to challenge the as-
sumption that women form stable job preferences through pre-work
socialization and to create an alternative account of the development
of work aspirations that holds more promise for understanding and
changing the dynamics of sex segregation in the workplace. In this
new account, women develop their work preferences only in the con-
text of and in response to structural features of the workworld itself.
Part VI concludes by sketching the broad implications of this new
account for title VII law. It suggests that judges must approach the
question whether women are "interested" in nontraditional work with
a greater self-consciousness about the law's role in creating women's
work aspirations.
I write, then, from a conviction that what judges say and do
matters. Courts have authority to help or hinder working women in
their struggle against marginalization and segregation into low-paying,
low-status jobs. judges' interpretations of sex segregation enter a
broader stock of cultural knowledge that organizes people's experience
and gives meaning to what we see when we observe men and women
doing separate tasks in everyday life. 23 An interpretation that portrays
women as having formed their job preferences before they ever enter
the workworld renders invisible all the ways in which employers
disempower women from claiming nontraditional jobs. As such, it
rationalizes the sex-segregated status quo. But if law organizes mean-
ing, it also orchestrates power. Judicial decisions establish the terms
within which women workers not involved in litigation will bargain
23 As my use of the metaphor of interpretation suggests, I believe that what courts say about
sex segregation influences more broadly how people not involved in the immediate legal contest
understand that reality. For earlier work in the interpretive tradition, see, for example, Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989),
which examines the use of storytelling in the struggle for racial justice; Fineman, Dominant
Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, iox
IARv. L. REV. 727 (1988), which explores how social workers helped shape legal discourse in
child custody cases so as to disempower custodial mothers; and Minow, Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. i86o (1987), which argues for an interpretive approach
to law that defends rights as tools for expressing communal aspirations.
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with their employers about segregation in the future.2 4 Furthermore,
courts have the institutional authority to order, or decline to order,
changes in employers' practices and arrangements. When judges im-
pose liability, they can dramatically alter the sexual composition of
employers' workforces or job classifications. 25 Conversely, when
courts refuse to intervene, segregation will likely continue. Thus,
judges have the power to create the conditions that make their stories
about sex segregation come true.
II. THE CONTEXT FOR THE STUDY
The story of how courts have dealt with sex segregation in the
workplace is necessarily a story about how they have treated statistical
evidence in title VII cases. The purpose of statistical evidence is to
demonstrate that women or minorities are significantly underrepre-
sented in the employer's workforce or in certain jobs, thereby proving
the existence of the patterns of segregation that the plaintiffs seek to
dismantle.26 From the beginning of title VII enforcement, judges
recognized that plaintiffs would often be forced to rely on statistical
evidence "'to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination."' 27 But
almost as quickly as plaintiffs began to use statistical evidence, em-
ployers began to devise strategies to undermine its probative value.
24 See infra note 71.
25 There are many documented cases of dramatic increases in female participation in non-
traditional jobs in response to court orders and court-supervised consent decrees. See, e.g.,
COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN BANKING: SHORTCHANGE/
UPDATE 68 (1976) (recording a z66% increase in female participation in managerial, professional,
technical and salesworker jobs, and an even greater increase in female participation in blue-
collar jobs, at a major bank between x971 and 1975); K. DEAUX & J. ULLMAN, WOMEN OF
STEEL: FEMALE BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS IN THE BASIC STEEL INDUSTRY 85 (1983) (recording
a 170% increase in female participation in production, maintenance, and craft positions in two
steel mills between 1976 and 1979); Appendix D, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY AND
THE AT&T CASE 343 (P. Wallace ed. 1976) (recording a 119% increase in female participation
in craft jobs and a 46% increase in female participation in managerial jobs between 1973 and
the end of 1974).
26 In classwide title VII cases, a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination by
demonstrating a gross disparity between the number of protected class members hired by the
employer and the number of qualified protected class members who would have been available
for hire in the absence of discrimination. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
339 n.20 (1977). In its most dramatic form, statistical proof reveals that the employer has never
hired any women or minorities or, more commonly, has never hired them for the higher-paying
jobs. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.23 (referring to the "inexorable zero" as powerful proof
of intentional discrimination).
27 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20 (quoting United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971), and citing other early courts of appeals
decisions).
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One central strategy has been the lack of interest argument. Since
1967,28 employers have sought to justify patterns of sex and race
segregation in their workforces by arguing that these patterns resulted
not from any actions they had taken, but rather from women's and
minorities' own lack of interest -in higher-paying nontraditional jobs.
The lack of interest argument attacks the meaningfulness even of
statistical evidence showing egregious, long-standing patterns of seg-
regation. For if these patterns are the expression of women's or
minorities' independent work preferences, then employers cannot be
blamed. Whether such preferences are attributable to biological influ-
ences or to pre-work socialization, the point is that employers are not
responsible.
A. Supreme Court Decisions Addressing
the Lack of Interest Argument
Although the lower courts have been wrestling with the problem
of interpreting statistical evidence for over twenty years, the Supreme
Court has never clarified the circumstances in which the lack of
interest argument constitutes a valid defense to discrimination. In-
deed, in three 1977 decisions, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States,29 Dothard v. Rawlinson,30 and Hazelwood School
District v. United States,31 the Court expressly delegated to the trial
courts the discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to
accept the lack of interest argument. 32
In Teamsters, the lack of interest argument arose in the remedial,
rather than the liability, stage of a classwide disparate treatment
28 The earliest case I found that addresses the lack of interest argument is Cypress v. Newport
News General & Nonsectarian Hospital Association, 375 F.2d 648, 653 (4 th Cir. 1967). For a
fuller discussion of this case, see pp. 1772-73 below.
29 431 U.S. 324 (I977).
30 433 U.S. 321 (,977).
3' 433 U.S. 299 (I977).
32 Although Teamsters and Hazelwood are race discrimination cases, they provide precedent
for how to analyze the lack of interest argument in sex discrimination cases as well. Title VIl's
anti-discrimination provisions make no distinction between race and sex discrimination. See 42
U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a)(I)-(2) (1982). The Supreme Court has never suggested that race and sex
discrimination are to be analyzed differently under title VII. To the contrary, the Court's title
VII decisions have consistently used the same approaches to analyze race and sex discrimination,
citing precedent from the two contexts interchangeably. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631 (1987) (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 197 ('979), to uphold the validity under title VII of an affirmative action plan for women);
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (citing title VII decisions recognizing
a cause of action for racial harassment to support recognizing a cause of action for sexual
harassment creating a hostile work environment). Indeed, in Dothard, a sex discrimination
case, the Court supported its analysis of the lack of interest issue with a reference to its earlier
analysis of the same issue in Teamsters. See infra p. 1762.
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suit.33 The government proved that the defendant trucking company
had engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination,
refusing to hire African-Americans and Hispanics for line-driver jobs
and relegating the few it had hired to lower-paid city-driver jobs. 34
The company argued that, as a matter of law, minority employees
who had failed to apply for line-driver jobs could not be considered
victims of discrimination and hence could not be awarded individual
relief. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that a
class member's failure to apply may not reflect a lack of interest, but
rather only the chilling effects of the employer's discriminatory prac-
tices:
If an employer should announce his policy of discrimination by a sign
reading "Whites Only" on the hiring-office door, his victims would not
be limited to the few who ignored the sign and subjected themselves
to personal rebuffs. The same message can be communicated to po-
tential applicants more subtly but just as clearly by an employer's
actual practices - by his consistent discriminatory treatment of actual
applicants, by the manner in which he publicizes vacancies, his re-
cruitment techniques, his responses to casual or tentative inquiries,
and even by the racial or ethnic composition of that part of his work
force from which he has discriminatorily excluded members of minor-
ity groups. 35
In spite of this recognition, the Court invalidated the Fifth Circuit's
remedial approach, under which all minority employees were pre-
sumed to have applied for line-driver jobs because all were likely to
have been aware of the futility of seeking them. Stating that the
"desirability of the [line-driver job] is not so self-evident as to warrant
a conclusion that all employees would prefer to be line drivers if given
a free choice," 36 the Court held that no minority non-applicant could
secure relief without first proving that he or she would have applied
to be a line-driver in the absence of the company's discrimination. 37
33 Classwide disparate treatment suits typically are tried in two stages. The first stage
addresses whether the employer has engaged in a regular practice of discriminating against
protected class members as a group. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 & n.z6. The second stage
allocates relief to individual victims of discrimination if liability is established. See id. at 361-
62. Classwide disparate treatment cases include both private class actions initiated under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and pattern or practice cases brought by the Department of Justice
or the EEOC under § 707(a) of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-6(a) (1982).
34 See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342-43.
3s Id. at 365.
36 Id. at 369.
37 See id. at 371-72. The Court held that a minority non-applicant who proves that he or
she would have applied but for discrimination stands in the same position as one who did apply.
At that point, the employer bears the burden of proving that he would not have hired the
person anyway, because of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason such as the lack of a vacancy,
even in the absence of the already proven pattern of discrimination. See id. at 357-62, 367-
68.
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Thus, the Court adopted an individualized approach in which the
trial court was to determine, as a factual matter, whether each mi-
nority non-applicant failed to apply because of discrimination or in-
stead because of an independent lack of interest in the work. This
approach to the lack of interest argument at the remedial stage,
however, provided the lower courts with little guidance for evaluating
the argument when it is raised as a defense to classwide discrimination
at the liability stage. 38
The lack of interest argument was asserted as a defense to class-
wide discrimination in Dothard,39 the only sex discrimination case in
which the Court has addressed the issue. 40 The district court held
that the Alabama Board of Corrections' use of minimum height and
weight requirements to select prison guards had an unlawful disparate
impact on women. 41 Alabama contended that the district court had
38 The lack of interest argument involves different considerations when asserted during the
liability, as opposed to the remedy, stage of a classwide discrimination suit. In raising the lack
of interest argument during the remedial phase, the employer is claiming that some individual
class member would not have been interested in some nontraditional job, even if the employer
had always welcomed protected class members into that job. This claim rests on an assertion
about the work preference of a particular claimant, as an individual, that is not necessarily
related to that person's race or sex. See id. at 369-70 (acknowledging that even some whites,
who had never been subjected to discrimination, had failed to express interest in the line-driver
job). But in raising the lack of interest argument during the liability phase, the employer is
claiming that minorities or women are, as a group, systematically less interested than whites or
men in the nontraditional work at issue. This claim necessarily rests on an assertion that there
is something distinctive about minorities' or women's work preferences that is directly attribut-
able to their race or sex.
39 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
40 In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), the Supreme Court upheld
the validity under title VII of an affirmative action program for women, holding that the plan
was justified by the "'manifest imbalance' that reflected underrepresentation of women in 'tra-
ditionally segregated job categories'" in Santa Clara County's workforce. Id. at 631 (citing
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)). Although the majority
did not mention the issue of women's interest in the county's nontraditional jobs, Justice Scalia
argued in dissent that the absence of women from road maintenance work was attributable not
to historical discrimination, but rather to women's own lack of interest in such work. See id.
at 668 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because Johnson involved the validity of a voluntary affirmative
action plan rather than the county's liability for sex discrimination against women, I do not
analyze the case here. Johnson did not influence the lower court decisions in my study: only
three cases were decided after Johnson, and none of them cited Johnson in analyzing the lack
of interest issue. See EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 885 F.2d 575 (gth Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Shultz, 8i5 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
41 In a disparate impact case, a plaintiff need not prove that the employer acted with
discriminatory purpose or intent. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff
need only show that apparently neutral selection criteria operated to exclude protected class
members at a disproportionate rate. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-
30 (I97I). The employer bears the burden of justifying the challenged criteria. The Supreme
Court recently held that the employer's burden is merely one of "producing evidence of a business
justification for his employment practice[s]." Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, IO9 S. Ct.
2115, 2126 (1989). Before Wards Cove, lower courts had held that the employer's burden is the
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erred in concluding that plaintiffs' statistical data, which measured
the effects of the height and weight requirements on the U.S. popu-
lation, established a prima facie case of disparate impact.42 According
to the state, a prima facie case could be made only with data showing
that women who had actually applied to be prison guards were dis-
proportionately excluded by the challenged requirements. Alabama's
position rested on a lack of interest argument, which implied that the
height and weight requirements could have no disparate impact be-
cause only women who were sufficiently tall and heavy to meet them
would be interested in applying to be prison guards in the first place.
Justice White agreed with this position in dissent, stating that he was
not "convinced that a large percentage of the actual women applicants,
or those who are seriously interested in applying, for prison guard
positions would fail to satisfy the height and weight requirements." 43
The majority rejected the State's position and held that the plain-
tiffs were not required to use applicant data to make a prima facie
case. But the Court failed to clarify whether and when an employer
might use applicant data to defeat a prima facie case with the lack
of interest argument. In a passage that seemed to acknowledge that
such an approach has the potential to undermine the entire disparate
impact model, 44 the Court recognized that the applicant pool might
not accurately reflect the characteristics of women interested in the
job: "Otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying
because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards chal-
lenged as being discriminatory.... A potential applicant could easily
determine her height and weight and conclude that to make an ap-
plication would be futile."45 In another passage, however, the Court
emphasized that the state had made no effort to introduce any evi-
dence to undermine the plaintiffs' prima facie showing. 46 In contrast
heavier one of persuading the court of the business necessity of the challenged practices. See
id. at 2130 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing earlier courts of appeals' decisions).
42 Plaintiffs' statistics showed that only 58.9% of all women in the United States between
the ages of i8 and 79 could meet Alabama's height and weight requirements, whereas 99.8%
of men could do so. Only i2.9% of the state's prison guards were women. See Dothard, 433
U.S. at 329-30 & n.12.
43 Id. at 348 (White, J., dissenting).
44 If the disparate impact model is to have any meaning, plaintiffs must be able to establish
the disproportionate impact of the requirements they are challenging with reference to some
pool of potential workers besides the applicant pool. Otherwise, employers could always argue
that only women or minorities who satisfy the requirements were interested enough in the job
to apply; by definition, the requirements would not operate to exclude those who already meet
them.
45 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330 (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 365-67 (I977)).
46 See id. at 331; see also id. at 337-39 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the
state had made virtually no effort to challenge the plaintiffs' prima facie statistical showing in
the trial court).
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to the earlier passage, this emphasis on the state's failure to meet its
burden of proof seemed to leave open the possibility that an employer
might rely on applicant data to attribute women's underrepresentation
to their lack of interest in the job, rather than to the impact of the
challenged requirements. Thus, although Dothard clarified that it is
the employer's burden to prove the lack of interest argument, the
Court left it to the trial courts to determine on a case-by-case basis
how an employer might meet that burden.4 7
In Hazelwood48 the Court made even clearer that the trial courts
are to resolve the interest issue. The Department of Justice alleged
that Hazelwood, a school district in an almost all-white suburb of St.
Louis, was intentionally discriminating on the basis of race in selecting
its teachers. Relying on the fact that Hazelwood's recent past was
tainted by discrimination 4 9 and that the vast majority of Hazelwood's
teachers had come from the city of St. Louis and the surrounding
county,5 0 the Eighth Circuit held that the combined citylcounty area
was the relevant labor market from which Hazelwood would have
drawn its teachers in the absence of discrimination. Because there
was a gross disparity between the racial composition of the teachers
employed in the city/county area and the racial composition of the
teachers employed at Hazelwood, 51 the court of appeals reversed the
district court and directed judgment for the Justice Department. 52
In the Supreme Court, Hazelwood contended that the city/county
figure provided an inappropriate basis for comparison to its post-title
VII hiring record,5 3 because the city of St. Louis school district's
47 See 433 U.S. at 331 (stating that the district court was entitled to find that the height and
weight requirements had a disparate impact where the defendant introduced no evidence to the
contrary); see also id. at 338 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("It is for the District Court . . . to
determine whether [the] statistics appear sufficiently probative of the ultimate fact in issue -
whether a given job qualification requirement has a disparate impact on some group protected
by Title VII.").
48 Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (i977).
49 See id. at 302-03 & nn.2 & 4, 3o4 n.7.
SO Eighty percent of Hazelwood's teachers had come from the city of St. Louis or the
surrounding county, and one-third from the city alone. See id. at 315 n.2 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
S1 In 1970, 15.4% of all teachers in the city of St. Louis and the surrounding county (which
included Hazelwood) were black. Yet in 1972 and 1973, blacks constituted less than 2% of
Hazelwood's teaching staff, see 433 U.S. at 303-05, and only 3.7% of its newly hired teachers,
see id. at 310.
S2 In ruling against the government, the district court had relied in part on the fact that the
racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff differed only slightly from the racial composition
of its students. The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's holding that this comparison
was erroneous as a matter of law, because the proper basis of comparison was the racial
composition of the qualified school teachers in the relevant labor market. See id. at 304-05,
3o8-o9.
S3 Hazelwood also contended that the court of appeals had erred in failing to consider whether
the district had discriminated in hiring after title VII became applicable to public employers in
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efforts to maintain a fifty percent black teaching staff had diverted to
the city a disproportionate number of black teachers who might oth-
erwise have been interested in Hazelwood. Hazelwood's position
rested on a lack of interest argument, for there was no reason to
suppose that St. Louis could meet its goal unless black teachers dis-
proportionately preferred teaching there over Hazelwood. 54 The case
potentially turned on this issue, for if the city were excluded from the
relevant labor market, the percentage of black teachers in the county
alone decreased dramatically.55 The Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Circuit had erred "in substituting its judgment for that of the
district court,"5 6 and it remanded the case to the trial court to deter-
mine whether the combined city/county figure, the county-only figure,
or instead some "intermediate figure," was the most accurate one to
form the basis of comparison to Hazelwood's hiring record.5 7 More
than once in its opinion, the Court stated that applicant data showing
the percentage of blacks among those who had applied to teach at
Hazelwood would provide a "very relevant" basis of comparison. 5 8
Hazelwood made clear that the specification of the relevant labor
market is a factual determination to be made by the trial court.5 9 But
the opinion provided no legal standards for how to make this deter-
mination and, thus, for how to resolve the lack of interest issue. The
Court strongly suggested that the government's statistical evidence
established a prima facie case of discrimination that was Hazelwood's
burden to rebut. 60 Thus, on remand, Hazelwood would have to
produce applicant or other data in the hope of convincing the trial
court that the black share of the applicant pool or some other pool of
potential workers provided a better basis for comparison to its hiring
1972. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(a) (1982)). The Supreme Court agreed that because figures showing
the racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff built in the effect of hiring decisions made
before 1972, the most appropriate figures to review were those showing the racial composition
of teachers the district had hired since 1972. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 3o8-o.
54 See id. at 312 (directing the trial court to consider the extent to which black teachers
employed by the city would prefer working for other school districts such as Hazelwood); id.
at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the city's 5o% goal provided no basis for excluding
it from the relevant labor market because there was no proof that black teachers employed by
the city preferred working there instead of for Hazelwood).
s Blacks constituted only 5.7% of the teachers employed in the county, excluding the city.
See 433 U.S. at 303.
56 Id. at 309.
57 See id. at 310-13.
S8 See id. at 308 n.13, 310, 313 n.21.
59 See id. at 312 ("Only the trial court is in a position to make the appropriate determination
after further findings."); see also id. at 313 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tioday's opinion revolves
around the relative factfinding roles of district courts and courts of appeals.").
60 See 433 U.S. at 3o9-IO (referring to the possibility that Hazelwood might be able to rebut
the "prima facie statistical proof"); see also id. at 314 (Brennan, J., concurring) (interpreting
the majority opinion as holding that the government's statistical proof sufficed to make a prima
facie case); id. at 347-48 (White, J., concurring) (same).
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record than the combined city/county area. 61 Unlike its opinions in
Teamsters and Dothard,62 however, the Court failed to mention in its
instructions to the trial court that an employer's discriminatory prac-
tices may discourage minorities from applying. 63 This omission was
particularly puzzling in light of the evidence of Hazelwood's recent
history of discrimination. By defining the determination of the rele-
vant labor market as a factual issue and by failing to provide clear
guidelines for how to evaluate applicant data, Hazelwood granted the
trial courts the discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
to attribute minorities' underrepresentation to their own failure to
express interest in the work by applying.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's 1977 decisions, the lower
courts have taken divergent approaches to evaluating the lack of
interest issue. The courts of appeals have disagreed, for example,
about the nature of the rebuttal burden to be borne by an employer
once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of classwide disparate
treatment.64 Some have imposed on the employer only the relatively
light burden of "articulating" a nondiscriminatory reason to explain
the apparent statistical disparities65 and have concluded that this
burden is satisfied when employers do little more than present testi-
mony from managers that few women expressed interest in nontra-
ditional jobs. 66 Other courts have imposed on the employer a heavier
burden to rebut the inference of discrimination created by the prima
facie case67 and have insisted that the employer offer more than
61 See id. at 314 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that on remand it would be up to
Hazelwood to "come forward with more focused and specific applicant-flow data in the hope of
answering the Government's prima facie case"); id. at 347-48 (White, J., concurring) (same).
62 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (I977).
63 See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 312 (enumerating five factors that the trial court should
consider).
64 In individual disparate treatment cases, where the inference of discriminatory purpose to
be drawn from the plaintiff's prima facie case is often relatively weak, the Supreme Court has
held that the employer's rebuttal burden is merely that of producing evidence of (or "articulating")
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to explain the plaintiff's unfavorable treatment. The
ultimate burden of persuading the court that it was the plaintiff's race or sex, rather than the
employer's stated reason, that motivated the employer remains on the plaintiff. See Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (I98i); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249,
1268 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 47, U.S. 115 (1985).
65 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 309 (7 th Cir. 1988); Piva v.
Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. i982).
66 In practical terms, this means that the plaintiff must offer convincing proof of women's
interest in order to meet her overall burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Sears, 839 F.2d at 309,
334-38.
67 See, e.g., Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1526-28 (iith Cir. 1985); Segar, 738 F.2d at
1267-70; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 397-404 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part) (holding that the employer may not meet its burden of rebutting a plaintiff's
prima facie case through speculative assertions that factors omitted from the plaintiff's statistical
analyses might explain the apparent disparities on a basis other than race).
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generalized, undocumented assertions that women were less interested
than men in nontraditional jobs. 68 Furthermore, Supreme Court de-
cisions since 1982 have defined the trial court's determination of
whether the employer discriminated as an issue of pure fact subject
to reversal only for clear error.69 These decisions have further solid-
ified the trial court's authority to determine whether patterns of seg-
regation are attributable to employers' discrimination or instead to
women's or minorities" own work preferences. 70
B. Methodology
Because the Supreme Court has delegated to the lower courts the
task of determining the validity of the lack of interest argument, a
historical examination of this issue requires studying lower court de-
cisions. The lower courts are the arenas in which plaintiffs and
employers have contested the meaning of workplace segregation and
from which the formal legal interpretations of that phenomenon have
emanated.
This Article examines these interpretations by analyzing a unique
data set of all published employment discrimination cases since 1965
in which a lower federal court addressed the lack of interest argu-
ment. 71 The data set includes cases raising the argument that women
65 See, e.g., EEOC v. General Tel. Co., 885 F.2d 575, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1989); Palmer v.
Shultz, 8r5 F.2d 84, iox (D.C. Cir. I987).
69 See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1982).
70 See, e.g., Sears, 839 F.2d at 310 (applying this reasoning to conclude that the trial court's
finding with respect to the interest issue is subject to reversal only for clear error).
71 1 searched the following two sources: (i) the Fair Employment Practice Cumulative
Digests, published by the Bureau of National Affairs, Volumes 1-46, covering the period from
1965 to 1987 and (2) the West digests, including the Eighth Decennial Digest, Ninth Decennial
Digest, the General Digest, Sixth Series, Volumes 1-53, and the General Digest, Seventh Series,
Volumes 1-2, together covering the period from 1966 through 1986. Although I searched
systematically for all cases in which the lack of interest argument was raised, I may not have
found every such case. That would raise no methodological problem, however, so long as my
search strategy did not produce a biased selection of cases. There is no reason to suspect that
my search yielded any such bias.
I do not claim that the decisions included in my study are representative of any larger
sample of title VII cases. Published judicial decisions are probably not a random sample of all
judicial decisions. See, e.g., S. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published
Cases (June 8-11, 1989) (unpublished manuscript of a paper presented at the annual meeting
of the Law and Society Association) (suggesting that civil rights cases are overrepresented among
published decisions of federal district courts). In addition, lawsuits tried to judgment are
probably not a random sample of all lawsuits that are filed. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1984). A more complete picture of
"the law" would review the terms of pre-trial settlement agreements, since the overwhelming
majority of lawsuits are settled before they ever reach trial. See Galanter, Reading the Landscape
of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 26, 32 (1983). Furthermore, even filed
lawsuits are a small portion of legally actionable grievances that might have been brought to
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failed to apply for the work at issue, where it is clear that the implicit
premise of this argument was that women failed to apply because
they lack interest in the work. 72 I treat as the unit of analysis not
the entire case, but rather the specific claim or claims of discrimination
in connection with which the lack of interest argument was asserted. 73
The data set includes fifty-four such sex discrimination claims, 74
the first decided in i97275 and the last in 1989.76 The lack of interest
the judicial system. See FeIstiner, Abel & Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . ., 15 LAw & Soc. REv. 631, 636 (198o-z98i); Trubek, Sarat,
Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 85-87
(1983). There is evidence that people who experience employment discrimination grievances are
less likely to take steps to vindicate their rights, including filing lawsuits, than are people who
experience other types of grievances. See B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 141-
42, 146, 262 (1977); see also Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, I5 LAw & Soc. REv. 525, 537, 540-42, 544-45, 563-64 (198o-i98i) (re-
porting the same finding for people who experience discrimination generally).
72 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977); supra pp. 1761-63 (discussing
Dothard).
73 A single employment discrimination lawsuit may of course raise a host of different claims,
ranging from discrimination in hiring, promotion, transfer, or discharge to claims of retaliation
or harassment. In such cases, the employer may assert the lack of interest argument to defend
against one or more of these claims (for example, hiring and promotion), but not all of them
(for example, discharge and retaliation). In cases in which the court analyzed the lack of interest
argument separately as a defense to more than one claim of discrimination, I have included
each claim as a separate "case" for purposes of analysis. The primary justification for doing so
is that the evidence presented on the interest issue is sometimes very different for separate
claims; it would have been impossible to capture the full range of evidence that influenced the
outcomes without including each claim as a separate unit. Furthermore, it seemed methodolog-
ically indefensible to exclude arbitrarily one claim or the other. In any event, the outcomes are
identical regardless of whether all claims or only one claim is included for each case. When all
claims are included, plaintiffs prevail in 57.4% (3I out of 54) of the claims, and when only one
claim is included, plaintiffs prevail in 57.4% (27 out of 47) of the claims.
74 Of the 54 sex discrimination claims analyzed in this study, in 44 (81.5%) the plaintiffs
alleged only sex discrimination in connection with their underlying claim. In five (9.3%) more,
plaintiffs alleged both race and sex discrimination, and the employer tried to defend the sex
claim by asserting that women lack interest, but chose not to defend the race claim by arguing
that minorities do. In the remaining five (9-3%) cases, plaintiffs alleged both race and sex
discrimination, and the employer tried to defend the sex claim by asserting that women lack
interest and tried to defend the race claim by asserting that minorities do. For these last five
cases, only the claims for which employers asserted women's lack of interest are designated sex
claims and included in this study. This analysis shows that women of color face a potential
double risk with respect to the lack of interest argument. As women, they may face the argument
that they lack interest because of their gender; as racial minorities, they may face the argument
that they lack interest because of their race.
75 See Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 140 (W.D.N.C.
1972). The dearth of cases before 1972 is consistent with other studies. See Mills, On the Use
of Equal Employment Laws, 24 PAC. Soc. REV. 196, 201 (i981) (finding that between 1967 and
1972, district courts in five circuits decided only 20 cases alleging any type of sex discrimination
in employment); cf. Stidham, Carp & Rowland, Women's Rights Before the Federal District
Courts, 1971-1977, ii AM. POL. Q. 205, 208 (1983) (limiting a study of federal district court
cases involving sex discrimination of all types to the period between 1971 and 1977, because
"[p]rior to 1971 there were too few women's rights cases to code as a separate case category").
76 See EEOC v. Gen. Tel. Co., 885 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1989).
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argument has been asserted more often in cases alleging classwide
discrimination than in cases alleging individual discrimination. 77 It
has arisen in both dispate treatment and disparate impact cases78 and
in cases brought by federal enforcement agencies as well as private
plaintiffs. 79 Most important, the women whose job interests are ques-
tioned in these cases are not economically privileged. In almost three-
quarters of the claims, women were trying to obtain relatively low-
level blue-collar jobs, mostly in factories.80 Furthermore, even most
of the white-collar jobs women were seeking were not professional or
other high-prestige positions. 8 ' Women of color initiated a number of
the claims.8 2
In Parts I and IV below, I employ different methods for analyz-
ing how courts have treated the lack of interest argument. Part IV
is a study of the rhetoric courts have used to justify their decisions.
Part IlI uses a methodology that is less typical in studies of judicial
77 Of the 54 claims in the study, only eight (14.8%) involved individual claims of discrimi-
nation. Employers typically assert the lack of interest argument in individual cases for the same
reason they do in classwide discrimination cases: to discredit the statistical evidence. In indi-
vidual cases, the plaintiff often introduces statistical evidence to persuade the court that her
treatment was only one instance of a larger pattern of discrimination by the employer. See,
e.g., Davis v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R., 593 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Va. 1984), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 8o3 F.2d 1322 (4 th Cir. 1986).
78 Thirty-nine of the 54 claims (72.2%) alleged disparate treatment, while i5 (27.8%) alleged
disparate impact.
79 Fifteen claims (27.8%) involved government participation by the Department of Justice or
the EEOC, and 39 (72.2%) involved private plaintiffs only.
80 Thirty-nine claims (72.2%) involved blue-collar jobs, while only 15 (27.8%) involved white-
collar jobs. Of the blue-collar claims, over half (22, or 56.4%) involved jobs in factories. The
remaining blue-collar claims (17, or 43.6%) involved laborer jobs with state or local governmental
employers, jobs in the baking or transportation industries, or jobs in law enforcement.
My study includes a higher proportion of blue-collar claims than other studies of sex-based
employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Burstein, Attacking Sex Discrimination in the
Labor Market: A Study in Law and Politics, 67 Soc. FORCES 641, 648 (r989) (finding that only
12.5% of all federal appellate decisions involved plaintiffs in blue-collar and operative occupa-
tions); Mills, supra note 75, at 203 (finding that only 39.8% of a sample of federal trial court
decisions involved blue-collar jobs). This finding may suggest that claims challenging sex
segregation are more likely to involve blue-collar work than other types of claims, or that
employers are more likely to assert the lack of interest defense when blue-collar work is involved.
51 Two of the 15 white-collar claims (I3.3%) involved university faculty jobs, another two
(i3.3%) involved foreign service positions, and one more (6.7%) involved public school admin-
istration. The majority of the white-collar claims involved far less prestigious positions as sales
agents (six out of 15, or 40%) or low-level supervisors (four out of 15, or 26.7%).
82 I attempted to ascertain from each opinion the race and sex of the individual or group of
individuals who initiated the lawsuit (that is, the named plaintiffs in a private class action or
any persons who filed charges of discrimination in cases brought by the government). Six of
the 54 sex claims (ii.i%) appear to have been initiated by minority women, and an equal
number (Ii.I%) by white women. Another claim (x.85%) was initiated by minority women and
men, and one more (I.85%) by minority and white women. For the vast majority of the sex
claims (40 or 74.1%), however, the opinions fail to disclose the race or ethnicity of any individual
women who are identified as having initiated the lawsuit.
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decisionmaking. For each case in the study, I collected information
about the outcome (how the court ruled on the lack of interest argu-
ment and the underlying claim of discrimination) and about three
types of evidence that may have affected the outcome. This infor-
mation allowed me to perform content analyses, which examine the
relationship between the evidence and the outcomes in the aggregate
group of cases. 83 I draw on these quantitative analyses of the cases
to build a theoretical account of how the courts have constructed a
framework for interpreting sex segregation that has limited the law's
capacity to dismantle it.
III. THE JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING
SEX SEGREGATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF How
THE COURTS HAVE DRAWN THE BOUNDARIES
BETWEEN "COERCION" AND "CHOICE"
An analysis of lower court decisions shows that the courts have
relied on two mutually exclusive explanations for sex segregation in
the workplace. The conservative explanation accepts the lack of in-
terest argument and attributes sex segregation to women workers' own
"choice," while the more liberal explanation rejects the lack of interest
argument and attributes segregation to employer "coercion."8 4 Even
though these interpretations lead to different results, the fact that they
are conceptualized as mutually exclusive reveals that they share a
common assumption that women form their choices about work, in-
dependently of employer action or coercion, in private pre-work
realms.
This Part traces how courts have relied on and reinforced that
assumption through their evaluations of the evidence pertaining to the
lack of interest argument. Both conservative and liberal courts have
refused to acknowledge that segregation has arisen because employers
have historically restricted women to lower-paying, female-dominated
jobs. Judges' failure to recognize the influence of historical discrimi-
93 Only a few other scholars have performed content analyses of employment discrimination
cases. None of them has analyzed the relationship between the outcomes and the evidence in
the cases, as I do in this study. See Burstein, supra note 8o; Eisenberg, Litigation Models and
Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989); Mills, supra note
75; P. Burstein, Legal Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for Equal
Employment Opportunity (1988) (unpublished manuscript of a paper presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association); P. Burstein & S. Pitchford, Social-
Scientific and Legal Challenges to Educational Credential and Testing Requirements in Em-
ployment (June 8-11, 1989) (unpublished manuscript of a paper presented at the annual meeting
of the Law and Society Association).
84 Throughout this Article, I use the term "conservative" to refer to courts who have accepted




nation on women's work aspirations has led them to adopt an anti-
institutional, individualistic approach to evaluating evidence and con-
ceptualizing discrimination in sex segregation cases. The definition of
discrimination is limited to takig specific actions to bar women from
exercising what are imagined to be preexisting preferences for nontra-
ditional work. The role of title VII is limited to ensuring that em-
ployers do not place formal barriers in the way of women who have
managed to form and express preferences for nontraditional work
under existing workplace arrangements. To a large extent, however,
the structures of the workworld that disempower most working
women from ever aspiring to nontraditional work are left unexamined.
This approach was not inevitable. Before the first sex discrimi-
nation case raising the lack of interest argument was decided, the
courts had already decided a landmark series of race discrimination
cases addressing the same argument. In these early race discrimina-
tion cases, the courts applied evidentiary standards that presumed
that continuing patterns of racial segregation were attributable to
historical labor market discrimination, rather than to minorities' in-
dependent preferences for lower-paying, less-challenging jobs. This
approach recognized that human choices are never formed in a vac-
uum and that people's work aspirations are inevitably shaped by the
job opportunities that have historically been available to them, as well
as by their experiences in the work structures and relations of which
they have been a part.
I begin by describing the early race discrimination doctrine. My
purpose is not to provide a full history of how the lack of interest
argument has been evaluated in race discrimination cases8 5 or to
suggest a broader comparison of how race and sex discrimination cases
have fared in the courts. 86 It is, rather, to show that there is nothing
85 In a forthcoming piece, I analyze how courts have treated the lack of interest argument
in race discrimination cases over time. Preliminary results suggest that after a twelve-year
period in which courts almost universally rejected employers' attempts to attribute racial seg-
regation to minorities' lack of interest in more remunerative jobs, judges have since 1978 become
increasingly more willing to accept this explanation. See V. Schultz & S. Petterson, Privatizing
Work Preferences: A Study of Outcomes and Evidentiary Approaches in Title VII Cases Chal-
lenging Job Segregation (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). The Supreme Court's
recent decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 21X5 (1989), may provide
enhanced legitimacy for the notion that minorities' underrepresentation in higher-paying work
reflects their own cultural preferences rather than employer discrimination. See id. at 2122-23
(holding that plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing gross
disparities between the proportion of minorities employed in lower-paying and higher-paying
jobs, even where the skills required for the two sets of jobs were the same, because most
minorities did not seek the higher-paying jobs and plaintiffs failed to prove that the employer's
practices discouraged them from doing so); cf. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, ioi HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1379
(1988) (arguing that the new conservative rationalization for black economic disadvantage is
.cultural inferiority").
86 Specifically, I do not intend to suggest that since 1965, plaintiffs have experienced greater
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necessary about the way courts have approached the interest issue in
sex segregation cases, for they had already developed an alternative
approach. The early race discrimination doctrine illustrates what the
courts can accomplish when their historical and political vision con-
vinces them that it is their responsibility to dismantle workplace dis-
crimination.8 7 That the courts have never taken such an approach in
sex discrimination cases is a testimonial to the degree to which judges
have accepted the dominant societal view of women as marginal
workers. This view is linked to the cultural image of women as beings
formed in and for the private domestic sphere, rather than actors
shaped like their male counterparts by and for the public world of
wage work.
A. Early Race Discrimination Doctrine
Between 1967 and 1971, the lower federal courts decided twelve
major cases in which employers argued that African-Americans' or
other minorities' failure to express interest by applying explained their
underrepresentation in more highly paid work traditionally done by
whites. Plaintiffs experienced almost universal success in these
cases. 88 The courts acknowledged that where a historically discrimi-
success in cases challenging race segregation than in cases challenging sex segregation. There
are defenses other than the lack of interest argument available to employers to defend segregation
in their workforces. An employer might contend, for example, that the statistical disparity is
attributable to minorities' or women's relative "lack of qualifications." See Wards Cove, 1O9 S.
Ct. at 2122; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 338-39 (7th Cir. 1988); Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1II5 (I985). Although
my data do not permit me to test this proposition, employers may have used the lack of
qualifications arginment more often to justify racial segregation and the lack of interest argument
more often to justify sex segregation.
87 This vision seems to be receding from the Supreme Court's view. A number of the Court's
recent decisions have cut back on broader approaches to dismantling race- and sex-based
employment discrimination developed by the lower courts. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989); Wards Cove, 1o9 S. Ct. 2115; Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 1o9 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 7o6 (I989);
see also Supreme Court cases cited infra note 318. Nonetheless, the lower courts retain the
authority to determine the validity of the lack of interest argument, and the Court's recent
decisions do not prevent them from taking an approach similar to the one taken in early race
discrimination cases. Indeed, Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam), prohibits
the trial courts from rejecting a plaintiff's statistical analyses based solely on the employer's
speculative assertion that factors omitted from those analyses might explain the disparity on a
neutral basis. See id. at 397-404 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
88 In all but two of the cases, the courts rejected the lack of interest argument outright. See
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 4o6 U.S. 950 (1972); Boudreaux
v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d ioi1 (5th Cir. 197i); Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d
245 (ioth Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes Int'l
Corp., 415 F.2d io38 (5th Cir. 1969); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp.
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natory labor market had relegated minorities to the lowest-paid, most
menial positions, it was legally (and morally) indefensible for employ-
ers to .attempt to attribute racial segregation in their workforces to
minorities' own job preferences.
To counter the lack of interest argument, judges developed a
doctrine that I will call the futility doctrine. This doctrine held that
even if minorities had failed to apply in representative numbers, this
did not signal any lack of interest in the work, but rather a sense of
futility created by the employer's history of discrimination. The fu-
tility doctrine was first articulated in 1967, in Cypress v. Newport
News General & Nonsectarian Hospital Association.8 9 The plaintiffs
sought to bring a class action claim alleging that the hospital was
discriminating on the basis of race in admitting doctors to its medical
staff. The hospital tried to defeat this claim by arguing that only two
black doctors had ever applied for staff privileges and only four had
testified that they were interested in obtaining such privileges. The
Fourth Circuit rejected this defense, stating:
That so few Negro physicians have applied is no indication of a lack
of interest, but indicates, we think, a sense of the futility of such an
effort in the face of the notoriously discriminatory policy of the hos-
pital, and may even reflect a fear of possible reprisals should they
seek to attain their rights. 90
The court held in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that their statis-
tical evidence, coupled with the hospital's unexplained rejection of
two qualified black doctors, created an inference of classwide discrim-
ination that the hospital had failed to rebut. 91
In Cypress there was no evidence that the hospital had ever
adopted an open (or "overt") policy of excluding African-Americans.
Thus, the court might have accepted the hospital's interpretation of
the statistical evidence and attributed the historical absence of African-
Americans to their own lack of interest in joining the hospital's staff.
Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Central Motor Lines, 338 F. Supp. 532
(W.D.N.C. 1971); United States v. Local No. 86, Int'l Ass'n of Bridgeworkers, 3i5 F. Supp.
1202 (W.D. Wash. 197o), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (i971);
United States v. Plumbers Local 73, 314 F. Supp. 16o (S.D. Ind. i969). In the two remaining
cases, plaintiffs won at least a partial victory. See United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 491 F.2d
1105 (5th Cir. 1974) (vacating the district court's decision accepting the lack of interest expla-
nation when at the court of appeals' prompting, the parties entered a consent decree that
substantially revamped the company's hiring practices); Castro v. Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930,
945 (D. Mass. 1971) (attributing minorities' low rate of application in part to their own lack of
interest, but nonetheless ordering the defendant to submit a comprehensive recruiting plan
designed to convince minorities that they were "not only welcome but eagerly sought"), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
89 375 F.2d 648 (4 th Cir. 1967).
90 Id. at 653.
91 See id. at 654-55.
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But the court took judicial notice that this hospital was only one
among many that had long refused to admit black physicians and
that in the context of this history, the concept of "choice" was an
illusion.92
Early courts applied the futility doctrine in a way that acknowl-
edged the history of racial disadvantage in the labor market. Through
their adoption of three approaches to evaluating evidence, the courts
created an almost irrebuttable presumption that any failure by mi-
norities to apply for more desirable jobs was due to the employer's
own historically discriminatory practices. First, as in Cypress, judges
allowed plaintiffs to prove historic discrimination through statistical
evidence alone. If judges had required plaintiffs to prove the existence
of a formal, overt system of racial exclusion, the futility doctrine
would have been of limited use to plaintiffs. Many employers had
implemented segregated systems through informal customs so deeply
ingrained that they did not require being openly stated.93 Courts
acknowledged this phenomenon and attributed statistical disparities
to past discrimination even where plaintiffs produced no "smoking
gun" evidence of a facially discriminatory policy. 94
Second, courts imposed on employers with historically segregated
workforces an affirmative duty to attract minority workers to formerly
segregated jobs. This affirmative duty was implicit in the futility
doctrine itself: if historically discriminatory employers could not de-
fend present patterns of segregation by pointing to minorities' failure
to apply, the employers were under a duty to eliminate the effects of
their own past discrimination by taking steps to attract minority work-
ers. Many courts imposed this affirmative duty explicitly, holding that
employers were required to overcome their "reputations for discrimi-
nation" in the African-American community.95 In other cases, the
duty was triggered by the employer's use of an informal, word-of-
mouth recruiting system, through which incumbent (white) employees
92 See id. at 653 nn.7 & 8.
93 See Hill, Myth-Making as Labor History: Herbert Gutman and the United Mine Workers
of America, 2 INT'L J. POL., CULTURE & SOC'y 132, 136 n.* (1988).
94 Of the 12 early race discrimination cases, at least six involved no proof that the employer
had ever operated an overt system of racial discrimination. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315, 323 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (X972); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1970); Jones v. Leeway Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245, 247
(ioth Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Cypress, 375 F.2d at 653-55; Castro v.
Beecher, 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
459 F.2d 725 (ist Cir. 1972); United States v. Plumbers Local 73, 314 F. Supp. i6o, 161-63
(S.D. Ind. 1969).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 36, 416
F.2d 123, 139 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Central Motor Lines, 338 F. Supp. 532, 551,
559-60 (W.D.N.C. 197); United States v. Local 86, Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp.
1202, 1236 (W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
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passed along job information to other (overwhelmingly white) pro-
spective applicants. 96 Importantly, courts evaluated whether employ-
ers had fulfilled this affirmative duty with reference to results - and
not merely good faith efforts. Employers often tried to exonerate
themselves by claiming that after title VII took effect, they had made
special efforts to recruit minorities into predominantly white jobs.
Courts held that such efforts, however laudable, did not absolve
employers from liability. 97 In cases after case, judges condemned
employers' efforts for "fall[ing] short of what is necessary."9 8
Third, the courts refused to individualize the problem of segrega-
tion. Employers tried to discredit the statistical proof by pointing to
plaintiffs' failure to produce anecdotal evidence showing that individ-
ual minorities had been discriminatorily rejected or discouraged from
applying. The courts concluded, however, that plaintiffs need not
present individual victims of discrimination to refute the argument
that minorities lacked interest in nontraditional work. 99 This ap-
proach followed from judges' recognition of the history of racial dis-
crimination in the labor market. If a people's aspirations have been
formed in the context of historical oppression, it is unreasonable (even
cruel) to ask them to prove that they have not chosen their lot. Thus,
courts presumed that if minorities had always had the same work
opportunities as whites, they would not have chosen their own eco-
nomic disenfranchisement.
Taken as a whole, this body of doctrine reflected a strong judicial
commitment to the view that minorities' work aspirations posed no
impenetrable barrier to their full integration into jobs traditionally
reserved for whites. This commitment, in turn, reflected an under-
96 Early courts were virtually unanimous in concluding that word-of-mouth recruiting systems
were discriminatory because they built upon patterns of racial segregation in non-work realms
to perpetuate segregation in the workplace. See, e.g., Parham, 433 F.2d at 427; Sheet Metal
Workers, 416 F.2d at 139; Central Motor Lines, 338 F. Supp. at 551, 558, 561-62; Ironworkers,
315 F. Supp. at 1225-26, 1237; Plumbers, 3x4 F. Supp. at 163-64.
97 See, e.g., Parham, 433 F.2d at 425, 429 (holding that although the telephone company
had made progress in hiring blacks, the company was still liable and subject to continuing
judicial supervision); Central Motor Lines, 338 F. Supp. at 549-50, 565-66 (holding that
although the trucking company had made extensive efforts to recruit black clericals and had
recently hired black applicants at a higher rate than whites, the company was still liable and
subject to numerical goals and timetables).
98 Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d at 139; accord Jones, 431 F.2d at 248; United States v.
Hayes Intl Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1044 (5th Cir. 1969); Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp. at 1235;
Plumbers, 314 F. Supp. at 163-64.
99 See, e.g., Jones, 431 F.2d at 247 ("True, no specific instances of discrimination have been
shown. However, because of the historically all-white make-up of the Company's [job] category,
it may well be that negroes simply did not bother to apply."); Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d
at 127 (same); see also Carter v Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that presence
of individual victims of discrimination is not required to justify numerical relief), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972).
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lying assumption that minorities' current work interests were neither
permanent or inevitable, but rather only provisional preferences
formed and expressed in the context of a historically racist workworld.
If these work interests had been formed by employers' historically
discriminatory practices, then they could also be altered through em-
ployers' persistent efforts. Courts universally pressed forward in the
belief that employers could "persuade the doubtful and the skeptical
that the discriminatory bars have been removed," 100 and thus free
minorities to aspire to work many had never before dreamed of being
able to do.1°1 By acknowledging that people's work aspirations and
identities are shaped in the context of what larger institutional and
legal environments define as possible, 10 2 early courts refused to allow
employers to escape responsibility for the collective history of labor
market discrimination by pinning the blame on its victims.' 0 3
100 Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d at 139.
101 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. I974) (en
banc), illustrates this perspective. The court held that the relief granted by the district court
was inadequate to eliminate the effects of the Mississippi Highway Patrol's long-standing history
of racial discrimination. The Patrol attempted to excuse its record by arguing that it had hired
every qualified black person who had applied to be a patrol officer. Rejecting this explanation,
the court stated that "[i]f this be true, it is apparent that either the qualifications are discrimi-
natory in effect, or the State has not conducted a sufficient recruitment campaign to enlist
blacks who meet those requirements." Id. at o55-56. The court added:
[We] are not sanguine enough to be of the view that benign recruitment programs can
purge in two years a reputation which discriminatory practices of approximately 30 years
have entrenched in the minds of blacks in Mississippi. . . . Imaginative initiative is
needed from all present members of the Highway Patrol.
Id. at 1056-57.
102 For three eloquent descriptions of how law can express and expand the aspirations of
disempowered groups, see Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong
to Us All," in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 353 (D. Thelen ed. 1988); Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's Movement, 6i N.Y.U. L.
REV. 589 (1986); and Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R_-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
103 This early race discrimination law may, however, have taken sex segregation as a given.
Most of the cases involved jobs held by white men, and the courts probably did not envision
women of color as victims among those who had been discriminatorily denied these jobs. In
one case the Second Circuit vacated a 30% hiring goal because it was based on the entire
population of minorities in the local area, and thus included minority women. Noting casually
that "women have never sought to become steamfitters," the court held: "Absent racial discrim-
ination, . . . the non-white members of the Union would have been drawn from the male
workforce over I8 years of age in the Union's jurisdiction." Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters
Local 638, 5oi F.2d 622, 632 (2d Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). In other cases, minority women
are mentioned only in connection with clerical jobs. See, e.g., United States v. Central Motor
Lines, 338 F. Supp. 532, 548-52 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
A burgeoning new literature discusses other examples of the legal "erasure" of women of
color. See, e.g., Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539; Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Scales-Trent, Black
Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place: Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 9 (1989).
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B. Sex Discrimination Cases
In sex discrimination cases raising the lack of interest argument,
the courts have used a different interpretive framework from the one
used in the early race discrimination cases. This section traces the
framework for interpreting sex segregation. I draw on quantitative
analyses of the outcomes and evidence in the aggregate group of sex
discrimination cases104 as well as close readings of illustrative cases.
i. The Success and Significance of the Lack of Interest Argument.
- Despite the publicity it generated, the outcome of the Sears case
was not unusual. Table i illustrates this point, showing the parties'
success rates on the lack of interest argument in sex discrimination
cases over time.'0 5
TABLE 1:
HISTORICAL SuccEss RATES ON THE LACK OF INTEREST ARGUMENT
Early period Modem period Both periods
1972-77 1978-89 1972-89
P Wins 6 (54.5%) 25 (58.1%) 31 (57.4%)
D Wins 5 (45.5%) 18 (41.9%) 23 (42.6%)
Total 11 (100.0%) 43 (100.0%) 54 (100.0%)
In the entire period from I972 to 1989, plaintiffs have prevailed
on the interest issue in 57.4% of the claims in connection with which
104 Throughout this section I report the results from tests of statistical significance. Because
my search strategy was designed to locate every published decision that addressed the lack of
interest argument, the collection of claims in my study approximates a universe rather than a
sample. Strictly speaking, it is unnecessary to test for statistical significance of the relationship
between variables in a universe, as opposed to a sample, of cases. I report p-values, however,
to give the reader some sense of the relative importance of the variables under consideration.
The p-values may be particularly useful in connection with the analyses which show the
relationship between case outcomes and certain types of evidence. A p-value of .o5 or less
means that the probability that the outcomes would have differed as much as they did across
cases where that evidence was present and absent, by chance alone, is one in 20 or less.
Similarly, a p-value of .io or less shows that the same probability is one in io or less.
The reported p-values were calculated using chi-square tests, unless the numbers were too
small. Where any of the expected cell values in the contingency table was less than five, a
Yates correction was used. Where the total size of the sample was less than 2o, a Fisher's
Exact Test was used. For a very readable description of these tests, see IV. MENDENHALL, L.
OTT & R. LARSON, STATISTICS: A TOOL FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 321-36 (1974).
105 The early period begins in 1972, when the first sex discrimination case raising the lack
of interest argument was decided, and continues through 1977, when the Supreme Court decided
Teamsters, Dothard, and Hazelwood. The modem period spans from 1978 through 1989, when
the last sex discrimination case in my data set was decided.
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it has been asserted. 10 6 Thus, almost half the courts considering the
issue have attributed sex segregation to women's own work prefer-
ences. In addition, outcomes have remained relatively stable over
time,' 0 7 which suggests that the lower courts have not altered their
approach in response to the Supreme Court's 1977 decisions in Teams-
ters, Dothard, and Hazelwood.
Whether one views plaintiffs' victory rate as high or low depends
on one's expectations and standards for comparison. '08 There are few
other studies of outcomes in employment discrimination cases with
which to compare these results. 10 9 Challenges to workplace segrega-
tion, however, go to the core of what we think of as title VII's
protection against sex discrimination. 110 Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
106 The outcomes vary only slightly in individual as opposed to classwide claims of discrim-
ination. Plaintiffs prevailed on the lack of interest argument in 5o% (four out of eight) of the
individual claims and in 58.7% (27 out of 46) of the classwide claims (p = i.o).
107 p = 1.0.
108 Some theoretical work in the sociology of law predicts that disadvantaged groups will
tend to lose legal confrontations with powerful groups having greater resources and better
organizational capability. The classic article is Marc Galanter's Why the 'Haves' Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'" REv. 95 (,974). Other
models of litigation predict that under certain conditions, plaintiffs will win approximately 5o%
of all cases tried to judgment, regardless of whether the legal standard is favorable or unfavorable
to them. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 71, at 4-5. This work suggests caution in
interpreting plaintiffs' success rates in tried cases as evidence of the favor or disfavor with which
they are treated by the legal system, because these success rates do not reveal how the parties
fared in cases settled before trial. See id. For an empirical study examining the extent to which
these models explain success rates in employment discrimination litigation, see Eisenberg, cited
above in note 83.
109 In the only comprehensive study of employment discrimination cases that reports separate
results for sex discrimination cases, Burstein found that plaintiffs won at least a partial victory
in 58% percent of the 672 cases decided by federal appellate courts and published in the Fair
Employment Practices Reporter between 0963 and 1985. See Burstein, supra note 80, at 655-
57; see also Mills, supra note 75, at 206 (finding that plaintiffs won 32% of all sex-based
employment discrimination cases decided by federal district courts in five circuits between 1967
and 1975); cf. Eisenberg, supra note 83, at 1578 (finding that plaintiffs won 22% of employment
discrimination cases decided by the federal district courts between 1978 and 0985, but reporting
no separate results for sex discrimination cases). For a more detailed comparison of success
rates in race and sex discrimination cases raising the lack of interest argument in various
historical periods, see V. Schultz & S. Petterson, cited above in note 85, at 38-52.
110 Those who spoke in favor of the amendment adding the prohibition against sex discrim-
ination to the original 1964 Act focused primarily on the injustice of sex segregation in the labor
market. See, e.g., 1o CONG. REc. 2579-80, 2580-81 (1964) (remarks of Reps. Griffiths and
St. George). Moreover, when Congress amended title VII in 1972, both the House and the
Senate made clear that they considered sex segregation to be the primary evil that the statute
was designed to address. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2140 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] ("[W]omen
are placed in the less challenging, the less responsible and the less remunerative positions on
the basis of their sex alone. Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objectionable in
view of the fact that Title VII has specifically prohibited sex discrimination since its enactment
in x964."); S. REp. No. 415, 92nd Cong., ist Sess. 7 (,971) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]
(including similar statements).
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ine what title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination was intended
to cover if not the relegation of women to lower-paid, lower-status,
dead-end jobs."' If dismantling sex segregation is at the heart of title
Vii's protection of women, the success of the lack of interest defense
is directly counter to that vision. This defense is virtually never
supported by direct evidence. Instead, employers who assert it ask
courts to make broad assumptions about women as a group with
respect to an intangible quality that eludes objective measurement
(their "interest" in the work)." 2 Thus, courts embracing the lack of
interest explanation seem to engage in precisely the sort of undocu-
mented generalizations about women that title VII was designed to
prohibit. 113
Employers have been willing not only to advance this justification,
but also to state it in the most blatant form possible. They have
framed the lack of interest argument in two different ways. In the
weaker form of the argument (the "lack of applicants" argument), the
employer asserts only that women have underapplied, leaving the
court to fill in the unstated assumption that women have failed to
apply because they lack interest in the work. 114 In the stronger form,
"I Even those who take the position that title VII should not be interpreted to require pay
equity argue that the way to eliminate the male-female wage disparity is to enforce title VII
and the Equal Pay Act of 2963, 29 U.S.C. § 2o6(d) (1982), vigorously to ensure that women
are integrated into nontraditional jobs and that they are paid the same as men in those jobs.
See, e.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. fllinois, 783 F.2d 716, 730 (7th Cir. 1986); Abram,
Concurring Statement of Morris B. Abram, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE
WORTH: AN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 76, 77 (r985) [hereinafter COMPARABLE
WORTH]; Pendleton, Concurring Statement of Clarence Pendleton, Jr., in COMPARABLE WORTH,
supra, at 73, 75.
112 Employers sometimes try to substantiate the lack of interest argument with data showing
that women have underapplied for the work relative to their representation in the relevant labor
market. But as Dothard, Teamsters, and the early race discrimination cases teach, applicant
data do not "prove" anything about women's relative interest in the work. One needs to know
why women were less likely than men to apply.
113 The only other defense that draws on these sorts of broad generalizations is the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense permitted under § 7o3(e) of title VIII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2oooe-2(e) (1982). With the BFOQ defense, the employer seeks to justify an overt policy of
excluding all women by proving that "all or substantially all women would be unable to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved," Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969), or that "the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively." Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways,
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1972);
accord Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (2977) (citing both the Weeks and Diaz
formulations approvingly). Although there are no studies showing how often employers succeed
in establishing the BFOQ defense, the perception is that the courts have accepted it only
infrequently. See, e.g., B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 341,
353 (2d ed. 1983). Courts have held that the BFOQ defense is to be interpreted narrowly
precisely because it draws upon the sort of broad generalizations about women that title VII
was intended to prohibit. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333-34; Diaz, 442 F.2d at 387;
Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235.
114 See, e.g., Piva v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1981); Hill v. Western Elec.
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however, the employer states explicitly that women are not interested
in nontraditional work and that they actually prefer lower-paid, lower-
status, traditionally female jobs. 115 Although both forms of the ar-
gument are premised on the same set of assumptions, there is a
rhetorical distinction between the two. In its weaker form, the ar-
gument masquerades as a mere observation of statistical "fact": "We
don't know why, but women simply aren't applying for this work."
But in its stronger form, the argument is cast in terms of an almost
ontological description of the "reality" of women's nature: "Women
prefer traditional over nontraditional jobs, and (of course) we know
why. It's because they are women."
One might have expected employers to prefer the weaker form,
since it obscures the appeal to generalizations about the intrinsic
preferences of "women as a group." But in the overwhelming majority
of cases - 79.6% (forty-three out of fifty-four) of the claims in my
study - employers framed the argument in its stronger form. Fur-
thermore, judges have not penalized employers for making the argu-
ment in its stronger form. Courts accepted the argument in 41.9%
(eighteen out of forty-three) of the cases in which employers framed
it in the stronger form, and in 45.5% (five out of eleven) of the cases
in which employers framed it in the weaker form. 116 Thus, employers
have had little to fear in arguing openly that women have chosen
their own economic disenfranchisement. 117
Whatever the form in which it is framed, the lack of interest
argument is of central importance in the cases in which it is raised.
Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1175, 1179-8o (E.D. Va. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979).
11s See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1305 (N.D. ]M. 1986),
aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. i988); EEOC v. Mead Foods, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Okla.
1977); Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 140, 144 (W.D.N.C.
1972).
116 p = i.O.
117 Indeed, in Sears, defense lawyer Charles Morgan went so far as to argue in his summation
that it is ridiculous to suggest that sex discrimination even exists. "Strange, isn't it," said
Morgan, "that we live in a world where there is supposed to be a monopoly of white men who
somehow get up every morning trying to find a way to discriminate against their wives, their
daughters, their mothers, their sisters." Closing Argument, Trial Transcript at i9,o64, EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. i986) (No. 79-C-4373). Of course, if
sex discrimination does not exist, it follows that women have chosen their lot in life, including
their "place" at work.
That many judges have condoned such arguments suggests that they may share with em-
ployers and defense attorneys the dominant cultural image of women as marginal workers. As
a counter-vision, one can imagine a world in which judges would consider employers' willingness
to argue that women "choose" to segregate themselves into the lowest-paying, most menial jobs
as itself evidence of a sexually discriminatory attitude. Cf. Arnold v. Ray, 21 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 793, 795 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (finding that the "most telling piece of evidence" of




As Table 2 shows, 1 8 success on the interest issue is significantly
associated with success on the underlying sex discrimination claim. 119
TABLE 2:
THE RELATION BETWEEN SUCCESS ON THE LACK OF INTEREST
ARGUMENT AND SUCCESS ON THE UNDERLYING CLAIM
P wins on D wins on
interest interest
argument argument Total
P wins on 28 (90.3%) 0 (0.0%) 28 (51.9%)
underlying
claim
D wins on 0 (0.0%) 20 (87.0%) 20 (37.0%)
underlying
claim
Neither party 3 (9.7%) 3 (13.0%) 6 (11.1%)
wins
Total 31 (100.0%) 23 (100.0%) 54 (100.0%)
The results in the third column are not surprising. Because the
lack of interest explanation is a complete defense to liability, plaintiffs
cannot win their sex discrimination claims unless they prevail on the
interest issue. In addition, the second column shows that there was
not a single instance in which plaintiffs won on the interest issue but
lost on the underlying claim. This result is surprising, because the
lack of interest argument is only one defense employers might advance
to justify women's underrepresentation. Perhaps many employers (and
their lawyers) did not seriously investigate any alternative explana-
tions, because dominant cultural norms had so deeply shaped their
views that it did not occur to them to view sex segregation as anything
11s The "neither party wins" category includes four cases in which the court of appeals
remanded the underlying claim to the trial court for further consideration so that neither party
achieved a clear victory, as well as two cases in which the interest issue was raised during the
remedial phase of the litigation so that the discrimination claim was no longer at issue. In the
two remedy cases, the employers urged women's lack of interest in an attempt to persuade the
courts that there was no need to impose numerical relief. See United States v. Virginia, 22
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 936, 939 (E.D. Va. 1978); Jordan v. Wright, 47 F. Supp. 42,
45 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
119 p = .0000.
178o [Vol. 103:I749
TELLING STORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND WORK
other than the expression of women's own choice. 120 Whatever the
explanation, the centrality of the lack of interest argument in these
cases is clear. The contest over the legality of segregation focuses on
the struggle over its interpretation.
2. The Relation Between Three Types of Evidence and the Success
of the Lack of Interest Argument. - If some courts have attributed
sex segregation to employer "coercion" and others have attributed it
instead to women's own "choice," how have judges decided which of
these two competing explanations to adopt in particular cases? In
ruling on any legal issue, courts consider the evidence introduced by
the parties. Judges' evaluations of the evidence - their assessments
of what types of evidence are more and less probative of the issue -
create the legal -framework for analyzing that issue. In the sections
that follow, I examine how judges have evaluated the three major
types of evidence presented in connection with the lack of interest
issue. First, there is plaintiffs' evidence that the employer discrimi-
nated in the past, before the liability period began ("evidence of past
discrimination"). Second, there is employers' evidence that they made
special efforts to attract women to nontraditional work ("evidence of
special efforts"). Third, there is plaintiffs' evidence that the employer
discriminatorily rejected individual women or discouraged them from
even applying ("anecdotal evidence"). Although these three types of
evidence were also central to judicial discussion in the early race
discrimination cases, judges have responded to this evidence differ-
ently in sex discrimination cases. Through their responses, the courts
have drawn the boundaries between the coercion and choice expla-
nations for sex segregation in a way that limits title VI's capacity to
address it.
(a) Evidence of Past Employer Discrimination. - Drawing on the
early race discrimination doctrine, plaintiffs in sex discrimination have
tried to place women's "interest" in nontraditional work within the
larger context of historical employer discrimination. In almost two-
thirds of the cases - 64.8% (thirty-five out of fifty-four) of the claims
in my study - plaintiffs presented evidence suggesting that the em-
ployer had discriminatorily segregated jobs by sex before the liability
period began. In doing so, plaintiffs hoped to invoke the futility
120 This is only one possible explanation for the observed pattern. In some cases, it may be
that there simply were no plausible alternative explanations for women's underrepresentation;
pre-trial discovery may have shown, for example, that the women were as well qualified as the
men. In other cases, employers may have asserted defenses other than women's lack of interest,
but the same evidence and attitudes that led courts to reject the interest argument led them to
reject the alternative explanations as well. See, e.g., Kilgo v. Bowman Transp. Co., 57o F.
Supp. 15o9, 1517, 1526-28 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (rejecting the lack of qualifications defense on the
ground that the company's experience requirement was a pretext for discrimination intended to
discourage females from applying, and finding that this and other evidence of discouragement
also invalidated the lack of interest defense), aff'd, 789 F. 2d 859 (iith Cir. 1986).
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doctrine, which attributes protected class members' failure to pursue
historically segregated jobs to a sense of futility created by the em-
ployers' past discrimination, rather than to a lack of interest.
In sex discrimination cases, however, evidence of past discrimi-
nation has not led courts to apply the futility doctrine, as Table 3
illustrates.
TABLE 3:
THE RELATION BETWEEN EVIDENCE OF PAST DISCRIMINATION AND
THE SUCCESS OF THE LACK OF INTEREST ARGUMENT
Evidence of past No evidence of past
discrimination discrimination
P wins 17 (48.6%) 14 (73.7%)
D wins 18 (51.4%) 5 (26.3%)
Total 35 (100.0%) 19 (100.0%)
Plaintiffs have been no more likely to persuade judges to reject
the lack of interest argument in cases in which they presented evidence
of past discrimination than in cases in which they did not.' 2 ' In fact,
the opposite was true. Plaintiffs were less likely to win on the interest
issue when they introduced evidence of past discrimination than when
they introduced no such evidence. This result is the opposite of the
one we would expect if courts had relied on the futility doctrine to
reject the lack of interest argument.
One might speculate that plaintiffs were more successful in cases
in which they did not present evidence of past discrimination because
in such cases, they were more likely to introduce other evidence more
favorable to them, such as anecdotal evidence that the employer
discriminated during the more recent liability period. Alternatively,
one might speculate that plaintiffs were less successful in cases in-
volving evidence of past discrimination because employers who had
discriminated historically were more likely to have compensated for
their past records by making special efforts to attract women during
the more recent period. Although either of these speculations might
explain why evidence of past discrimination did not increase plaintiffs'
likelihood of winning, neither is borne out by data. Regardless of
whether plaintiffs introduced anecdotal evidence of discrimination and
regardless of whether employers introduced evidence of special efforts,
121 p = .07.
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plaintiffs remained no more likely to win in cases in which they
presented evidence of past discrimination than in cases in which they
did not.122
How, then, are we to explain why evidence of past employer
discrimination has not helped plaintiffs persuade courts to reject the
lack of interest argument? Part of the answer lies in the type of
evidence presented to prove past discrimination. Courts have been
far less willing to find that employers engaged in past discrimination
from statistical evidence than from direct or anecdotal evidence sug-
gesting the same history. 123 Furthermore, there is a strong association
between judges' willingness to infer past discrimination from statistical
evidence and their willingness to attribute present patterns of segre-
gation to discrimination. Whereas all of the judges who were willing
to infer past discrimination from statistical evidence alone rejected the
lack of interest argument, almost all of those who refused to make
such a finding from statistical proof accepted that argument. 124
122 The relationship between evidence of past discrimination and outcome observed in Table
3 remains even after controlling for the presence or absence of anecdotal evidence of discrimi-
nation. In cases in which anecdotal evidence was introduced, plaintiffs won only 61.9% (13
out of 2 1) of the cases in which they presented evidence of past discrimination, compared to
81.8% (nine out of ii) of the cases in which they did not. Similarly, in cases in which no
anecdotal evidence was introduced, plaintiffs won only 28.6% (four out of 14) of the cases in
which they presented evidence of past discrimination, compared to 62.5% (five out of eight) of
the cases in which they did not.
The relationship between evidence of past discrimination and outcome in Table 3 also
remains after controlling for the presence or absence of evidence of special efforts. In cases in
which evidence of special efforts was introduced, plaintiffs won only 28.6% (four out of 14) of
the cases in which they presented evidence of past discrimination, compared to 71.4% (five out
of seven) of the cases in which they did not. Similarly, in cases in which no evidence of special
efforts was introduced, plaintiffs won only 61.9% (13 out of 21) of the cases in which they
presented evidence of past discrimination, compared to 75.0% (nine out of 12) of the cases in
which they did not.
These analyses do not control for possible interaction among all three types of evidence. A
separate logistic regression analysis showed, however, that even after controlling simultaneously
for anecdotal evidence and evidence of special efforts, evidence of past discrimination still
decreased plaintiffs' likelihood of winning. The T-ratio for the evidence of past discrimination
variable was -1.837, with a corresponding p-vaue of .07.
123 Of the ii claims for which plaintiffs presented direct or anecdotal evidence of past
discrimination, the courts found in all ii (ioo%) that the employer had engaged in past
discrimination. But of the 24 claims for which plaintiffs relied on statistical evidence alone,
courts found in only 11 (45.8%) that the employer had engaged in past discrimination (p =
.0069).
Statistical evidence of past discrimination is no different from statistical evidence of current
discrimination, except that it covers the time preceding the liability period. Typically, the
plaintiff will show that, until a certain date, the employer hired no women at all (or only a few
women) for nontraditional jobs.
124 More precisely, all ii (ioo%) of the courts who inferred past employer discrimination
from statistical evidence alone rejected the interest argument, and 12 out of 13 (92.3%) of those




Evidence of past discrimination has not helped sex discrimination
plaintiffs partly because conservative 125 courts have refused to attri-
bute to past employer discrimination even egregious, long-standing
patterns of sex segregation revealed by statistical evidence. Instead,
conservative courts have interpreted these historical patterns as the
expression of women's own past "choices" - just as they interpret
present patterns as the expression of women's current "choices." In
EEOC v. Mead Foods, Inc., 126 for example, the EEOC sued a South-
western company whose five bakeries were highly segregated by sex.
The statistical evidence showed that this segregation reached far into
the past. In eighty percent of its entry-level jobs, the company had
never employed any women (or had employed only a few). 127 The
company had hired women instead for its lower-paid, heavily female
jobs. When the company tried to justify these disparities by arguing
that women had always found the higher-paying jobs unappealing, 128
the court accepted this explanation, stating: "[C]ommon practical
knowledge tells us that certain work in a bakery operation is not
attractive to females. This is a fact of life that an Act of Congress
cannot overcome .... ))129
Similarly, EEOC v. Korn Industries130 involved a South Carolina
furniture manufacturer whose workforce was highly segregated by sex
and race. Based on the statistical evidence alone, the court had little
trouble concluding that the company was discriminating on the basis
of race. 131 The court refused, however, to draw an inference of sex
discrimination from similar evidence showing a long-standing pattern
of sex segregation. 132 The judge attributed this pattern instead to
women's own historical preferences, stating: "There has been no show-
ing that any female has ever wanted to work for the Hardwood
Division. . . . Although the plaintiff may call this stereotype female
classification, the Court has not seen females clamoring to work in
such jobs . . "133
12S I use the term "conservative" here to refer generally to courts that have accepted the lack
of interest argument. I also use it more specifically here to refer to courts that refused to infer
past employer discrimination from statistical evidence. Although not all courts that accepted
the interest argument were presented with statistical evidence of past discrimination, part of
what leads courts to attribute present patterns of segregation to women's choice is a vision of
an uninterrupted history in which women have always been free to choose whatever work they
wanted.
126 466 F. Supp. i (W.D. Okla. 1977).
127 Id. at 3-4.
128 Id. at 2-3.
129 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
130 i7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 954 (D.S.C. I978), aff'd on other grounds and remanded,
662 F.2d 256 (4 th Cir. ig8x).
131 See id. at 959.
132 The company had never hired a single woman for its hardwood division and had
employed women in only five of nine job categories in its cabinet division. See id. at 958.
133 Id. at 959. The court's refusal to find sex discrimination is particularly disturbing because
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Given that the employers in Mead and Korn had never hired
women for nontraditional jobs, the courts in both cases could easily
have found that both employers had engaged in past discrimination.
The courts could then have invoked the futility doctrine to reject the
employers' suggestions that women's failure to pursue the jobs was
attributable to some timeless set of "feminine" preferences unrelated
to their historical experience of discrimination. That these and other
conservative courts were unwilling to take this approach reveals their
view of the history of women's experience in the labor market. They
were not only hostile to, but also incredulous at, the suggestion that
sex segregation exists because employers have historically imposed it
on women.
While conservative courts have refused to recognize the history of
sex discrimination in the labor market, even more liberal134 courts
who have acknowledged this history have not relied on the futility
doctrine to counter the lack of interest argument. Although courts
rejected the interest argument in sixteen of the twenty-two cases in
which they found past employer discrimination, few of these courts
drew on the employer's past record to explain women's present failure
to apply. 135 Indeed, in most of these cases, judges seemed to mention
the employer's history of discrimination only in passing.
Liberal courts recognize that employers historically discriminated
against women, but they are skeptical that past generations of women
would have wanted to work in nontraditional jobs even if employers
had permitted them to do so. In Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 136
for example, the Fifth Circuit first concluded that a Louisiana drug-
the EEOC had alleged not only that the company was segregating its jobs by race and sex, but
also that it was discriminating specifically against black women. See id. at 955. The court's
rulings prohibited the company from denying black men access to the higher-graded jobs held
by white men, but they left the company free to exclude black (and other) women from the
same jobs.
134 1 am using the term "liberal" here to refer to courts who have rejected the lack of interest
argument, as I do throughout the Article. As shown earlier, though, there is a significant
relationship between judges' willingness to reject the lack of interest explanation and their
willingness to infer past employer discrimination from statistical evidence alone. See supra note
124 and accompanying text.
13s Only one court has explicitly invoked the principle that an employer has an affirmative
duty to correct for past discrimination by attracting women to the jobs from which they formerly
had been excluded. See Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 262 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
In a few additional cases, courts did not invoke this affirmative duty, but nonetheless seemed
to place women's current interest in nontraditional jobs in the context of the employer's historical
discrimination. See Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 6ii, 618 (6th Cir.) ("[The police department's]
policies had been engraved in stone since the 192o's. Every woman on the police force and
every woman interested in becoming a member of [the force] knew her restricted role."), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 872 (i98o); Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147, ii5o, 1161-62 (D.D.C.
1979) (citing the history of sex discrimination in the bookbinder industry to explain women's
diminished interest in the craft), aff'd sub norm. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir.
x982).
136 711 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984).
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store chain had discriminatorily denied women managerial positions
between 1965 and 1972.137 Emphasizing that the drugstore had placed
male-only advertisements for managers, the court held that the com-
pany's assertion that women lacked interest in management could not
excuse its failure to hire a single woman during this early period. 138
In a second ruling, however, the court accepted the same lack of
interest argument to justify women's continuing underrepresentation
from 1973 to I977.139 Remarkably, the court failed even to discuss
whether the company's proven history of discrimination might have
dissuaded women from seeking management jobs during the more
recent period. Apparently the judges did not really believe that many
women would have aspired to management even if the drugstore had
always welcomed them. 140 Thus, when the company lifted the formal
barriers and hired a few token women, the court was all too ready to
assume that women's historical disinclination toward responsible, up-
per-level jobs accounted for the remaining disparity.
Similarly, in Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Com-
mission,141 the statistical evidence showed that, until 1976, the state
of Missouri had never hired a single woman for its road "mainte-
nanceman" job and women in the local labor force continued to be
significantly underrepresented. 142 When the state argued that this
evidence was insufficient to establish discrimination because few
women had expressed interest in the job by applying, the Eighth
Circuit rejected this defense and held that the district court had
properly refused to rely on applicant data. 143 In analyzing the issue,
however, the court failed to mention that the state's long history of
excluding women may have discouraged them from applying for road
maintenance work. 14 4 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit vacated the
137 See id. at 662.
138 See id. at 653, 66o-6i. The company tried to excuse its sexually discriminatory adver-
tising by emphasizing that a female personnel officer had placed the ads and that she had not
intended to discriminate against women. When asked at trial why she placed the ads in the
male-only section of the newspaper, the personnel manager replied: "'Well, that was because
managers were always males. So, I put it in the male column.'" Id. at 66o.
139 Between 1973 and 1977, women were only 9.2% of those the company hired as managers.
See id. at 652. By the Fifth Circuit's own account, "[t]he results of [plaintiff's statistical] tests
. . . consistently showed the probability of such disparate hiring occurring by chance to be less
than one in io,ooo." Id.
140 Indeed, the court emphasized that the company had hired zero women during the early
1965-1972 period, and observed that hiring even two or three women would have gone a long
way toward showing the company's "willingness to consider women as equals in firm manage-
ment." Id. at 662.
141 828 F.2d 126o (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988).
142 See Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 589 F. Supp. 929, 933-34 (V.D.
Mo. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 126o (8th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (x988).
143 See Catlett, 828 F.2d at 1266.
144 Evidence in the record directly tied the low number of female applicants to the state's
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district court's award of numerical relief, holding that the state's past
record failed to justify such relief and concluding that there was no
need for the trial court even to maintain jurisdiction to ensure that
the state ceased its discriminatory practices.145 The court of appeals
seemed to believe that once the plaintiffs had made the state aware
of women's interest in road maintenance jobs, Missouri would vol-
untarily place women in those jobs without any judicial supervision. 146
There is a distinction in the historical sensibilities of conservative
and liberal courts, but it is a distinction without a difference. In the
conservative approach, women have always had a timeless set of
"feminine" attributes that include a preference for traditionally female
work. This conservative vision is ultimately ahistorical, for history
reveals only the expression of an unchanging "truth" that gender and
gendered work aspirations are so deeply ingrained that they may be
considered part of human nature. The liberal approach is more com-
plex. Even apparently sympathetic liberal judges who reject the idea
that contemporary women "choose" female-dominated work have been
unwilling to abandon the notion that women of the past did "choose"
such work. The liberal approach thus rests on a story of historical
progress that imagines a "modern" woman who has emerged only
since the passage of title VII and whose aspirations for nontraditional
work represent a sharp break from those of most women in the past.
Unlike the conservative vision, the liberal one is not completely ahis-
torical, for it acknowledges implicitly that human consciousness is
subject to historical influences and change. But it attributes the his-
torical change in women's work aspirations not to changed labor
market conditions, but rather to other, unspecified "societal" influ-
ences.
The liberal approach ultimately converges with the conservative
one for title VII purposes. Neither clearly acknowledges the influence
of historical labor market discrimination on the formation of working
women's job aspirations. 147 Conservatives and liberals alike have
historical hiring practices. With each additional woman hired, the state experienced an increase
in applications from women. In 1975, before the state had hired a single woman as a road
maintenance worker, only nine women applied for the job. In 1976, when the state hired its
first woman, the number of women applicants rose to i6. In 1977, when the State hired two
more women, the number of women applicants rose to 55. In 1978, when the State hired five
more women, the number of women applicants rose to 120. See Catlett, 589 F. Supp. at 934.
145 See Catlett, 828 F.2d at 1268-69.
146 The district court had explicitly rejected this position: "While defendants argue that their
voluntary efforts in changing their hiring practices are enough to preclude additional affirmative
relief, the Court finds the long history of discrimination and the comparatively short history of
attempts to end such discrimination warrant further measures . . ." Catlett, 589 F. Supp. at
1020.
147 Indeed, one cannot always distinguish clearly between the two approaches in judicial
decisions. There is slippage between the view that women aspire to "women's work" because
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found implausible the proposition that sex segregation exists because
employers have historically reserved higher-paying jobs for men and
restricted women to lower-paying, less desirable jobs. It is unclear
why judges have adopted this view, for it denies the primary reason
women needed title Vii's protection. The history of employer discrim-
ination relegating women to female-dominated jobs is well docu-
mented. 148 Furthermore, although the prohibition against sex discrim-
ination began with an inauspicious "story of origins' 49 - the popular
perception of the congressional motivation for adding it to the original
1964 bill is that it was a "joke," a last-ditch effort by opponents to
defeat the legislation 50 - Congress made clear when it amended title
VII in 1972 that sex segregation is a serious form of employment
discrimination that courts are to treat with the same degree of concern
as all other forms of discrimination.'15
they are women and the view that women aspire to "women's work" because society has
socialized them to be women. The allegedly more historical liberal approach converges with
the ahistorical, conservative approach insofar as both approaches attribute the historical change
in women's work aspirations to "societal" forces that are so vague and ill-identified as to
constitute essentialist explanations for women's experience and work consciousness. This slip-
page is analogous to that observed in some cultural feminist work. See Schultz, Room to
Maneuver (f)or a Room of One's Own? Practice Theory and Feminist Practice, 14 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 123, 128 (1989); Scott, Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis, 91 AM. HIST.
REV. 1053, 1o65 (1986).
148 For examples of recent work documenting the history of labor market discrimination
against women, see P. FoNER, cited above in note 20; M. GREENWALD, WOMEN, WAR, AND
Woax: THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR I ON WOMEN WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1980);
J. JONES, cited above in note i7; S. KENNEDY, cited above in note i9; A. KESSLER-HARRiS,
cited above in note I9; and R. MILKmAN, GENDER AT WORK: THE DYNAMICS OF JOB SEG-
REGATION BY SEX DURING WORLD WAR 11 (1987).
149 1 borrow this phrase from Richard Delgado, who borrowed it from Milner Ball. See
Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't Compute, 1989
WIs. L. REv. 579, 580 & n.6 (citing Ball, Stories of Origins and Constitutional Possibilities,
87 MICH. L. REv. 228o (I989)). Here the "story of origins" refers to the constitutive myths and
ideals we ascribe both to title VIrs ban on sex discrimination, and to ourselves as a nation and
as a people in having enacted the legislation.
150 See, e.g., C. BIRD, BORN FEMALE (x968); A. SMITH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 327 (1978); Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of r964, 84 HARv. L. REV. IXO9, 1167 (1971). At least one scholar has
challenged this view. See Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex
to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, i9 DUQ. L. REV. 453,
457-69 (i981) (arguing that even if members of Congress who introduced the amendment adding
sex did so for the purpose of trying to defeat the bill, the majority of Congress did not have
that motivation when they approved the amendment).
151 For sources showing that Congress considered sex segregation to be a primary evil that
title VII was intended to address, see note 1io above. For sources showing that Congress
intended the courts to treat sex discrimination with the same seriousness as discrimination on
other grounds, see SENATE REPORT, cited above in note iio, at 7 ("While some have looked at
• ..women's rights as a frivolous divertissement, this Committee believes that discrimination
against women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination, and that it is to
be accorded the same degree of concern given to any type of similarly unlawful conduct."); and
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The courts' failure to confront the history of sex discrimination in
the labor market has drained judicial decisions of passion and moral
vision. Like any civil rights statute, title VI's prohibition of sex
discrimination has meaning only if it is understood to symbolize a
nation's shared commitment to ending a history of oppression for a
disadvantaged group. In the absence of any recognition that women's
work aspirations have been shaped collectively and historically by
their experience of coercion in the workworld, courts have viewed
women's work preferences as formed freely and individually within
private pre-work realms.
(b) Evidence of Special Efforts. - The courts' anti-historical view
has led them to accept uncritically employers' assertions th at their
efforts to attract women to nontraditional work failed due to women's
lack of interest. In the early race discrimination cases, the same
historical perspective that led courts to impose an affirmative duty to
correct for past discrimination led them to evaluate employers' claimed
efforts to attract minorities critically, with an eye toward results. But
in sex discrimination cases, the courts' failure to place women's
"interest" in the context of past discrimination has prevented them
from invoking the futility doctrine or the accompanying duty to
attract women to historically segregated jobs.152 In this climate, em-
ployers have been able to bolster the lack of interest argument by
claiming that they made special efforts to recruit women for male-
dominated jobs. Table 4 illustrates this pattern.
HOUSE REPORT, cited above in note iio, at 5, which contains similar statements. See also
Barnes v. Costle, 56I F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concluding that "Congress was deeply
concerned about employment discrimination based on gender, and intended to combat it as
vigorously as any other type of forbidden discrimination").
1S2 By refusing to infer from statistical evidence that employers even engaged in past dis-
crimination, many courts have eliminated the factual foundation for invoking the futility doctrine
and the accompanying affirmative duty in sex discrimination cases. In some cases, judges have
accompanied their refusal to find past discrimination with explicit announcements that title VII
does not require employers to make any efforts to recruit women. See, e.g., Gilbert v. East
Bay Mun. Dist., ig Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 304, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("Defendant was
under no obligation to affirmatively solicit female applicants for these supervisory positions.");
EEOC v. Korn Indus., I7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 954, 959 (D.S.C. 5978) ("There is no
obligation on the defendant to waste its time and money trying to find women of extraordinary
size, strength, and stamina."), aff'd on other grounds and remanded, 662 F.2d 256 (4 th Cir.
i981). Some courts have gone even farther and held that even if the employer discriminated
against women in the recent past, title VII still does not require the employer to correct for that
discrimination by taking affirmative steps to attract women to formerly segregated jobs. See,
e.g., Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 65o F.2d 395, 403-04 (2d Cir. 198i); Lewis v. Tobacco





THE RELATION BETWEEN EVIDENCE OF SPECIAL EFFORTS AND THE
SUCCESS OF THE LACK OF INTEREST ARGUMENT
Special efforts No special efforts
P wins 9 (42.9%) 22 (66.7%)
D wins 12 (57.1%) 11 (33.3%)
Total 21(100.0%) 33 (100.0%)
Courts have been far more likely to credit the lack of interest
explanation in cases in which employers asserted that they made
special efforts to attract women to nontraditional jobs than in cases
in which they did not.153 To assess the significance of this pattern
one should understand the nature of the "special efforts" employers
claimed to have made. In the vast majority of cases, employers'
efforts fell far short of what is encompassed in a traditional affirmative
action plan.15 4
Not even a written affirmative action plan guaranteed that an
employer was serious about trying to integrate women into nontradi-
tional work, as Parker v. Siemens-Allis, Inc.,155 illustrates. The case
involved a female employee's allegations that a small motor manufac-
turer in Little Rock was discriminating against women by relegating
them to lower-paid jobs in the electrical department, while reserving
the higher-paid machine shop jobs for men. 15 6 The statistical evidence
showed that as late as 198o, the machine shop remained ninety-five
percent male, while the electrical department was eight-five percent
female.I5 7 The company tried to defend these disparities by asserting
that women were not interested in working in the machine shop.
Unfortunately for the company, however, its equal employment op-
portunity officer had been sufficiently naive to acknowledge this ex-
153 p = .08. A logistic regression analysis showed that, even after controlling simultaneously
for evidence of past discrimination and anecdotal evidence, evidence of special efforts increased
employers' likelihood of prevailing. (The T-ratio for the evidence of special efforts variable was
-1.524, with a corresponding p-value of .13.)
IS4 Of the 2I claims of special efforts, in only seven (33.3%) had the employers promulgated
written affirmative action plans that appeared to include goals and timetables for women. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. x264, 1292-94 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839
F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
51, 52 (W.D. Mo. ig8o); United States v. County of Fairfax, x9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
753, 758, 760 (E.D. Va. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 629 F.2d 932 (4 th Cir. i98o), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1979 (ig8i).
Iss 6oi F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
156 See id. at 1378-79.
157 See id. at 1379.
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planation in the company's affirmative action plan, which stated the
following justification for why it was not discriminatory to assign
women to electrical winding work: "'There are some things about the
job that appeal to the females such as: clean working conditions,
routine work, which once learned, gives the female the opportunity
to plan the family budget, menu and other responsibilities directly
related to family ties.""15 8 The court found this plan to be a per se
violation of title VII and held the company liable. 159
Parker is an extreme example, 160 but it is only one end of a
spectrum. These employers claimed that women's failure to respond
to their recruiting efforts proved that women lacked interest in non-
traditional work. Yet, of the twenty-one employers who claimed to
have tried to "woo" women into nontraditional jobs, not one presented
documentation that women had declined actual job offers at a higher
rate than men. Indeed, only a few employers offered any data at all
to support their assertions that women were less responsive than men
to attempts to persuade them to take nontraditional jobs.161 In most
cases, the employers offered only the undocumented assertions of
managers that when they had approached women about the possibility
of doing nontraditional work, the women said they found the work
unappealing. 162 Moreover, even when employers made this assertion,
they had not targeted their recruiting efforts specifically toward wom-
en's groups. None of the employers contacted working women's or-
ganizations, advertised in women's publications, or otherwise com-
municated through female-oriented networks that the firm was looking
to hire women for nontraditional work. 163 Thus, employers have
1ss Id. at 1385 (quoting the company's affirmative action plan).
159 See id.
160 For another case in which a court was able to conclude easily that the employer's
affirmative action plan was woefully lacking in substance, see Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc.,
711 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984). Capaci held that the company's
alleged affirmative action program did little to dispel the inference of sex discrimination, where
the company's president testified that "Itihe sex aspect of the discrimination was passed as a
part of the Civil Rights Act as an afterthought" and offered few specifics other than a written
statement of good faith intentions to treat women on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. at 657-58.
161 In a few cases, employers presented data showing that women had applied or bid for
the jobs at issue at disproportionately lower rates than men. See, e.g., Durant v. Owens-Illinois
Glass Co., 517 F. Supp. 710, 716 (E.D. La. 1g8o), aff'd, 656 F.2d 89 (Sth Cir. 1981); Davis v.
City of Dallas, 483 F. Supp. 54, 6i (N.D. Tex. 1979). Applicant data merely beg the question,
however, for they do not prove whether women underapplied because of lack of interest or
because the employer's discrimination discouraged them.
162 See, e.g., Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 650 F.2d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v.
Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
163 There are a variety of networks that employers might use to target their recruiting efforts
specifically toward women. All over the country, there are community-based programs designed
to help women enter nontraditional employment. See Law, "Girls Can't Be Plumbers" -
Affirmative Action for Women in Construction: Beyond Goals and Quotas, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 45, 53-55 & n.33 (1989) (describing such organizations). Employers might also contact
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presented little or no evidence that the failure of their alleged special
efforts is tied to women's lack of interest, and the efforts most em-
ployers claim to have made lack substance.
The courts' reliance on these efforts to resolve the interest question
reflects and reproduces a narrow understanding of discrimination that
is based on an anti-historical view of women's work aspirations. In
this view, women's work preferences have been shaped not by a labor
market that has defined only traditional female employment as pos-
sible, but rather by social forces operating in pre-work realms. Be-
cause women's work "choices" are fixed before they begin working,
employer "coercion" or discrimination consists only of actions to bar
women from exercising their already formed preferences. Thus, when
employers have made even minimal efforts to recruit women on a sex-
neutral basis, they have eliminated the formal barriers, and courts are
likely to attribute segregation to women's preexisting preferences.
Davis v. City of Dallas164 illustrates this perspective. Until 1972,
the Dallas Police Department (DPD) had excluded women from reg-
ular police officer jobs, 165 and thereafter, women in the local labor
force had underapplied.166 The case turned on whether women's low
application rate was attributable to DPD's discrimination or instead
to women's lack of interest in police work. 167 To support the lack of
interest explanation, DPD presented the testimony of its recruiting
officer, who "had found a marked resistance to police patrol work
among females." 168 DPD did not verify this statement with data
showing that women had declined offers for police work more often
than men. Nor did DPD demonstrate that it had targeted its recruit-
ment efforts specifically toward women's organizations. Nonetheless,
the court accepted the lack of interest argument, concluding that it
was the "most plausible" explanation for women's underrepresentation
among applicants. 169
other working women's organizations, broader women's rights groups, traditionally female ed-
ucational institutions, or a variety of other organizations that serve women, including welfare
rights groups. See id. at 53 (reporting that of the i5oo women who contacted Non-Traditional
Employment for Women in New York in an effort to find nontraditional work, most received
public assistance). Employers might also advertise in newsletters distributed by such organi-
zations, or in magazines, newspapers, or radio shows designed to appeal specifically to a female
audience. All these sorts of targeted outreach efforts find precedent in the race discrimination
context. See, e.g., Movement for Opportunity v. Detroit Diesel, i8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 557, 571-72 (S.D. Ind. 1978), aff'd sub nor. Movement for Opportunity & Equality v.
General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. i98o); United States v. Central Motor Lines,
338 F. Supp. 532, 565 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
'64 483 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
16S See id. at 59.
166 See id. at 61.
167 See id. at 59.
168 Id. at 61.
169 See id.
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The court revealed the thinking that animates the judicial frame-
work for interpreting sex segregation: "These job preferences of fe-
males may be born of attitudes conditioned by societal sexist values.
But frustration with the realization that equality of opportunity un-
touched by gender remains a social goal and not an achieved reality
must not be visited on this employer in the form of liability. 170
Women's work preferences have thus been "conditioned" not by a
labor market that has taught them their place, but by prior "social"
forces. Because women's work preferences are formed in these social
(even if sexist) spheres, one cannot really expect employers to have
much success in recruiting women for nontraditional work: even min-
imal, unspecified efforts to recruit women on a sex-neutral basis con-
firm that women find nontraditional work unappealing. The employ-
er's role is limited to ensuring that women who have already formed
an interest in nontraditional work are not precluded from obtaining
information about job openings. The law's role is limited to ensuring
that employers do not withhold this information from those women.
Absent is any notion that employers or courts might enable other
women to aspire to work they have never before been able to dream
of doing. Creating a workworld "untouched by gender" remains only
a "social" goal, beyond the responsibility of managers or judges.
(c) Anecdotal Evidence of Discrimination. - The same narrow
approach that has led judges to credit evidence of special efforts has
also led them to insist that plaintiffs present individual victims 17 1 of
discrimination to refute the lack of interest argument. In most cases
(thirty-two out of fifty-four, or 59.3%), plaintiffs have presented an-
ecdotal evidence that the employer discriminated against individual
women. In the remaining cases, however, they have sought to invoke
the principle from early race discrimination doctrine that protected
class members need not prove their "interest" in jobs in which they
have been traditionally underrepresented. If the courts had acknowl-
edged that employers have historically relegated women to low-paid,
traditionally female jobs, they might have concluded that it is unrea-
sonable to demand proof that individual women are interested in
nontraditional work. Most people do not aspire to something they
have never been permitted to do.
170 Id. (emphasis added).
171 Anecdotal evidence shows that the employer discriminated against live "victims." For
this reason, it is sometimes referred to as evidence of "individual instances of discrimination,"
or "victim testimony." A woman who failed to apply for a job because the employer's sex
discrimination persuaded her that it would be futile to do so is referred to in legal doctrine as
a futility victim. This term should not mislead us into seeing such women as passive. By
failing to submit herself to an employment process she perceives as discriminatory, the victim
is actively seeking to avoid the experience of victimization. See Bumiller, Victims in the Shadow
of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal Protection, 12 SIGNS 421 (1987).
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The courts have not taken such an approach, however, as Table
5 illustrates.
TABLE 5:
THE RELATION BETWEEN ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE AND THE SUCCESS
OF THE LACK OF INTEREST ARGUMENT
Anecdotal evidence No anecdotal evidence
P wins 22 (68.8%) 9 (40.9%)
D wins 10 (31.3%) 13 (59.1%)
Total 32 (100.0%) 22 (100.0%)
Courts have relied heavily on the presence of individual victims
to decide whether to accept the lack of interest argument.' 7 2 Indeed,
anecdotal evidence has served for plaintiffs a function parallel to the
one that evidence of special efforts has served for employers. Whereas
employers have been able to bolster the lack of interest argument by
asserting that women failed to respond to their efforts to recruit them
for nontraditional jobs, plaintiffs have been able to counter the ar-
gument by presenting individual women who were interested in non-
traditional jobs but were discriminatorily rejected or discouraged from
applying. Controlling for both types of evidence simultaneously shows
TABLE 6:
THE RELATION BETWEEN ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE/SPECIAL EFFORTS
AND THE SUCCESS OF THE LACK OF INTEREST ARGUMENT
No Anecdotal No Anecdotal
anecdotal evidence/ anecdotal evidence/
evidence/ special evidence/ no special
special efforts no special efforts
efforts efforts
P wins 3 (30.0%) 6 (54.5%) 6 (50.0%) 16 (76.2%)
D wins 7 (70.0%) 5 (45.5%) 6 (50.0%) 5 (23.8%)
Total 10 (100.0%) 11(100.0%) 12 (100.0%) 21(100.0%)
172 Courts were approximately three times more likely to reject the lack of interest argument
in cases in which plaintiffs presented anecdotal evidence than in cases in which they presented
no such evidence (p = .o4).
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that the parties' likelihood of prevailing on the lack of interest argu-
ment shifts dramatically according to whether one type of evidence,
but not the other, is present. 173
Courts have been most likely to attribute sex segregation to wom-
en's lack of interest when the employer claimed to have made special
efforts to attract women and the plaintiffs presented no anecdotal
evidence. At the other end of the spectrum, courts have been least
likely to accept the lack of interest argument in cases when the plain-
tiffs presented anecdotal evidence and the employer did not claim
special efforts to recruit women. In the middle of this spectrum,
courts accepted the lack of interest argument in 50.0% of the cases
involving neither evidence of special efforts nor anecdotal evidence
and in 54.5% of the cases involving both types of evidence. The
similar outcomes suggest that these two types of evidence tend to
cancel each other out, leaving courts in the same interpretive void as
when neither type of evidence is present.
That courts have relied heavily on anecdotal evidence of discrim-
ination reveals, perhaps even more clearly than their reliance on
evidence of recruiting efforts, the anti-historical, individualistic per-
spective they have brought to their interpretations of sex segregation
in the workplace. The courts' failure to acknowledge employers' his-
torical influence on women's work aspirations has left judges in a
quandary about how to characterize women's current preferences.
Anecdotal evidence has served to convince judges that the "modern"
woman exists - that women have managed to emerge from early life
experiences with aspirations for nontraditional work. This image al-
lows judges to attribute current patterns of sex segregation to em-
ployers' "coercion" rather than to women's own "choice." Thus, the
courts' reliance on anecdotal evidence both reflects and reproduces the
notion that employers merely prevent or permit women to exercise
preexisting job preferences, rather than create those preferences in the
first place.
Both conservative courts and liberal courts have relied on anec-
dotal evidence to interpret sex segregation. 174 Conservative courts
173 The p-value for Table 6 is .09. Furthermore, a logistic regression analysis showed that
anecdotal evidence greatly increased plaintiffs' likelihood of prevailing, even after controlling
simultaneously for evidence of past discrimination and evidence of special efforts. (The T-ratio
for the anecdotal evidence variable was 1.958, with a corresponding p-value of .o5.)
174 A few liberal courts have been willing to reject the lack of interest argument even in the
absence of anecdotal evidence, but most of these were "easy" cases in which the evidence showed
that the employer was operating an overt system of sex segregation during the period when the
employer claimed women lacked interest in the work. See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 61g F.2d
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have stated explicitly that they disregard statistical proof of segrega-
tion without supplemental evidence that the employer discriminated
against individual women. In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 175 for
instance, the statistical studies showed that women were severely
underrepresented in higher-paying commission sales jobs compared to
their representation among all sales applicants. Nonetheless, the court
berated the EEOC for failing to produce individual victims of dis-
crimination. "It is almost inconceivable," said the judge, "that, in a
nationwide suit alleging a pattern and practice of intentional discrim-
ination for at least 8 years involving more than 900 stores, EEOC
would be unable to produce even one witness who could credibly
testify that Sears discriminated against her.' 76 According to the
judge, the EEOC's failure to produce individual victims served only
to confirm that Sears' segregation was attributable to women's own
choice. 177 The Sears court was by no means exceptional. In fully
half of the claims for which courts accepted the lack of interest
justification, judges pointed to the fact that plaintiffs had produced
no individual victims.178
This same attitude appears in the decisions of the liberal courts.
Even many judges who have rejected the lack of interest argument
have seemed skeptical that women are, as a group, as interested as
men in nontraditional work. But the fact that a few women an-
nounced their interest persuaded the judges to reject the interest
explanation. In Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 179 for example, a
plastic bottle manufacturer with a proven history of sexually exclu-
sionary practices tried to defend claims of discrimination in promotion
and transfer by asserting that its women employees were not interested
6I, 614, 618 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980); Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring
Co., 583 F.2d 275, 280 (6th Cir.) (finding sex discrimination in a plant whose superintendent
testified at trial that he assigned women only to lower paying positions because "'that's the type
of work that's open for them to do'"), modified, 587 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 922 (1979); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 262, 264 (N.D. Ind. x977).
At the other end of the spectrum, a few conservative courts have accepted the lack of interest
explanation even though plaintiffs presented anecdotal evidence of discrimination or discour-
agement. See, e.g., Peltier v. City of Fargo, 396 F. Supp. 710, 722 (D.N.D. 1975) (rejecting
three women's testimony that they failed to apply for police officer jobs because they believed
the city would not hire women, as mere "feelings . . .subjectively dependent on rumors that
could not be substantiated"), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1976).
175 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. i986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
176 Id. at 1324-25.
177 See id.
178 See, e.g., Piva v. Xerox Corp., 654 F.2d 592, 595 (9 th Cir. ig8i); EEOC v. H.S. Camp
& Sons, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 411, 446-47 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Gilbert v. East Bay Mun. Dist., ig
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 304, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1979); EEOC v. Korn Indus., 17 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 954, 959 (D.S.C. r978), off'd on other grounds and remanded, 662 F.2d 256
(4 th Cir. i98i).
179 48o F. Supp. 2015 (W.D. Va. 1979).
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in moving into higher-paying nontraditional jobs. Although finding
that "many of the female [employees] prefer the jobs to which they
are assigned," the court cited the testimony of other women employees
to conclude that at least some women "are or have been interested in
the spectrum of traditionally male jobs at the plant." 80 In other
cases, liberal courts relied on anecdotal evidence to reject the lack of
interest argument, even though the judges seemed ambivalent about
whether women were on the whole as interested as men in nontradi-
tional work. 181
This points to an interesting paradox - and problem - with the
courts' reliance on anecdotal evidence. The lack of interest argument
depends on the proposition that women are systematically less inter-
ested than men in nontraditional work. Its purpose is to refute sta-
tistical evidence showing that the employer has underhired women
relative to their representation among some eligible pool of workers.
This statistical evidence is not undermined simply because some
women in the proposed pool lack interest in the work; some men
undoubtedly lack interest in it also. The lack of interest assertion
undermines the statistical evidence if, and only if, the women in the
proposed pool are sufficiently less interested than men in the work to
account for the statistical disparity.' 8 2
Judges have no way of discovering, on the basis of the evidence
offered in these cases, whether the relative proportions of women and
180 Id. at 1027-28.
181 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275, 278-79 (6th Cir.), mod-
ified, 587 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp.
Inc., 57o F. Supp. 1509, i515 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff'd, 789 F.2d 859 (xith Cir. 1986); Ostapowicz
v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522, 537, 538 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (acknowledging that the
employer had produced "a large amount of testimony that certain women were happy in the
plant and thought there was no discrimination" but relying on the fact that a number of women
had not opted out of the class to reject the lack of interest argument), aff'd in part and vacated
in part on other grounds, 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
182 To illustrate, suppose the plaintiffs' evidence shows that, of ioo people hired by the
employer, only five (5%) were women. By comparison, of the iooo workers that plaintiffs
contend were eligible for hire in the local area, 400 (4o%) were women and 6oo (6o%) were
men. Now suppose the employer proves that of the 400 women workers plaintiffs contend were
eligible for hire, 200 (5o%) lacked interest in the employer's work. The employer might contend
that women's lack of interest explains their underrepresentation. But if 50% (3oo) of the men
in the original pool of xooo lacked interest in the work, too, the number of eligible male workers
would decline from 6oo to 300. This would leave a final pool of 5oo eligible and interested
workers, 200 (4o%) of whom are women and 300 (6o%) of whom are men. Thus, the proportions
of men and women in this final pool are identical to those in the pool originally proposed by
plaintiffs. Obviously the lack of interest argument cannot explain the fact that the employer's
hirees included only five (5%) women, where the pool of eligible and interested workers included
200 (40%) women. To show that the employer hired women in proportion to their representation
among eligible and interested workers, the employer must show that of whatever number of
eligible workers in the original pool of iooo were interested in the work, only 5% were women
and 95% were men. This would mean that of the original pool, women were i9 times less
interested than men in the work.
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men in the plaintiffs' proposed pool accurately reflect the relative
proportions of women and men who are interested in the work. They
turn to anecdotal evidence as a way out of this dilemma. But anec-
dotal evidence merely reproduces this same uncertainty. With enough
resources, a good plaintiff's lawyer can always find some women who
were interested in the work. On the other hand, a good management
lawyer can probably also find at least a few women willing to say
that they were not interested in the work. Because there is no way
of verifying whether the plaintiffs' or the employer's witnesses are
representative of the larger pool of eligible women, anecdotal evidence
gets the court no closer to determining what proportion of the women
in the pool were interested in the work. Even if this problem could
be surmounted, there would still be no way of determining what
proportion of men in the pool were interested in the work. Thus,
anecdotal evidence does not and cannot reveal whether the eligible
women were sufficiently less interested than the men to explain the
degree of female underrepresentation. 183
It therefore seems paradoxical that so many courts have charac-
terized statistical evidence as "meaningless" and berated plaintiffs for
failing to introduce anecdotal evidence that is surely just as meaning-
less for ascertaining the validity of the lack of interest explanation.
By the same token, it seems paradoxical that so many courts have
chosen to rely heavily on anecdotal evidence when it does little or
nothing to establish the relative interests of women and men in the
work. The truth is that, with or without anecdotal evidence, the
judge is forced to make assumptions about whether the plaintiffs'
statistical data reflects the relative proportions of men and women
interested in nontraditional work. Because people's work interests are
not quantifiable, the judge is inevitably left with an evidentiary void.
In the end, the judge cannot avoid the problem of interpretation.
In the early race discrimination cases, courts approached this same
problem of interpretation with a sensitivity to the fact that minorities'
work aspirations had been formed in the context of historical labor
market discrimination. Courts filled in the evidentiary "gap" by as-
suming that minorities were no less interested than whites in higher-
paying, more challenging work. Thus, the courts' attribution of mi-
norities' work aspirations to forces within the world of work - rather
than private pre-labor market influences - grounded the presumption
183 This is the point the EEOC's lawyers were trying to make in Sears, when they argued
that "'where 47,000 hires and promotions were at issue ... it would have been impossible to
present enough individual demonstrations of discrimination to meaningfully reflect on the sta-
tistics.'" EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 311 (7 th Cir. 1988). The Seventh
Circuit rejected this argument, remarking that "[elven a few examples would have helped bring
'cold numbers convincingly to life.'" Id. at 311-12 (citation omitted). The court failed to explain
exactly what these examples would have proved.
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that there were no systematic racial differences in work preferences.
If judges had been unwilling to take such an approach, employers
would have simply rationalized the status quo as the expression of
minorities' own work choices.
To a large extent, this rationalization of the status quo has occurred
in sex discrimination cases. Courts have been unwilling to take an
approach that situates women's work aspirations in the context of
historical labor market discrimination. Instead, they have attributed
women's work aspirations exclusively to their early socialization. An-
ecdotal evidence has become central, not because it allows judges to
estimate with any accuracy whether women's work interests' differ
systematically from men's, but because it signifies that society has
progressed sufficiently to produce women who grow up aspiring to
"men's work." The individual victim has come to symbolize the "mod-
ern" woman, that genderless creature entitled to the law's' protection.
But the judicial focus on the victim has left the majority of work-
ing women in the wake of the law. Within the interpretive framework
embraced by both conservative and liberal courts, employers' practices
are defined as discriminatory only insofar as they prevent individual
women from realizing preexisting preferences for nontraditional work
- and not because those practices are part of a larger workplace
environment in which many women have never been able to dream
of the possibility of doing such work.
IV. STORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND WORK:
A RHETORICAL STUDY OF THE TWO COMPETING
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SEX SEGREGATION
In this Part, I examine how judges have used the "choice" and
"coercion" explanations to legitimate accepting or rejecting the lack of
interest argument. Even though both explanations rest in a common
evidentiary framework, each of them also stands as a separate nar-
rative that justifies a different legal outcome. I refer to the rhetorical
justification used by courts who have accepted the lack of interest
argument as the conservative story of choice, and to the one used by
courts who have rejected that argument as the liberal story of coer-
cion.1 8 4 Each of these justifications may be envisioned as a "story"
with a beginning, middle,, and end. There is dramatic tension and
resolution, as each story draws on a particular set of images of women
and work to explain why women are underrepresented in nontradi-
184 Each of these stories is, of course, an "ideal type" drawn from a reading of the cases in
the aggregate. The ideal type does not necessarily apply in every case.
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tional work. Each story ends with a "moral" that legitimates a certain
way of understanding sex segregation in the workplace. 185
The critical assumption that binds the two stories within a single
interpretive universe is the assumption that women form stable job
preferences, independently of employer action, in early social realms.
In the conservative story, this assumption is accompanied by a natu-
ralized, totalizing account of gender. Sex segregation exists because
women are "feminine," and the feminine role is so all-encompassing
that it implies by definition a preference for "feminine" work. In the
liberal story of coercion, by contrast, the assumption that women's
job preferences are fixed before they begin working means that gender
difference must be suppressed. Liberal courts can justify holding
employers liable only to the extent that judges can represent women
as "ungendered" subjects who emerge from a gender-free social order
with the same aspirations and values as men.
That these two stories constitute the entire interpretive universe
creates problems for plaintiffs challenging sex segregation. By ac-
cepting the premise that only women who escape early sex-role so-
cialization can aspire to nontraditional jobs, the liberal story reinforces
the conservative one. By failing to develop an account of how em-
ployers create jobs and job aspirations along gendered lines, both
stories ultimately assume away the major problem title VII should be
addressing: the organization of work structures and workplace cultures
to disempower large numbers of women from aspiring to and suc-
ceeding in more highly rewarded nontraditional work.
A. The Conservative Story of Choice
The conservative story of choice is the familiar one told by the
Sears court: women are "feminine," nontraditional work is "mascu-
line," and therefore women do not want to do it. The story rests on
an appeal to masculinity and femininity as oppositional categories.
Women are "feminine" because that is the definition of what makes
them women. Work itself is endowed with the imagined human
characteristics of masculinity or femininity based on the sex of the
workers who do it. "Femininity" refers to a complex of womanly
traits and aspirations that by definition precludes any interest in the
work of men. Even though the story always follows this same logic,
the story changes along class lines in the way it is told. 186 Cases
185 1 have borrowed heavily from Martha Fineman's insightful description of the role of
narrative in legal decisionmaking about child custody. See Fineman, supra note 23, at 753-58.
186 Courts have been almost equally likely to attribute segregation to women's "choice" in
blue-collar and white-collar cases. They rejected the lack of interest argument in 59.o% (23 out
of 39) of the claims involving blue-collar jobs, and in 53.3% (eight out of 1s) of the claims
involving white collar jobs.
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involving blue-collar work emphasize the "masculinity" of the work,
drawing on images of physical strength and dirtiness. Cases involving
white-collar work focus on the "femininity" of women, appealing to
traits and values associated with domesticity.
In the blue-collar context, the story begins by describing the work
in heavily gendered terms. Courts invoke oppositional images of work
as heavy versus light, dirty versus clean, and explicitly align the left
side of the equation with masculinity (while implicitly aligning the
right side with femininity). Thus, nontraditional jobs in bakeries are
described as "hot, heavy, and hard work." 8 7 Males, of course, do
this "heavy work," while females do the "lighter," "less demanding"
work.' 88 Work in a cardboard box factory is "dirty and somewhat
heavy"; the factory is located in a "very poor section of the city,"
where women fear to tread.' 8 9 Road maintenance work is "outside
laboring work" that is "physically demanding and generally unap-
pealing" to women. 190 Working as a food inspector for a railroad
association is characterized as "nocturnal prowling in railroad yards
inspecting rotten food" that is not "attractive" to "young women." 19
In such cases, conservative courts did not bother to question
whether the work fit the gendered characteristics ascribed to it. In-
deed, employers did not assert that being male was a bona fide
occupational qualification for these jobs. 192 Although some of the jobs
may have required considerable physical strength, the courts made no
inquiry into whether this was true and if so, whether only men had
sufficient strength to perform them. Similarly, although some of the
settings may have been dirty, a tolerance for dirt is surely not a "job
qualification" possessed only by men. Within the story of coercion,
nontraditional work is simply reified, endowed with characteristics
typically thought of as masculine, as though there were a natural
connection between heavy, dirty work and manhood itself. Ironically,
courts associated such work with masculinity even in some cases
where the employer's traditionally female jobs involved equally dirty
and physically demanding work. 193
187 EEOC v. Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
188 See id. at 4.
189 EEOC v. Service Container Corp., ig Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) x614, 1616 (W.D.
Okla. 1976). The judge in this case seemed to believe that women who work in relatively
unskilled jobs in factories do not live in "very poor" sections of the city, evidence of a class bias
that colors a number of these opinions.
190 Mazus v. Department of Transp., 489 F. Supp. 376, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 629
F.2d 870 (3d Cir. ig8o), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (ig8i).
191 Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 65o F.2d 395, 403 (2d Cir. 1981).
192 For a description of the bona fide occupational qualification defense, see note 113 above.
193 In EEOC v. H.S. Camp & Sons, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. Fla. 1982), for example,
a meat processing plant explicitly barred women from a number of departments, on the ground




Once the court described the work in reified, masculine terms,
women's lack of interest followed merely as a matter of "common
sense." "The defendant manufactures upholstered metal chairs," 194
said one court. "Common sense tells us that few women have the
skill or the desire to be a welder or a metal fabricator, and that most
men cannot operate a sewing machine and have no desire to learn." 195
Or, as another court put it: "Common practical knowledge tells us
that certain work in a bakery operation is not attractive to females
.... The work is simply not compatible with their personal interests
and capabilities." 196 In these blue-collar cases, courts almost never
state their specific assumptions about women workers' traits or atti-
tudes. Just what is it about women's "personal interests" that causes
them not to want to be welders or bakers? Interestingly, employers
and courts almost never invoke women's family roles as the reason
for their lack of interest in male-dominated blue-collar jobs.197 They
appeal instead to a much broader, naturalized conception of femininity
that draws on physical images of weakness and cleanliness and applies
even to women without family responsibilities.
While in blue-collar cases, the story begins by describing the work
as "masculine," in white-collar cases, it begins instead by describing
women as "feminine." In the white-collar context, courts invoke social
and psychological characteristics rather than physical images. In par-
ticular, employers invoke women's domestic roles to explain their lack
of interest in traditionally male white-collar work, 198 and conservative
even though the company produced no evidence other than the owner's subjective opinion that
women were incapable of doing these jobs. See id. at 429. Ironically, the company did hire
women for other lower-paying departments in which the jobs appeared to require equal physical
strength. Women predominated in the meat packing department, for example, where they were
required to carry boxes of meat weighing from So to go pounds. In the all-male receiving
department, by contrast, the men did not rely on brute strength but used hydraulic jacks to
unload heavy boxes from delivery trucks. In addition, the company had hired no women for
at least three other departments that, according to the court's own description, required no
particular physical prowess. See id. at 422.
194 Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 140, 144 (W.D.N.C.
1972).
195 Id.
196 EEOC v. Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
197 1 found only one blue-collar case in which an employer appealed to women's family roles
to explain their alleged preferences for traditionally female work. See Parker v. Siemens-Allis,
6oi F. Supp. 1377, 1385 (E.D. Ark. r985) (noting the company's assertion in its affirmative
action plan that women prefer electrical wiring to higher-paid machine-shop work because the
former is "clean . . . [and] routine work, which once learned, gives the female the opportunity
to plan the family budget, menu and other responsibilities directly related to family ties").
198 See, e.g., Kraszewski v. State Farm Ins. Co., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 197, 222
(N.D. Cal. 985); EEOC v. Akron Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 733, 748 (N.D. Ohio
ig8o). It is not clear why employers use different explanations for sex segregation in the blue-
collar and white-collar contexts. Perhaps employers have realized that it would be implausible
to try to attribute sex segregation to women's domestic roles in blue-collar settings, in which
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courts accept these explanations. In Gillespie v. Board of Educa-
tion,199 the court explained why women teachers did not want to be
promoted to administrative positions as follows:
[Mlales who are pursuing careers in education are often the principal
family breadwinners. Women.. ., on the other hand, have frequently
taken teaching jobs to supplement family income and leave when this
is no longer necessary or they are faced with the exigencies of raising
a family. We regard this as a logical explanation and find as a matter
of fact that there has been no discrimination in the North Little Rock
School District.200
In some cases the appeal to women's domestic roles is less direct,
but even broader in its implications. In Sears,201 for example, the
court invoked women's experience in the family as the underlying
cause of a whole host of "feminine" traits and values that lead them
to prefer lower-paying noncommission sales jobs. According to the
court:
Women tend to be more interested than men in the social and coop-
erative aspects of the workplace. Women tend to see themselves as
less competitive. They often view noncommission sales as more at-
tractive than commission sales, because they can enter and leave the
job more easily, and because there is more social contact and friend-
ship, and less stress in noncommission selling.20 2
women with family responsibilities have long labored in jobs that demand as much of their time
as the higher-paying jobs done by men. See generally L. WEINER, FROM WORKING GIRL TO
WORKING MOTHER 86-87 (1985) (describing the relegation of married women to lower-paid
blue-collar work before 1940). In numerous cases in this study, women were assigned to lower-
paying female jobs in factories, even though those jobs were apparently on the same shifts as
the higher-paying, male-dominated jobs. See, e.g., Parker, 6oi F. Supp. at 1385; Chrapliwy
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 266 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co.,
369 F. Supp. 522, 527 (,V.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 541
F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); see also Mitchell v. Mid-Continent
Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979) (noting that a
plant permitted male-only machine set-up employees to transfer between the day and night
shifts, but refused to permit female-only machine operators to do so, because "'there was a
shortage of men. However, females were easier to hire.'"). Conversely, employers may have
realized that they could not plausibly defend women's absence from white-collar work with
images of physical difference, because white-collar work is light, clean work of the type asso-
ciated with femininity in the blue-collar context. Thus, in white-collar cases, employers have
had to resort to imputed social and psychological characteristics to ground their conceptions of
femininity and masculinity.
199 528 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Ark. i981), aff'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1982).
200 d. at 437.
201 EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. II. z986), aff'd, 839 F.2d
302 (7th Cir. z988).
202 Id. at i3o8.
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To support these generalizations, the court cited the testimony of the
historian Sears hired as an expert witness, 203 who attributed the "nur-
turing" aspects of women's personalities directly to their historic do-
mestic roles.204 This reasoning transforms the observation that women
have been family caretakers into the far more general proposition that
they do not aspire to nontraditional work.
Even though the white-collar story begins by portraying women
as "feminine," the story nonetheless depends on a contrasting image
of nontraditional white-collar work as "masculine." In the Sears case,
women were romanticized as friendly and noncompetitive, but this
mattered only because such traits were the opposite of the ones al-
legedly needed for successful commission selling. Sears' retail testing
manual described a commission salesperson as a "'special breed of
cat"' who has a "sharper intellect" and "more powerful personality"
than noncommission salesworkers, 205 someone who is "active" and
"'has a lot of drive,"' has "'considerable physical vigor,"' and "'likes
work which requires physical energy. '"'206 Sears also administered to
sales applicants a test that included such questions as, "'Do you have
a low-pitched voice?,"' "'Do you swear often?,"' "'Have you ever done
any hunting?,"' and "'Have you played on a football team?"' 207 Yet,
it did not occur to the court to ask whether Sears had used the sales
manual and test to construct the job in masculine terms. 208 Like the
203 See id. at 1308 & n.42.
204 Rosalind Rosenberg was the historian who testified for Sears. The gist of her testimony
is captured in the following excerpt:
Women's role in American society and in the American family unit has fostered the
development of 'feminine' values that have been internalized by women themselves ....
Throughout American history women have been trained from earliest childhood to de-
velop the humane and nurturing values expected of the American mother. Women's
participation in the labor force is affected by the values they have internalized. For
example: Women tend to be more relationship-centered and men tend to be more work-
centered. Women tend to be more interested than men in the cooperative, social aspects
of the work situation. These differences in female and male self-perception present
difficulties for women in traditionally masculine occupations.
Offer of Proof Concerning the Testimony of Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (No. 79-C-4373) [hereinafter Testimony of Rosalind
Rosenberg].
20S Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1290.
206 Id. at i3oo.
207 Id. at 13oo n.29.
208 The fact that Sears' characterization of the commission sales job varied dramatically from
the way the job was defined in an earlier era shows that there is nothing necessary or inevitable
about the way Sears characterized it. Susan Porter Benson has shown that from 189o to 1940,
when department store managers were eager to attract women to retail sales jobs (including
commission sales) in the newly expanding service sector, managers defined the essence of "good
selling" in terms of stereotypically feminine traits rather than the masculine traits emphasized
by Sears. See S. BENSON, COUNTER CULTURES: SALESWOMEN, MANAGERS, AND CUSTOMERS
IN AMERICAN DEPARTMENT STORES, I890-I940o , at 130-31 (1986).
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courts in blue-collar cases, the judge simply took for granted that the
gendered characteristics Sears ascribed to the commission sales posi-
tion were an inherent, necessary part of the job. Once the court
endowed the job with these stereotypically masculine characteristics,
it became a foregone conclusion that women would find it unappeal-
ing.
In the end, the logic of the story of choice converges in both blue-
collar and white-collar cases. It makes no difference that in blue-
collar cases gender is described in physical imagery, while in white-
collar cases gender is described in social and psychological terms. In
both contexts, the story portrays gender as so complete and natural
as to render invisible the processes through which gender is socially
constructed by employers. The story is powerful because it appeals
to the widely held perception that the sexes are different. It extends
this perception into an account of gendered job aspirations: if women
have different physical characteristics or have had different life ex-
periences from men, then they must have different work interests,
too. There is no room for the possibility that women are different
from men in certain respects, yet still aspire to the same types of
work. If gender is all-encompassing, it is also so natural as to be
unalterable. Women's preferences for "feminine" work are so central
to the definition of womanhood itself that they remain unchanged (and
unchangeable), regardless of what women experience at work. Be-
cause there is no room for change, employers do not and cannot
contribute to shaping women's job preferences.
The flip side of the coin is that work itself is somehow inherently
"masculine" or "feminine," apart from anything employers do to make
it that way. With the world neatly compartmentalized into gendered
people and jobs, sex segregation becomes easy to explain. Women
bring to the workplace their preexisting preferences for traditionally
female work, and employers merely honor those preferences. In the
story of choice, workplace segregation implies no oppression or even
disadvantage for women. Courts telling this story often describe wom-
en's jobs as "more desirable" than men's jobs, even where women's
jobs pay lower wages, afford less prestige, and offer fewer opportu-
nities for advancement than men's. 20 9 The implicit point of reference
for evaluating the desirability of the work, is, of course, the courts'
own construction of women's point of view: no court would describe
women's work as more desirable to men. The moral of the conser-
vative story is that working women choose their own economic disem-
powerment.
209 See, e.g., EEOC v. H.S. Camp & Sons, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 411, 446 (M.D. Fla. I982);
EEOC v. Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
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B. The Liberal Story of Coercion
Like their conservative counterparts, liberal courts assume that
women form their job preferences before they begin working. This
shared assumption, however, drives liberal courts to a rhetoric that is
the opposite of conservative rhetoric. Whereas the conservative story
has a strong account of gender that implies a preference for "feminine"
work, the liberal story has no coherent account of gender. To the
contrary, liberal courts suppress gender difference, because the as-
sumption of stable, preexisting preferences means that they can hold
employers responsible for sex segregation only by portraying women
as ungendered subjects who emerge from early life realms with the
same experiences and values, and therefore the same work aspirations,
as men.
The liberal story centers around the prohibition against stereotyp-
ing. Courts reject the lack of interest argument by reasoning that
"Title VII was intended to override stereotypical views" of women. 210
"[M]o justify failure to advance women because they did not want to
be advanced is the type of stereotyped characterization which will not
stand."2 "l This anti-stereotyping reasoning is the classic rhetoric of
gender neutrality: it invokes the familiar principle that likes are to be
treated alike.212 The problem lies in determining the extent to which
women are "like" men. On its face, the anti-stereotyping reasoning
seems to deny the existence of group-based gender differences and
assert that, contrary to the employer's contention, the women in the
proposed labor pool are no less interested than the men in nontradi-
tional work. Below the surface, however, this reasoning reflects a
basic ambiguity (and ambivalence) about the extent of gender differ-
ences. For the anti-stereotyping rule may be interpreted to admit that
women are as a group less interested than men in nontraditional work,
and to assert only that some individual women may nonetheless be
exceptions who do not share the preferences of most women. Under
such an individualized approach, the employer is forbidden merely
from presuming that all women are so "different" from men that they
do not aspire to nontraditional work.213
210 EEOC v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 5, 56 (W.D.
Mo. 1980).
211 Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd in
part and vacated in part on other grounds, 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1041 (r977).
212 See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 122-23 (1978).
213 The Supreme Court has adopted this form of anti-stereotyping reasoning in both the title
VII and fourteenth amendment contexts. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707-08 (1978) (holding that under title VII "[elven a true generaliza-
tion about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the
generalization does not apply"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (adopting a similar
rationale in the fourteenth amendment context).
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This individualized approach finds support in a number-of cases,
which emphasize the exceptional woman who does not "share the
characteristics generally attributed to [her] group."214 Some courts
condemn employers who raise the lack of interest argument for "ste-
reotyping" all women as being uninterested in nontraditional work. 215
Other courts reject the interest argument by observing that although
some women do not desire nontraditional jobs, others do. 216 These
courts reason that "Title VII rights are peculiar to the individual, and
are not lost or forfeited because some members of the protected classes
are unable or unwilling to undertake certain jobs. '217 Logically, how-
ever, this reasoning does not suffice to refute the lack of interest
argument. The employer is not asserting that no individual woman
is interested in nontraditional work, but rather that, within the pool
of eligible workers, the women are as a group sufficiently less inter-
ested than men to explain their underrepresentation. 218
The focus on individual women thus serves a largely symbolic
function. The liberal story invokes the *image of the victim, the
modern woman who comes to the labor market with a preexisting
interest in nontraditional work, to signify the presence of a new social
order in which the sexes are equal and ungendered. In this brave
new world free of gender, women emerge from pre-work realms with
the same life experiences and values, and therefore the same work
aspirations, as men. The liberal story suppresses gender difference
outside the workplace to attribute sex segregation within the work-
place to employer coercion. Insofar as women approach the labor
market with the same experiences and values as men, they must have
the same job preferences as men, and to the extent that women end
up severely underrepresented in nontraditional jobs, the employer
must have discriminated.
The symbolic use of the victim, however, does not resolve the
underlying issue of how representative of other women the victim is.
This poses no practical difficulty when the only women who testify
are the plaintiff's witnesses, who say that the employer prevented
them from realizing their preferences for nontraditional jobs. But
214 Ostapowicz, 369 F. Supp. at 537.
21S ee, e.g., Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275, 281-83 (6th Cir.), mod-
ified, 587 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (i979); EEOC v. Cook Paint &
Varnish Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 28, 5i, 56 (W.D. Mo. I98O); EEOC v. Rath
Packing Co., 4o Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 559, 566 (S.D. Iowa 1979), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458
F. Supp. 252, 262-63 (N.D. Ind. 1977).
216 See, e.g., Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015, 1027-28 (W.D. Va. 1979);
Ostapowicz, 369 F. Supp. at 537-38.
217 Rath, 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 566; accord Mitchell, 583 F.2d at 281;
Chrapliwy, 458 F. Supp. at 278.
218 See supra pp. 1797-98.
,99o] 1807
HARVARD LAW RE VIEW
when employers present testimony from other women, who say that
they are happier doing traditionally female jobs and that they would
not take more highly rewarded nontraditional jobs even if offered, the
liberal story confronts a dilemma. Often, liberal courts have simply
characterized these women as unrepresentative of the larger group of
women in the labor pool.219 But they have no way of explaining why
these women should be considered less representative of most women
than the victims, or how they came to have more gendered job
aspirations than other women. Because liberal courts have no coher-
ent explanation for gender difference, more conservative courts can
easily portray the victims, rather than those satisfied with traditionally
female work, as the anomalous, unrepresentative group. 220
Indeed, at a conceptual level, the liberal suppression of gender
difference actually reinforces the conservative story. Because the lib-
eral story assumes that women form their job preferences through
pre-workworld socialization, it accepts the notion that only women
who are socialized the same as men desire such work. To secure legal
victory under the liberal approach, women must present themselves
as ungendered subjects without a distinctive history, experience, cul-
ture, or identity. But this approach only validates the conservative
notion that women who are "different" ("feminine") in non-work as-
pects automatically have "different" ("feminine') work preferences, as
well.
The EEOC's position in Sears illustrates this dynamic. The EEOC
emphasized that contrary to the district court's findings, it had not
assumed that female sales applicants were as interested as males in com-
mission sales jobs. Instead, the EEOC had recognized that the women
were less interested than the men, and it had controlled for sex
differences in interest by isolating the subgroup of female applicants
219 See, e.g., Palmer v. Shultz, 8i5 F.2d 84, iio (D.C. Cir. 1987); Kohne, 480 F. Supp. at
2027-28 & n.6; Rath, 4o Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 565-66; Ostapowicz, 369 F. Supp. at
537-38. Employers tend to present testimony from women who were hired for traditionally
female jobs, rather than from women who were rejected from employment altogether, as
examples of women who prefer traditionally female work. But as Judge Thornberry has
observed, the fact that women already working in traditionally female jobs have grown accus-
tomed to them says little about whether women who were denied employment altogether "might
well have taken [nontraditional jobs], if not precluded from doing so by a discriminatory hiring
policy." Durant v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 656 F.2d 89, 91 (sth Cir. zg8x) (Thornberry, J.,
dissenting).
220 As one court who accepted the lack of interest argument stated: "To be sure there are
some females who would be interested in this type of physical [road maintenance] work but a
reliable percentage has not yet been developed." Mazus v. Department of Transp., 489 F.
Supp. 376, 388 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. i98o), cert. denied, 449 U.S. iN26
(ig8i); see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 2264, 2314 (N.D. Il. 2986)
(dismissing the EEOC's historical examples of women who have responded to nontraditional
job opportunities as isolated instances involving only "small groups of unusual women" rather
than "the majority of women"), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. I988).
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who were similar to the males on a number of different background
characteristics and who therefore could be presumed to be equally
interested in commission sales. 221 The EEOC argued that "men and
women who are alike with respect to [these] ...characteristics ...
would be similar with respect to their interest in commission sales. '222
Judge Cudahy, in a dissent from the Seventh Circuit's opinion,
agreed. 223 Although he condemned the majority and the district court
for "stereotyping" women,224 his acceptance of the EEOC's argument
suggests that the only women whose job interests were being inaccu-
rately stereotyped were those whose earlier life experiences resembled
men's. 225 Judge Cudahy's and the EEOC's position assumed that the
women had formed specific preferences for commission or noncom-
mission saleswork before they applied at Sears. Indeed, Judge Cudahy
expressed this assumption explicitly, emphasizing that the EEOC's
case would have been much stronger if it had produced "even a
handful of witnesses to testify that Sears had frustrated their childhood
dreams of becoming commission sellers." 226 Once this assumption was
accepted, it was impossible to analyze seriously the extent to which
Sears had shaped its workers' preferences. The only alternative was
to identify the illusive group of women whose personal histories were
so similar to men's that one might safely presume that they had been
socialized to prefer the same jobs.
This liberal approach faces two strategic difficulties that leave
working women vulnerable to the conservative explanation for seg-
regation. The first may be termed a credibility problem. Insofar as
the liberal story relies on an image of women as "ungendered," it is
less believable than the conservative story. Like most people, judges
tend to find implausible the suggestion that women have the same
characteristics, experiences, and values as men. Employers are able
to turn this perception to their advantage by arguing that even fem-
inists have acknowledged that our sexist society socializes girls and
women into "feminine" roles. 227 In Sears, for example, the historian
221 See EEOC Brief, supra note 6, at 127, 141. Among the characteristics the EEOC
controlled for in its statistical analyses were age, education, job applied for, job type experience,
product line experience, and expanded commission sales experience. See supra note 7.
222 EEOC Brief, supra note 6, at 38.
223 See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 360-66 (7th Cir. 1988) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224 See id. at 361-62.
22s See id. at 362.
226 Id. (emphasis added).
227 There is now an extensive feminist literature taking the position that women's and men's
divergent life experiences lead them to develop different perspectives, attitudes, and values.
Carol Gilligan's book is perhaps the most prominent example of work in this tradition. See C.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). The popularity of Gilligan's work attests to the
fact that people find the cultural "difference" thesis intuitively plausible. For critiques of
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retained by Sears was able to cite the feminist consciousness-raising
movement to the company's advantage, asserting that the very need
for consciousness-raising was premised on the "recognition that men
and women have internalized different personality traits and different
attitudes." 228 In the end, it made no difference that the EEOC had
controlled for sex differences in background, for the judge believed
that even women whose life experiences resembled men's remained
sufficiently "different" that they lacked interest in commission sales
jobs. 229 The conservative story thus capitalizes on the widely held
perception of sexual difference to imply that, because girls are con-
ditioned to conform to "feminine" sex roles, adult women will auto-
matically aspire to "feminine" work.
This same dynamic emerges more subtly in connection with the
"different family roles" explanation for women's underrepresentation
in nontraditional jobs. The liberal approach refuses to credit this
explanation, but fails to make clear whether this refusal is based on
a denial that women have heavier family responsibilities than men or
rather a rejection of the notion that women's concededly heavier
family responsibilities lead them to choose female-dominated jobs. 230
This ambiguity weakens the liberal story, for women do assume a
greater burden than men for sustaining family life. 231 Again, the
result is greater credibility for the conservative story, which clearly
acknowledges that domestic labor is gendered. The flaw in the con-
servative story is not that it unfairly "stereotypes" women as family
caretakers, but rather that it portrays women's domestic roles as the
fulfillment of a broader set of unalterable "feminine" attributes that
dictates a preference for low-paying, traditionally female jobs.
Gilligan's work, see Auerbach, Blum, Smith & Williams, On Gilligan's In A Different Voice,
ii FEMINIST STUD. 149 (1985); Scott, cited above in note 147, at io65; and Women and
Morality, 5o Soc. RES. 487 (1983).
228 Testimony of Rosalind Rosenberg, supra note 204, at 766; see also Davis v. City of
Dallas, 483 F. Supp. 54, 6i (N.D. Tex. 1979) (attributing women's failure to apply for police
work to "job preferences ... born of attitudes conditioned by societal sexist values").
229 See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1302-o8 (N.D. Ill. 1986),
aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
230 See, e.g., Palmer v. Shultz, 8i5 F.2d 84, xio (D.C. Cir. 1987); EEOC v. Akron Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 733, 748 (N.D. Ohio 198o). But see Kraszewski v. State
Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 197, 221 (N.D. Cal. r985) (acknowledging
that women were interested in careers as insurance sales agents "despite difficult family situa-
tions").
231 Studies have universally found that women do far more child care and other domestic
work than men and that married men increase their share of housework very little in response
to increases in their wives' paid employment. See, e.g., B. BERGMANN, supra note i, at 261-
69; S. BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF WORK IN AMERICAN HOUSE-
HOLDS (1985); M. GEERKEN & W. GovE, AT HOME AND AT WoRK: THE FAMILY'S ALLOCATION
OF LABOR (1983). See generally P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note x, at 94-99 (1986)
(summarizing these studies and the prevailing explanation for men's low participation in house-
work).
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This leads to the second, related problem with the liberal story.
Because it denies gender difference, the liberal approach misses the
ways in which employers draw upon societal gender relations to pro-
duce sex segregation at work. The liberal prohibition against stereo-
typing assumes that the problem is that the employer has inaccurately
identified the job interests of (at least some exceptional) women who
have already formed preferences for nontraditional work. By stopping
at this level of analysis, however, liberal courts fall to inquire into or
discover the deeper processes through which employers actively shape
women's work aspirations along gendered lines. The liberal approach
to discriminatory recruiting exemplifies this overly narrow focus.
Through their recruiting strategies, employers do more than simply
publicize job vacancies to those who are already interested: they ac-
tually stimulate interest among those they hope to attract to the jobs.
The harm of sexually discriminatory recruiting is thus not only, or
even primarily, that it falls to provide information about nontradi-
tional job openings to women who have already formed an interest
in those jobs. The deeper harm of discriminatory recruiting is that it
is part of a larger process of investing nontraditional jobs with such
a masculinized image and culture that many women will never picture
themselves as the sort of person the employer has in mind and will
therefore never actualize their potential interest in such jobs. 232 Ev-
idence shows that sex-segregated advertising depicting the "Man for
the Job" in stereotypically masculine terms has precisely this effect. 233
232 This process works in the opposite direction, too, when employers create low-paying jobs
and then recruit in a way, that is designed to attract women. After title VII took effect a
number of employers in the cases in this study transfered some of the responsibilities of an
exclusively male job to a new, much lower-paid job, and then proceeded to construct the new
job as a "female" job by recruiting and hiring all or mostly women. See, e.g., Peltier v. City
of Fargo, 396 F. Supp. 710, 713 (D.N.D. 1975) (involving a female car marker position carved
out of a police officer job), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d 374 (8th
Cir. 1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1150-5I (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(involving a female claims representative position carved out of a claims adjuster job), aff'd,
5uI F.2d 199 (3d Cir. i975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
There is evidence that managers construct new jobs as "female" by designing their recruiting
strategies and even their location decisions specifically with women in mind, so that they may
take advantage of the fact that women are a cheap source of labor. See Kelley, Commentary:
The Need To Study the Transformation of Job Structures, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORK-
PLACE, supra note I, at 261, 264. Some multinational corporations justify hiring women for
the least skilled jobs in ideological terms, citing women's "natural patience" and "manual
dexterity"; they justify paying women low wages by claiming the women do not need to work
and will quit when they get married anyway. See A. FUENTES & B. EHRENREICH, WOMEN
IN THE GLOBAL FACTORY I-I5 (1983).
233 A classic study by Bern and Bern illustrates this point. Whereas only 5% of the women
surveyed expressed interest in nontraditional telephone "lineman" and "frameman" jobs when
the ad described those jobs in sex-biased language, 25% expressed interest when the language
was sex-neutral, and fully 45% expressed interest when the ad was written to appeal to women.
Bern & Bem, Does Sex-Biased Job Advertising 'Aid and Abet' Sex Discrimination?, 3 J. APPLIED
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Nonetheless, even though courts have uniformly held that title VII
prohibits the use of sex-segregated advertising, 234 only two courts have
come close to identifying its deeper harm. 235 Most have simply noted
that it violates title Vil's mandate of gender-neutral treatment and
have not really analyzed the nature of the injury.2 36
Just as sex-segregated advertising constructs an artificial masculine
culture around nontraditional work, so, too, does word-of-mouth re-
cruiting. Drawing on doctrine developed in the race discrimination
context, a few liberal courts have invoked the discriminatory impact
of word-of-mouth recruiting as a rationale for rejecting the lack of
interest argument. These courts might have acknowledged that the
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 6 (1973). Even apparently sex-neutral language can communicate to women
that they are not who the employer had in mind for the job. Cockburn describes the following
ad for an electronics engineer: "Enthusiasm, along with creativity, drive and a clear understand-
ing of your personal contribution are needed in a business where technological limits are
constantly being tested and new frontiers broken and explored." C. CocKBuRN, supra note 14,
at x81. As Cockburn states:
On the face of it, this is not discriminatory wording. But women know how women are
usually defined - not with words like 'drive,' 'limits,' 'test.' [A] woman is likely to read
[this] as addressed not to women but to men. To many women it will be more of a
warning than an invitation.
Id.
234 It was not until 1969, however, that the EEOC guidelines on sex discrimination prohibited
employers from placing neutrally worded advertisements under "Male" or "Female" newspaper
headings. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 604.4(b) (1966) (permitting advertising placements under
"Male" and "Female" headings to convey "that some occupations are considered more attractive
to persons of one sex than the other") with 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1989) (prohibiting such placements
unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job).
235 See Wetzel, 372 F. Supp. at i5o-Si, 1154 (recognizing that the company's use of
separate, heavily gendered recruiting brochures was designed to communicate to women that
the only position appropriate for them was the lower-paying claims representative job, but not
the higher-paying claims adjuster job); see also Kraszewski v. State Farm Ins. Co., 38 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 197, 230-31 (N.D. Cal. z985) (using a similar analysis).
236 See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 252, 266-67, 284 (N.D. Ind. x977);
Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1175, 1179 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 596 F.2d 99 (4 th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929(z979); Peltier v. City of Fargo, 396 F. Supp. 710, 727 (D.N.D. 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1976). Peltier illustrates the pitfalls for plaintiffs
caused by the courts' failure to develop an analysis of the deeper gender dynamics of sexually
discriminatory advertising. The plaintiffs were three women who had been hired in 1973 for
the police department's newly created, all-female car marker position. They claimed that they
had been discriminatorily denied the opportunity to become regular police patrol officers. They
had never applied to be patrol officers, but they testified that they believed it would have been
futile to do so in light of the fact that the department had never hired any women for the job.
Id. at 713-14. The police department had advertised the job as one for males only until the
spring of 1973, when it stopped advertising altogether and began to rely on word-of-mouth
recruiting. Even in the face of this evidence, however, the court held that the fact that the
plaintiffs' failure to apply for the patrol officer job defeated their claims. The court recognized
that the sex-segregated advertising was discriminatory, but it concluded that the advertising
could not have discouraged the plaintiffs from applying, because the last male-only ad had been
placed shortly before the plaintiffs were hired as car markers. See id. at 723.
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harm of word-of-mouth recruiting is not merely that it fails to dissem-
inate job information to women who are already interested in the
work, but that it also actively (if informally)- shapes the potential
interest of women in applying. Word-of-mouth recruiting signals to
women that they would be unwelcome in an occupational culture so
masculinized that the employer relies on male employees to recruit
new workers through mostly male networks. However, the few courts
that have condemned word-of-mouth recruiting have not extended
their reasoning this far. They have portrayed word-of-mouth recruit-
ing not as an active means of creating a gendered occupational culture,
but rather as a passive failure to provide women formally equal access
to information about job opportunities. They have reasoned that
when the employer fails to publicize vacancies for nontraditional jobs,
women who are already interested in those jobs will be less likely
than men to be told about openings by existing male employees.2 37
Though these liberal courts deserve credit for recognizing that lack
of awareness of opportunity poses a barrier for women seeking non-
traditional jobs, 238 their failure to identify the deeper gender dynamics
has restricted application of the word-of-mouth recruiting doctrine and
left it on shaky ground. Ironically, other courts have used the liberal
rhetoric of gender neutrality against itself to transform the word-of-
mouth recruiting doctrine into a defense of sex segregation. In Wilkins
v. University of Houston,2 39 the plaintiffs alleged that "new faculty
members often were selected through operation of an 'old boy network'
by which exclusively male or male-dominated recruitment committees"
237 As one court stated, "[n]o notices of vacancies were ever posted, nor had the Union ever
recommended any of its women members for these positions [as meat-cutters). Consequently
plaintiffs were never informed of the vacancies for which they could apply." Babrocky v. Jewel
Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 1985). Of the 54 sex discrimination claims in my study,
in 17 claims the employer used word-of-mo'uth recruiting. Of these 17 claims, in only eight did
the court rely even in part on the employer's use of word-of-mouth recruiting to reject the lack
of interest argument. See, e.g., Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 686 F.2d 1144, 1148, 1152 (5th
Cir. i982); Davis v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R., 593 F. Supp. 271, 278 & n.i, 279 (E.D. Va.
1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 803 F.2d 1322 (4 th Cir. 1986). Kraszewski
is the only one of these cases in which the court portrayed the use of word-of-mouth recruiting
as an active form of constructing a male-oriented occupational culture rather than a merely
passive form of failing to provide information about job opportunities to already interested
women. Kraszewski, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 228-29 (citing from the company's
own employment manual to show how word-of mouth recruiting inevitably produces candidates
who look just like the men who are recruiting them).
238 An extensive literature documents that male workers are more likely to share job infor-
mation with other men than with women. For this reason, men are more likely to secure their
jobs through personal contacts, while women are more likely to use formal job-search methods.
For a summary of this literature, see Roos & Reskin, Institutional Factors Contributing to Sex
Segregation in the Workplace, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE, cited above in note
1, at 235, 241-42, 245-46.
239 654 F.2d 388 (Sth Cir. I98i), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 8o9 (x982).
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overlooked women. 240 The evidence showed that as many as fifteen
percent of all faculty openings had been filled with "preselected" can-
didates the same day the vacancy was announced, and almost half of
all faculty positions had been filled by men without any women being
considered.241 The plaintiffs invoked a long line of Fifth Circuit race
discrimination doctrine condemning these practices as discriminatory.
But the court dismissed this doctrine as irrelevant, reasoning that "the
obstacle of widespread segregation faced by potential black employees
S.. is not present for women seeking university faculty positions...
[because]... women.., have been educated at the same institutions
and by the same professors as their male counterparts."2 42  In the
world portrayed by the Fifth Circuit, old-boy networks are not part
of college life; female students are just as likely as male students to
be favored by their (mostly male) professors. 243 By failing to recognize
that gender dynamics permeate social life, the court blinded itself to
the processes through which employers extend and strengthen those
same dynamics into the workplace itself. In an effort to ground title
VII in a vision of a gender-neutral world, the liberal story thus renders
invisible the mechanisms of reproducing sex segregation at work. 244
C. The Need for a New Story
The story one tells about women and work has profound impli-
cations for the power of law to dismantle sex segregation in the
workplace. Both the conservative and liberal stories are stories about
women and work; they are not explicitly about law. But intertwined
with their portrayals of women and work are implicit messages - or
"morals"-- about the constitutive and transformative power of title
240 See id. at 399.
241 See id. at 396 n.8, 399.
242 Id. at 400.
243 This, of course, is not true. The New York Times reported the findings of a recent study
which is only "the latest in a steady stream of research over the last two decades showing that
while they may be sitting side by side, male and female [college students] have substantially
different educational experiences." Fiske, Lessons, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 199o, at B8, col. x.
According to Catherine G. Krupnick, the Harvard Graduate School of Education researcher
who conducted the study: "'College catalogues should carry warnings: The value you receive
will depend on your sex.'" Id. Like earlier researchers, Krupnick's study found that "faculty
members consistently take male students and their contributions more seriously than females
and their ideas." Id.
244 Other courts also have refused to characterize word-of-mouth recruiting as sexually
discriminatory. In EEOC v. Service Container Corp., i9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1614
(W.D. Okla. 1976), for example, the plaintiff contended that the plant's reliance on its almost-
exclusively male workforce to recruit new shop workers discriminated against women. The
court disposed of this contention in a sentence, noting that the plaintiff herself "came to work
as a referral." See id. at x616. But the plaintiff had applied because she had learned specifically
that the plant was replacing another female worker, not because she had heard that the plant
was hiring workers generally. See id.
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VII. The conservative story implies that law does not and cannot
influence women's work aspirations. There is a natural order of gen-
der and work that even "an Act of Congress cannot overcome." 245
The liberal story is an inadequate alternative. Indeed, the liberal
story's suppression of gender leaves plaintiffs vulnerable to the con-
servative explanation for sex segregation at work. The partial truth
of the conservative story is that people and jobs are gendered. But
they are not naturally or inevitably so. To provide an adequate
explanation for sex segregation, one must account for how employers
arrange work systems so as to construct work and work aspirations
along gendered lines. The liberal story fails to develop such an ac-
count because it shares the conservative assumption that women form
their work preferences exclusively in early pre-work realms. This
assumption, in turn, leads the liberal approach to adopt an overly
restrictive view of the role title VII can play in dismantling sex
segregation in the workplace. If women have already formed their
job preferences before seeking work, the most the law can do is to
ensure that employers do not erect formal barriers to prevent women
from realizing their preexisting preferences.
There is a need for a new story to make sense of sex segregation
in the workplace. Gender conditioning in pre-work realms is too
slender a reed to sustain the weight of sex segregation. To explain
sex segregation, the law needs an account of how employers actively
construct gendered job aspirations - and jobs - in the workplace
itself.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF GENDER AND WORK
This Part draws on a rich body of recent sociological research to
construct an alternative account of sex segregation in the workplace.
Unlike the liberal story, this account recognizes the reality of gender
in social life. It acknowledges that women and men are subjected to
different expectations and experiences growing up, and that, as a
result, they tend to express preferences for different types of work
early in their lives. But unlike the conservative story, the new account
does not find sex-role conditioning so monolithic or so powerful that
it dictates irrevocably gendered job aspirations. Girls may be taught
to be "feminine," but this does not imply that adult women will aspire
only to traditionally female work throughout their adult lives. Rather,
women's work preferences are formed, created, and recreated in re-
sponse to changing work conditions.
This new account traces gendered work attitudes and behaviors
to organizational structures and cultures in the workplace. Like all
24S EEOC v. Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F. Supp. i, 3 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
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workers, women adapt their work aspirations and orientations ration-
ally and purposefully, but always within and in response to the con-
straints of organizational arrangements not of their own making. Pro-
viding women the formal opportunity to enter nontraditional jobs is
a necessary but insufficient condition to empower them to claim those
jobs, because deeper aspects of work systems pose powerful disincen-
tives for women to enter and remain in nontraditional employment.
The new account of work and gender thus reverses the causation
implicit in the current judicial framework. Sex segregation persists
not because most women bring to the workworld fixed preferences for
traditionally female jobs, but rather because employers structure op-
portunities and incentives and maintain work cultures and relations
so as to disempower most women from aspiring to and succeeding in
traditionally male jobs.
The new account suggests a more transformative role for the law
in dismantling sex segregation at work. Once we realize that women's
work aspirations are shaped not solely by amorphous "social" forces
operating in early pre-work realms, but primarily by the structures of
incentives and social relations within work organizations, it becomes
clear that title VII can play a major role in producing the needed
changes. Title VII cases challenging segregation seek to alter (at least
indirectly) the very structural conditions that prevent women from
developing and realizing aspirations for higher-paid, more challenging
nontraditional jobs. By attributing women's aspirations to forces ex-
ternal and prior to the workworld, courts deny their own ability to
(re)construct workplace arrangements and the work aspirations that
arise out of those arrangements. In a very real sense, the legal system
has perpetuated the status quo of sex segregation by refusing to ac-
knowledge its own power to dismantle it.
A. The Inadequacy of the Pre-Labor Market Explanation
for Sex Segregation in the Workplace
The current judicial framework proceeds from the view that
women bring to the labor market stable, fixed preferences for certain
types of work. Whether women's preferences for traditionally female
work are traced to biological influences or early socialization to "fem-
inine" sex roles, this view attributes workplace segregation to social
forces operating prior to the labor market rather than to forces oper-
ating within the workplace itself. I will refer to this view as the pre-
labor market explanation for workplace segregation by sex.
The pre-labor market explanation depends on two different sets of
assumptions. The first is the assumption that young women emerge
from early life experiences articulating preferences for different types
of work than young men. This assumption is correct. There is,
however, nothing "natural" about the process through which young
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people come to express gendered job aspirations. Girls and boys are
regularly subjected to sex-role conditioning in the family, the schools,
and other early realms of life; they are constantly bombarded with
messages that link "femininity" or "masculinity" to sex-appropriate
work. It is therefore unsurprising that numerous studies have docu-
mented sex differences in the vocational aspirations of children, ado-
lescents, teenagers, and young adults. 24 6 "
This evidence alone, however, is insufficient to support the claim
that workplace segregation exists because women have been socialized
to prefer traditionally female jobs. Women may change their initial
preferences for jobs sex-typed as "female" to jobs sex-typed as "male"
as a result of their experiences at work. If young women change the
sex-type of their early job preferences after they begin working and if
women's initial preferences do not predict the sex-type of the jobs
they perform as their careers unfold, then it is difficult to explain
segregation as a function of women's pre-labor market socialization.
Thus, the pre-labor market explanation depends also on a second set
of assumptions that link the sex-type of women's early work aspira-
tions to the sex-type of the work they do over the course of their
careers.
247
Recent sociological research has demonstrated the weakness of this
link. In his book Revolving Doors, sociologist Jerry Jacobs presents
the most comprehensive quantitative analyses of these issues to
date. 24 8 Jacobs' research presents three propositions that refute the
claim that workplace segregation is attributable to women's pre-labor
market preferences. First, the sex-type of the work to which young
women initially aspire does not remain stable over time, but changes
substantially after they start working.2 49 For the more than eighty
246 See Marini & Brinton, Sex Typing in Occupational Socialization, in SEX SEGREGATION
AND THE WORKPLACE, supra note z, at 192 (describing studies that show differences in young
people's early occupational aspirations and discussing the mechanisms through which their
aspirations come to be gendered).
247 Researchers who explain segregation as a function of pre-labor market socialization have
done little to explore this link. Typically, they point to evidence showing that the level of sex
segregation in young people's occupational aspirations corresponds to the level of sex segregation
in the labor force. See, e.g., id. at 203-04 (concluding that the "overall similarity between the
sex typing of occupational aspirations and attainments indicates that influences prior to labor
market entry play an important role in the determination of occupational outcomes for individ-
uals"). However, they fail to demonstrate any direct connection between the sex-type of early
aspirations and the sex-type of later occupational outcomes.
248 See J. JACOBS, supra note z.
249 Jacobs examined data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLS
Young Women), a survey of a representative sample of more than 5ooo women between the
ages of 14 to 24 in 1968. Each year between i968 and z98o, the women were asked to name
the occupation in which they were employed that year, as well as the occupation to which they
aspired at age 35. See id. at io. Jacobs' analyses treat the sex-type of occupations held or
aspired to as a continuous variable, with each occupation coded from o to ioo percent female.
See id. at 94.
11990] 1817
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
percent of young women who changed their aspirations between 1970
and i98o, the sexual composition of the occupation to which they
aspired in 1970 was only very weakly associated with the sexual
composition of the occupation to which they aspired ten years later.250
Second, the sex-type of the work to which young women initially
aspire does not predict the sex-type of the work they do as their
careers unfold. For the eighty percent of young women who changed
occupations, the sexual composition of the occupations they said they
desired in i970 was not correlated with the sexual composition of the
occupations they actually held in 1980.251 Third, the sex-type of
women's early work does not predict the type of work they do later
in life. For those who changed occupations, there was no correlation
between the sexual composition of the occupations in which they
began and the sexual composition of the occupations in which they
were employed a decade later.25 2 Furthermore, not only young women
change the sex-type of their occupations over time; older women do
also.25 3 Mature women who move into nontraditional occupations
mid-career are almost equally likely to move into them from male-
dominated, female-dominated, and more sexually integrated occupa-
tions.254
Taken together, Jacobs' analyses provide strong evidence that
workplace segregation cannot be attributed solely to women's pre-
labor market preferences. Even if young women's early preferences
perfectly predicted the sex-type of their first jobs, the sex-type of the
occupations to which they aspire changes substantially over time.
Indeed, most young women aspire to both female-dominated and
male-dominated occupations at some point or another during their
2s0 For women who changed their aspirations between 197o and xg8o, less than x% of the
variance in the sex-type of the occupations to which they aspired in 398o was explained by the
sex-type of their 197o aspirations. See id. at 94-96.
251 See id. at 96-97.
252 See id. at 97-98.
253 Jacobs also examined data from the NLS Survey of Mature Women, a representative
sample of over 5ooo women between the ages of 3o and 44 in 1967. See id. at ii. A majority
of these women (58%) changed occupations between 1967 and 1977. See id. at 141 (derived
from table 7.1). For those who changed occupations, there was no correlation between the sex-
type of the occupations in which they were employed in 1967 and 1977. See id. at 340-42.
Indeed, 6i% of the occupation-changers changed the sex-type of their occupations. See id. at
141 (derived from table 7.').
254 See id. (table 7.I). Jacob's findings are consistent with those of other studies of women's
mobility patterns. See Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza, Work Experience, Job Segregation, and
Wages, in SEx SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note I, at 171, X77-78 (finding that
34% of the women in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics survey changed the sex-type of their
occupations between 1975 and 1979); Rosenfeld, Job Changing and Occupational Sex Segrega-
tion: Sex and Race Comparisons, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE, Supra note i, at
56, 63 (finding a low correlation between the sex-type of original and destination occupations
for a sample of women who changed employers between 1972 and 1973).
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early careers. 255 In addition, women's early aspirations bear almost
no relationship to the sex-type of the occupations they hold over time.
If sex segregation were attributable to the fact that women emerged
from early life experiences with stable preferences for work of a certain
sex-type, we would not expect to see so many women moving between
female-dominated and male-dominated occupations.
Furthermore, the fact that women in male-dominated and female-
dominated employment have similar personal histories suggests that
nothing in their backgrounds has led them to approach the labor
market with permanent preferences for "masculine" or "feminine"
work. That women employed in nontraditional occupations often
began in traditionally female ones undercuts the view that nontradi-
tional women workers are an anomalous group of women who some-
how managed to escape socialization to feminine roles. To explain
segregation as a function of women's early socialization, proponents
of this explanation must be able to identify and account for the
personal characteristics that distinguish women who work in nontra-
ditional occupations from the majority who do not. However, re-
searchers have been unable to identify any such demographic char-
acteristics. Mobility studies have found that women's probability of
moving across sex-typed occupational boundaries over time does not
vary significantly by race, age, marital status, or parental status. 25 6
These mobility studies are consistent with other studies finding that
various personal, family-related characteristics - such as marital sta-
tus, 25 7 continuity of labor force participation, 258 or number of
children 259 - do not predict women's likelihood of being employed
255 See J. JACOBS, supra note i, at 1o3. Jacobs found that 49% of the NLS Young Women
aspired to, and 44% worked in, a male-dominated occupation in some survey year between
x968 and ig8o. See id.
256 See id. at 148-49. Jacobs also found that other independent variables - including
number and ages of children, weeks employed, and hours worked per week - did not dra-
matically alter women's occupational mobility patterns. See id. at 149-5o. Jacobs' findings are
consistent with Rosenfeld's, who found that, for both black and white women, the likelihood
of changing the sex-type of their occupations was independent of marital status and whether
they had interrupted their careers to care for children. See Rosenfeld, supra note 254, at 72-
76. Ironically, Rosenfeld found that "[t]he only effect of family responsibility . . . [was] for
white men," who were less likely to move from a male-dominated to a female-dominated
occupation if they were married. Id. at 74 (emphasis in original).
2S7 See, e.g., Belier, Occupational Segregation by Sex: Determinants and Changes, 17 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 371, 383 (1982); England, The Failure of Human Capital Theory To Explain
Occupational Sex Segregation, 17 J. HUM. RESOURCES 358, 367 (1982).
2S8 See, e.g., Corcoran, Duncan & Ponza, supra note 254, at I88; England, supra note 257,
at 368.
259 See Beller, supra note 257, at 384-85; Daymont & Statham, Occupational Atypicality:
Changes, Causes and Consequences, in 5 DUAL CAREERS 107 (L. Shaw ed. i981). Indeed,
Beller found that contrary to conventional predictions, the probability that a woman was
nontraditionally employed actually increased slightly with her number of children. Moreover,
Belier found that, even if women had been identical to men in terms of a number of personal
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in a male-dominated or female-dominated occupation at any given
time. These studies demonstrate that workplace segregation cannot
be attributed to women's different family roles.2 60 The studies do not
imply that women do not assume a greater burden for caring for
families than men. Women do. 261 The studies show only that con-
trary to the conventional wisdom, sex segregation does not persist
because women's commitment to the family leads them to "choose" to
consign themselves to lower-paid, female-dominated occupations.2 62
If sociological evidence refutes the view that workplace segregation
is a function of women's early socialization, it also challenges the
theoretical account of gender implicit in that view. By positing that
women have chosen traditionally female work, the pre-labor market
explanation initially appears to portray women as agents actively
involved in constructing their own work aspirations and identities.
Instead, this-explanation eliminates women's capacity for agency. To
explain segregation as a function of women's own choice, one must
presume that the content of early sex-role conditioning is so coherent
characteristics associated with family responsibilities (for example, marital status, number of
children, number of weeks worked, part-time versus full-time status, and whether the reason
for working part-inie "was "home specialization"), the probability that a woman would have
worked in a nontraditional occupation in 1974 would have increased by only x.x%. See Belier,
supra note 257, at 384-85.
260 See J. JACOBS, supra note i, at igo-gI ("[M]arital and family responsibilities simply are
not powerful factors in producing mobility from male-dominated into female-dominated occu-
pations."); Rosenfeld, supra note 254, at 77 ("For neither white nor black women was there
much support for the idea that extent of family responsibilities influences the chance to move
from or to a sex-typical occupation.").
261 See supra note 231.
262 The fact that women with primary family responsibilities are about as likely as women
without such responsibilities to be found in, or to move to, nontraditional occupations may
reflect a number of underlying phenomena. First, many nontraditional jobs probably do not
pose any greater barriers to family life than do traditionally female jobs. See supra note x98.
Indeed, portraying the jobs men do as inherently more demanding than the jobs women do is
part of the ideological framework that stigmatizes women as marginal workers and justifies
keeping them out of the higher-paying "men's jobs." This is part of the insight of the comparable
worth movement. See Clauss, Comparable Worth - The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and
the Feasibility of Implementation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7 (x986). Second, to the extent that
certain nontraditional jobs may make demands that are difficult for primary family caretakers,
many such women are willing to undertake those demands despite the back-breaking double
burden. Particularly for working-class women, the higher wages for nontraditional jobs enable
them to give their children greater opportunities, such as a college education. See, e.g., M.
WALSHOK, BLUE-COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS ON THE MALE FRONTIER 252 (I98i). As Walshok
explained:
Most of the women with children indicated they would like more time with their children,
but none defined their need for employment as a hardship on children because "what
could I do for my kids and husband just sitting around the house all dayl" This is not
to suggest the women had no problems combining work and family. They clearly
did. . . . In fact, their descriptions of a typical workday showed that most were fully
occupied twelve to fourteen hours a day.
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and its hold on women so permanent that it predetermines what they
do throughout their lives. In adopting this static view of women's
work preferences, the pre-labor market explanation reduces women
to little more than walking embodiments of other people's early role-
expectations for them. Adult women are limited to acting out "femi-
nine" scripts others wrote for them while they were children.
In fact, the content of early socialization is neither monolithic nor
uniform. Girls receive ambiguous and inconsistent signals that en-
courage them in some stereotypically masculine behavior as well as
stereotypically feminine behavior.263 In addition, children do not al-
ways conform to even the clearest parental expectations, but respond
to parental and other messages with their own interpretations.2 64 In
light of these factors, it is not surprising that women emerge from
early socialization with work attitudes and preferences that are open
and subject to revision. Neither life nor people are static. Even if
the main thrust of women's early training is to reward them for
appropriate sex-role behavior, socialization is not a straitjacket that
predetermines that adult women will aspire only to work defined by
the dominant culture as feminine. 265
Christine Williams' recent study of women in the Marines confirms
this point.266 One would be hard-pressed to think of an occupation
263 See K. GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT WORK, CAREER, AND
MOTHERHOOD 53-55 (i985). Gerson did a life-history analysis of a group of women between
the ages of 27 and 37, with varying socioeconomic backgrounds and work histories. When
asked about parental expectations while growing up, only 32% of the women responded that
their parents had stressed the importance of marriage and family above all else. An almost
equal proportion (27%) reported that their parents had placed greater value on education, work,
and economic self-sufficiency than on marriage and parenting. Another 17% could not recall
their parents expressing any strong expectations. The remaining 25% stated that they had
received mixed messages: the importance of education, work and economic independence had
been stressed, while marriage, motherhood, and homemaking had been assumed. See id. at
54-
264 See id. at 198.
26s Gerson confirms this theme of change and development over time. Of the women she
studied, 55% stated that they had emerged from childhood with "domestic" orientations, in
which they expected their primary roles to be marriage, mothering, and homemaking. The
other 45% reported early "nondomestic" orientations, in which they looked with indifference or
disdain on domesticity and expected to devote themselves primarily to wage work instead. See
id. at 59-65. Both groups of women deviated substantially from their original orientations as
they moved into adulthood. Of those who reported early domestic orientations, 67% changed
their orientations to nondomestic ones as adults, and of those who reported nondomestic origins,
63% became domestically oriented as adults. See id. at 67. Furthermore, neither parental
expectations nor maternal role models predicted whether the women took domestic or non-
domestic paths. Of those whose parents had stressed marriage and family, only 47% were
domestically oriented as adults; of those whose parents had stressed education, work, and self-
sufficiency, only 62% held primarily nondomestic orientations as adults. See id. at 55.
2 6 6 See C. WILLIAMS, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: WOMEN AND MEN IN NONTRA-
DITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 78-79 (1989).
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our culture defines as more quintessentially masculine than the U.S.
Marine Corps. Yet Williams found that women Marines were no
different - no less "feminine" - than other women. 267 Most women
in the Marines "value[d] femininity and identif[ied] themselves as
feminine," 268 but they had a complex sense of feminine identity that
did not preclude them from engaging in masculine occupational pur-
suits. As one recruit struggled to explain: "We're equal with the men,
but you can distinguish the difference. The men do it rough, and we
do it rough, but we still have the feminine within ourselves ....
We do the same things men do, but we're still women, ico percent
women." 269 For these women, femininity meant "self-confidence and
self-respect - basic human qualities we tend not to associate with
gender at all." 270
Like the quantitative studies, Williams' research refutes the claim
that only unusual women who managed to escape early conditioning
to feminine sex-roles will aspire to nontraditional work. It is only
within the context of their work experiences that women even come
to develop stable work aspirations and identities. Mary Washok's
Blue-Collar Women provides a vivid and comprehensive documenta-
tion of this process. 271 Walshok found that women employed in non-
traditional blue-collar trades acquired definite work preferences and a
stable work role identity only after "a number of on-the-job experi-
ences and trial and error experiments." 272  Like the nontraditional
women workers studied by other researchers, 273 the women in Wal-
267 Few women joined the Marines out of a desire to defy traditional sex roles. They joined
the Marines for pragmatic reasons, most notably a desire for financial security and career
advancement. They almost universally planned to combine childrearing with their military
careers; many enlisted to support their children. See id. at 72-74.
268 Id. at 75.
269 Id. at 6. Many of the women also refused to accept the cultural construction of the
military as inherently "masculine." Some of them insisted, for example, that the Marine's basic
training in discipline and deference was no different from Catholic schoolgirls' education. See
id. at 141.
270 Id. at 79. If the women did not view nontraditional work as inconsistent with their
womanhood, most were also disdainful of women who tried to "use" their womanhood to obtain
special favors. True "femininity," for them, lay in a sense of dignity and self-worth that was
incompatible with "using the fact that you're feminine . . . . to get out of things." See id. at
77.
271 See M. WALSHOK, supra note 262. Two more recent books include detailed interviews
with women in nontraditional blue-collar occupations. See M. MARTIN, HARD-HATTED
WOMEN: STORIES OF STRUGGLE AND SUCCESS IN THE TRADES (x988); J. SCHROEDEL, ALONE
IN A CROWD: WOMEN IN THE TRADES TELL THEIR STORIES (1985).
272 M. WALSHOK, supra note 262, at x15-16.
273 See K. DEAUX & J. ULLMAN, supra note 25, at 74 (reporting that of the 103 women in
nontraditional jobs in the steel industry, the vast majority had previously been employed in
traditionally female jobs); M. MARTIN, supra note 271 (revealing that of the i8 women who
discussed their employment history, 14 had previously worked in female-dominated jobs); J.
SCHROEDEL, supra note 271 (revealing that of the 25 women in nontraditional blue-collar jobs,
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shok's study moved to nontraditional employment from traditionally
female work. 2 74 They began in female occupations "not because of a
strong preference for that kind of work, but because there were no
alternatives. '275 As a consequence of limited opportunities, both the
college graduates and the less educated women had erratic and unsta-
ble work histories - moving in and out of low-paying, dead-end,
female-dominated jobs. These women had formed no real preference
for any particular type of work before they began working in nontra-
ditional jobs. They discovered their commitment to nontraditional
work, and their identities as committed workers, only as a result of
encountering opportunities that became available to them after they
had been in the labor force for years. More than half the women had
held no prior interest in the nontraditional trade they eventually en-
tered or even in nontraditional work generally.276 Indeed, most of
the women knew little or nothing about the jobs they moved into
before they were trained for them. 277
These women's experiences point up the central flaw in the pre-
labor market explanation for sex segregation. As Walshok points out,
the pre-labor market explanation assumes that
a certain amount of interest, planning, and preparation precede actual
decisions about employment . . . . In contrast, the experiences of
these women in the workplace and their exposure to' opportunities
seemed more crucial to the development of their vocational interests
than advance planning, preparation, or reinforcement from a teacher,
parent, or counselor. 278
2o had previously held female-dominated jobs); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN TRADITION-
ALLY MALE JOBS: THE EXPERIENCE OF TEN PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANIES 35-37 (1978) (re-
vealing that of women in nontraditional jobs in utility companies, most had begun in clerical
jobs).
274 See M. WALSHOK, supra note 262, at 121.
27S Id. at 12o. All of the women, including college graduates, reported that their "employ-
ment opportunities [had been] limited primarily to clerical jobs, waitressing, housecleaning, and
factory work." Id. at 121.
276 See id. at 138. As one female mechanic put it: "I never made a conscious decision to
become a mechanic, y'know, for that to be my skill or my trade. I don't remember that
happening. It is now. And I think this is pretty much my life's work." Id. at 156.
277 As one female aircraft production control trainee explained: "I didn't know anything
about aircraft other than to see them fly.... I didn't know what to expect, but I knew that
I would be trained." Id. at 136. Another female stationary engineer did not even know what
her own father had done for a living until after she had decided on her own to enter his trade.
See M. MARTIN, supra note 271 at 39. While her story may seem amusing, it is also telling.
It reveals that many fathers do not pass on knowledge of their trades to daughters the way they
have passed it on to their sons and nephews. Thus, informal social networks for sharing
occupational knowledge and skill remain gendered, even if some courts refuse to acknowledge
this truth. See, e.g., Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 809 (1982); supra pp. 1813-14 (discussing Wilkins).
278 M. NVALSHOK, supra note 262, at 132-33 (footnote omitted).
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Thus, the women's work preferences and commitments evolved and
stabilized only as a result of employment opportunities and experi-
ences. Prior interests and commitments did not lead women to the
jobs. 279
At one level, these observations seem astonishingly simple. It
seems obvious that socialization does not grind to a halt when young
women emerge from childhood, but continues behind the office door
or factory gate to influence their attitudes and aspirations as adult
workers. This simple point has profound implications, however. It
challenges much of what has been taken for granted about how gender
is reproduced in our society. The conventional view embodied in the
law portrays women's attitudes and identities as constructed exclu-
sively in private, pre-labor market spheres. Yet, the research mar-
shalled here suggests that women's aspirations and identities are con-
structed in the public world of work as well. This, in turn, has
important public policy implications. As one researcher put it, early
socialization is a necessary but insufficient condition to account for
sex segregation at work. Keeping women in their place economically
requires a lifelong system of social control that must be exercised
powerfully within the workplace itself.2 80
B. The Construction of Gender in the Workplace
An emerging perspective in the sociological literature provides an
alternative to the pre-labor market explanation for sex segregation in
the workplace. This alternative perspective begins from the premise
that people's work aspirations are shaped by their experiences in the
279 See id. at 132. Walshok suggests that the assumption that people form their work
aspirations before they enter the workworld is class-biased. Since women from upper-middle-
class families do not necessarily take paid employment for granted, they have the luxury of
clarifying their work values and interests before they enter the labor market. Working-class
women, however, must begin working early in life in whatever jobs they can get. Thus,
"employment may be the first step and the primary context in which [their] values and interests
become solidified. . . . [They] might discover a whole world of unanticipated interests and
abilities on the job which then become the impetus for training or education at a later phase in
life." Id. at 272.
The assumption that career development proceeds in a linear sequence with stable values
and interests leading people to enter certain lines of work seems to capture the experience of
professionals better than that of working-class people. Jacobs suggests, however, that this linear
model may not accurately describe the experience of many middle-class women, either. In his
case studies of women in medicine and law, he found that substantial numbers of women entered
these professions mid-career, after beginning in female-dominated occupations. Thus, contrary
to the pre-labor market perspective, women physicians and lawyers were not necessarily raised
with atypical sex-role expectations. Many contested their early socialization and entered male-
dominated professions when the opportunity became available. See J. JACOBS, supra note i, at
155-64.
280 See J. JACOBS, supra note i, at 48.
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workworld. 281 It examines how structural features of work organi-
zations reduce women's incentive to pursue nontraditional work and
encourage them to display the very work attitudes and behavior that
come to be viewed as preexisting gender attributes. 282
The central insight of this perspective is that adults' work attitudes
and behavior are shaped by the positions they occupy within larger
structures of opportunity, rewards, and social relations in the work-
place. Perhaps for this reason, this perspective has been coined "the
new structuralism." 283 But it should not be mistaken for deterministic
theories that portray people as having no capacity for agency, for it
emphasizes that people act reasonably and strategically within the
constraints of their organizational positions in an effort to make the
best of them. 284 Indeed, this perspective endows people with an
ongoing capacity for agency that is missing from early socialization
theories. People's work aspirations and behavior are "the result of a
sense-making process involving present experiencing and future pro-
jecting, rather than of psychological conditioning in which the dim
past is a controlling force." 285
This perspective sheds light on the workplace dynamics that limit
women's ability to claim higher-paid nontraditional work as their own.
Women's patterns of occupational movement suggest that there are
powerful disincentives for women to move into and to remain in
nontraditional occupations. The mobility studies show that women
in higher-paying, male-dominated occupations are much less likely to
remain in such occupations over time than are women in lower-paying
female-dominated occupations, who are more likely to stay put. 286
281 As Rosabeth Moss Kanter has written:
[To a very large degree, organizations make their workers into who they are. Adults
change to fit the system. . . . [O]rganizations often act as though it is possible to predict
people's job futures from the characteristics they bring with them [to] a recruiting inter-
view. What really happens is that predictions get made on the basis of stereotypes and
current notions of who fits where in the present system; people are then "set up" in
positions which make the predictions come true.
R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 263 (977).
282 See id. at 9.
283 See P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note I, at 140. "[R]esearch [in this tradition]
implies that individuals develop the psychological styles required to survive in the structural
position they hold. . . . [B]ehavioral differences between groups are a product of the jobs they
have been allowed to enter, rather than being exogenous to actual work experience." Id. at
138.
284 See R. KANTER, supra note 281, at 251-52.
285 Id. at 252.
286 See J. JACOBS, supra note I, at 141. Overall, 70.4% of the NLS mature women who
were employed in female-dominated occupations in 1967 remained in female occupations in
1977, but only 46.9% of the women who were employed in male-dominated occupations re-
mained in male occupations a decade later. See id. at 141-42. This pattern reflects a dispro-
portionate - and alarmingly high - rate of female attrition from male-dominated occupations.
Of the women who left male-dominated occupations between 2967 and 1977, only 19.5% moved
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Thus, just as employers appear to have begun opening the doors to
nontraditional jobs to women, almost as many women have been
leaving those jobs as have been entering them. 28 7 To the extent that
women have been given the formal opportunity to do nontraditional
work, something is preventing them from realizing that opportunity.
The new structuralism perspective instructs us to look beyond
formal labor market opportunity and to ask what it is about the
workplace itself that disempowers women from permanently seizing
that opportunity. Research in this tradition directs us toward the
"culture-producing" aspects of work organizations, 28 8 examining
whether there is "something in the relations of employment, in work
culture, the way jobs are defined and distinguished from each other,
that conspires to keep women from even aspiring to [nontraditional]
work."28 9 I analyze below two structural features of work organiza-
tions that discourage women from pursuing nontraditional work. 290
These two structural features interact dynamically to construct work
and workers along gendered lines - the first on the "female" side and
the second on the "male" side.
to other male-dominated occupations, while 43.2% switched to female-dominated occupations
and 37.4% to more sexually integrated ones. But of those who left female-dominated occupa-
tions, 45.1% moved to other female occupations and 35.3% to more sexually integrated ones,
while only i9.6% switched to male-dominated occupations. See id. at i41.
287 Because the absolute number of women who began in female-dominated occupations was
much greater than the number who began in male-dominated occupations, the relatively low
proportion of women who shifted from female to male occupations between r967 and 1977
caused a net increase in the overall share of women in male occupations. In other words, in
absolute numbers, more women entered male-dominated occupations than left them, and, thus,
the overall level of sex segregation declined slightly during the 1970's. Had there been less
attrition of women from male occupations, however, the level of segregation would have declined
much more dramatically. Jacobs found that this same "revolving door" pattern continued into
the 198o's:
In recent years, for every ioo women in male-dominated occupations who were employed
in two consecutive years, go remained in a male-dominated occupation, while io left for
either a sex-neutral or female-dominated occupation. At the same time, ii entered a
male-dominated occupation from one of these other occupation groups. Thus, the re-
volving door sends out io for every ii it lets in.
Id. at 4.
288 C. COCKBURN, supra note 14, at 167. A number of other British and Australian re-
searchers have done theoretical and empirical work from this perspective, examining how gender
both structures and is constructed within the labor process itself. See, e.g., V. BEECHEY & T.
PERKINS, supra note 14; A. GAME & R. PRINGLE, GENDER AT WORK (1983); Scott, Industrial-
ization, Gender Segregation, and Stratification Theory, in GENDER AND STRATIFICATION 154
(R. Crompton & M. Mann eds. 1986).
289 C. CocKwuRN, supra note r4, at i65.
290 By focusing on these two phenomena, I do not mean to suggest that they are the only
features of the workplace that contribute to women's disempowerment. See, e.g., Roos &
Reskin, supra note 238, at 235-60 (describing numerous institutional mechanisms that limit
women's ability to enter nontraditional jobs); supra pp. 1811-13 (discussing how employers'
recruiting strategies discourage women from aspiring to nontraditional work).
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i. The Structures of Mobility and Reward for Traditionally Female
Jobs. - It is an old insight that people who are placed in jobs that
offer little opportunity for growth or upward mobility will adapt to
their situations by lowering their work aspirations and turning their
energies elsewhere. Decades ago, researchers documented this phe-
nomenon among male workers. 291 Indeed, men in low-mobility po-
sitions display orientations toward work that conventional stereotypes
reserve for women. They do not define work as a central life interest,
but focus instead on non-work activities. 292 They dream of escape
from their jobs and often interrupt their careers. 293 They value ex-
trinsic aspects of their jobs, including sociability with their co-workers,
more than the intrinsic aspects of the work itself. 294 They also insist
that they are content not to be promoted.295
It was not until recently, however, that this same insight began to
be applied to female workers. 296 Within firms, jobs are highly seg-
regated by sex.29 7 Female-dominated jobs tend to be on distinct
promotional ladders that offer far less opportunity for advancement
than do those for male-dominated jobs.2 98 In light of these unequal
mobility structures, "[w]omen in low-mobility .. .situations develop
attitudes and orientations that are sometimes said to be characteristic
291 See, e.g., R. BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM (1964); E. CHINOY, AUTOMOBILE
WORKERS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM (1955); T. PURCELL, BLUE COLLAR MAN: PATTERNS
OF DUAL ALLEGIANCE IN INDUSTRY (1960); Dubin, Industrial Workers' Worlds: A Study of the
"Central Life Interests" of Industrial Workers, 3 SoC. PROBS. 131 (1956); Guest, Work Careers
and Aspirations of Automobile Workers, 19 AM. SOC. REV. 155 (,954); see also R. KANTER,
supra note 281, at 140, 143, 147-48 (summarizing these and other similar studies).
292 See E. CHINOY, supra note 291, at 114-15, 130, 132-133; Dubin, supra note 291, at 13l,
135.
243 See E. CHINOY, supra note 291, at 74, 82-83, 85-86, 118-2o; Guest, supra note 291, at
158-59, 162-63; Mayer & Goldstein, Manual Workers as Small Businessmen, in BLUE COLLAR
WORLD, 537, 539-43 (A. Shostak & W. Gomberg eds. 1964).
294 See, e.g., Pennings, Work-Value Systems of White-Collar Workers, i5 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
397, 401-02 (1970); Tichy, An Analysis of Clique Formation and Structure in Organizations, i8
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 194, 195-96, 204-05 (i973). See generally R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 319-22, 347 (1968) (noting that in high-mobility systems, individuals com-
pare themselves with those higher in rank in a process of "anticipatory socialization," but that
in low-mobility systems, individuals compare themselves with their peers and develop group
solidarity).
29S See E. CHINOY, supTra note 291, at 47-50, 59-60, 62, III-I2; T. PURCELL, supra note
291, at 125-26, 269; Guest, supra note 291, at 157-59.
296 For a critique of earlier sociological studies analyzing men's relationship to employment
on a "job model" while analyzing women's on a "gender model," see Feldberg & Glenn, Male
and Female: Job Versus Gender Models in the Sociology of Work, 26 SoC. PROBLEMS 524 (1979).
297 See, e.g., Bielby & Baron, supra note i, at 27, 35; Gutek & Morasch, supra note i, at
61-62.
298 See Hartmann, Internal Labor Markets and Gender: A Case Study of Promotion, in
GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE 59, 59-66 (C. Brown & J. Pechman eds. 1987) (reviewing studies
documenting the existence of separate internal career ladders for men and women); Roos &
Reskin, supra note 238, at 248-5I (same).
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of those people as individuals or 'women as a group,' but that can
more profitably be viewed as universal human responses to blocked
opportunities." 299
Kanter's study of secretaries in a major industrial corporation
vividly portrays this point. The corporation recruited its secretaries
from parochial high schools, attended mostly by young women who
were accustomed to taking orders and who had had little opportunity
to develop habits of independence and initiative. Once hired, secre-
taries had no opportunity to move upward in the organization. They
could not switch to the managerial track. Their own ladder was
short, with their formal rank derivative of their bosses': climbing to
"the top" meant only snaring a boss who was higher up in the man-
agerial hierarchy. Bosses rewarded secretaries for their attitudes in-
stead of their skills and their loyalty instead of their talent. An
analysis of their performance evaluations showed that bosses valued
them most highly for "enthusiasm" and "personal service orientation."
In exchange, secretaries were offered non-utilitarian, symbolic rewards
- such as "praise" and "love" - rather than money or career ad-
vancement. 300
The corporation's secretaries tended to display work attitudes and
behaviors that are commonly perceived to be attributes of "femininity."
Many were narrowly devoted to their individual bosses, timid and
self-effacing, dependent on praise, and given to emotionality and gos-
sip. But it was the their position within the organization and the
structure of incentives attached to their jobs that led them to develop
these orientations. 30 1 To be good secretaries, they were required to
display the "feminine" behaviors that are commonly viewed as an
extension of women's intrinsic personalities. 30 2
299 R. KANTER, supra note 281, at 159 (emphasis in original); see also Laws, Psychological
Dimensions of Labor Force Participation of Women, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
AND THE AT&T CASE, supra note 25, at 125, 141 ("When women lower their occupational
aspirations, this may reflect a realistic assessment of their chances for success.").
300 See R. KANTER, supa note 281, at 69-91.
301 See id. at 92-99.
302 There are several ways in which employers have structured traditionally female jobs so
as to require or encourage women to display behaviors that are commonly viewed as preexisting
attributes of womanhood. See, e.g., V. BEECHEY & T. PERKINS, supra note 14, at 45-76, 77-
ioi (showing how employers have built gender into the way they structure hours, achieving
flexibility in male jobs by adding overtime to full-time jobs, but doing so in female jobs by
constructing them as part-time); S. COHN, THE PROCESS OF OCCUPATIONAL SEx-TYPING: THE
FEMINIZATION OF CLERICAL LABOR IN GREAT BRITAIN 9i-ii5 (1985) (showing how employers
have forced women to quit work when they marry as a way of lowering labor costs in certain
female jobs and have legitimated such "marriage bars" by describing women as uncommitted to
wage work); B. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 134-36, 142-46 (i985) (showing how
employers have built sexual attractiveness into the very definition of what is required to do
traditionally female jobs).
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Like the blue-collar men studied by an earlier generation of soci-
ologists, Kanter's secretaries adjusted to their realistically nonexistent
possibility of advancement by rating the desirability of promotion
relatively low. 30 3 Similarly, they began to value social relations at
work over the intrinsic aspects of the job itself, developing close
relationships with their peers in a counterculture that valued mutual
aid and loyalty over individual mobility and "success. °30 4 The cor-
poration's "folk wisdom" maintained that only women would be wor-
ried about taking a promotion because it would mean leaving their
friends. But the men in low-opportunity positions exhibited the same
concern.305 Thus, women's work aspirations and orientations are,
like men's, shaped by their opportunities for mobility and the social
organization of their jobs. 306
The stories of blue-collar tradeswomen illustrate the converse effect
on women's aspirations created by the opportunity to enter nontradi-
tional jobs offering higher wages, challenge, and the chance for ad-
vancement. These women's interest and commitment to nontradi-
tional work seemed almost fortuitous, the by-product of being lucky
enough to encounter some opportunity to move into a job offering
greater personal growth and rewards. However, the fact that they
encountered such an opportunity was not mere happenstance, but a
direct consequence of the fact that their employers felt legal pressures
to hire women. 30 7 Many of these women cited the significance of
affirmative action in influencing them to pursue nontraditional work.
For them, sex-neutral recruiting efforts would have been insufficient.
It was important for them to hear that the employer was actively
seeking women workers - not just looking for workers in general
(which they would have understood to mean men). When they heard
that some nontraditional job was opening up specifically for women308
303 Kanter found that the mean score on a measure of motivation to be promoted was lower
for nonmanagerial women workers (mostly secretaries) than for nonmanagerial men. However,
the men's objective prospects for promotion were also better. Indeed, the women consistently
rated their promotional prospects as more desirable than likely. They believed they had no
chance of escaping low-level, female-dominated jobs. See R. KANTER, supra note 281, at 14o-
42.
3o4 See id. at 149-52.
3os See id. at I51.
306 See id. at 159.
307 Many women understood that they had obtained their jobs only as a result of legal
pressures. See, e.g., M. MARTIN, supra note 271, at 15o ("The company was pushing affirmative
action, because it had a class-action suit brought against it by a group of women in the mines
in r973. I was hired four years after the suit was filed, but even then, there were only a few
women working for the company."); id. at 71 ("The process of entering the San Francisco Police
Department... started for me in 1973. That's when community groups got together and fied
a suit to open up the job to women and minorities . . . .).
308 As one former secretary explained: "I didn't start thinking about non-traditional work
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or saw other women performing nontraditional work,,0 9 or made
contact with community-based programs designed specifically to at-
tract and support women in nontraditional work,310 many of them
perceived for the first time that they could aspire to nontraditional
jobs.
Once they began doing nontraditional jobs, these women became
highly motivated workers who defined work as a central life interest
and who valued the intrinsic aspects of their work. Although many
of the women had originally moved into nontraditional work because
they needed the money, the job quickly became more than a paycheck.
The women in Walshok's study valued four things most highly about
their work: (i) productivity, or "a feeling of having done something
constructive, of having accomplished something with one's time";311
(2) challenge, or "a new or unusual experience, that requires a woman
to stretch herself, to reach, to grow";312 (3) autonomy, or the oppor-
tunity to work independently and to exercise discretion about how to
control the timing and sequencing of one's work;313 and (4) relatedness,
or "feeling as if one's 'in the swim of things', in the 'mainstream' of
life."314 Indeed, women may appreciate these features of nontradi-
until I heard the carpenters were looking for women. . . . But as soon as the possibility was
mentioned, my imagination went with it." J. SCHROEDEL, supra note 271, at 35.
309 One woman described the transformative power of seeing women doing nontraditional
work as follows:
When I came out here I fell in with some women who worked in the trades and they
had some potiucks for women in the building trades and I went there and I saw all these
women and I was real excited - I thought, "Oh, yeah, that's who I am, I'm like those
women over there."
M. WALSHOK, supra note 262, at 137-38; see also id. at 163-64 (describing a similar transfor-
mation).
3 10 As one woman who became a sailor explained:
[I]t wasn't until I moved to Seattle when I was surrounded by organizations and groups
that seemed encouraging of this - just seeing flyers about workshops on women in non-
traditional trades, having Mechanica available where you could learn the details about
steps in joining a union. That's when it became a real possibility.
J. SCHROEDEL, supra note 271, at 77; see also M. WALSHOK, supra note 262, at 167-68
(discussing the importance of community-based programs in inspiring and helping women enter
nontraditional trades); Law, supra note 163, at 45-46, 53-55, 72-76 (same).
311 M. WALSHOK, supra note 262, at 140.
312 Id. at 142.
313 See id. at 147-48.
314 Id. at 145. Other studies have reported that women in blue-collar trades value the
challenge, freedom, and intrinsic rewards of the job, just as their male co-workers do. See,
e.g., K. DEAUX & J. ULLILAN, supra note 25, at 131-33. The women speak movingly of the
exhilaration that comes with challenge and freedom on the job. See, e.g., M. MARTIN, supra
note 271, at 167-68. One female firefighter stated:
For nine days, I was part of the biggest [fire] incident I ever expect to see. . . . I've
never worked as hard as I did on some of those hot afternoons, pulling those lines around
in the mud and rocks .... Events that demand everything you can give leave you with
1830 V'ol. 103:1749
TELLING STORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND WORK
tional work even more than men do, because they contrast so favor-
ably with the characteristics of female-dominated jobs available to
working-class women.315
If there is tragedy in this account of how work aspirations and
behaviors come to be gendered, there is also potential for hope. If
women's work orientations are attributable not to their individual
"feminine" characteristics, but rather to the structures of mobility and
rewards attached to jobs, then the solution is to change the work
structures. 316 Classwide title VII suits challenging sex discrimination
in promotion hold the promise to do just that. In alleging that women
on the female job ladder are systematically being denied promotion
into better jobs on the male job ladder, plaintiffs seek to restructure
internal career ladders to create new paths up and out of entry-level
female jobs for all women (and not just an exceptional few). 317 Courts
can order remedies that will prompt employers to restructure those
ladders in ways that will infuse women workers with new hopes and
aspirations. 318 In doing so, they may also stimulate employers to
an unconquerable feeling of exuberance that lasts well beyond fatigue. Given the choice,
there was no place in the world I would rather have been.
Id.; see also J. SCHROEDEL, supra note 271, at 14 ("That is the greatest feeling in the world -
the music, the sun, and wheeling along the freeway [in my truck]. . . . I like being on the
road where you haven't got somebody looking over your shoulder, bitching all the time.").
315 See M. WALSHOK, supra note 262, at xix-xx.
316 For suggestions for how to change work structures in ways that will both reduce sex
segregation and improve the quality of worklife for all workers, see C. COcKBuRN, cited above
in note 14, at 242-44; and R. KANTER, cited above in note 281, at 267-84.
317 In several cases, plaintiffs have alleged that women in entry-level female jobs were
systematically denied promotion or transfer into higher-paid male jobs on separate career ladders.
See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd on other grounds,
647 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 198i); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa.
1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d igg (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 424 U.S.
737 (1976); see also B. BERMAWN, supra note i, at io6-io (discussing these two cases). In
other cases, women employed in what we think of as nontraditional positions (such as manage-
ment) have alleged that they were disproportionately denied promotion into the upper echelons
or were given discriminatory work assignments that decreased their chances for promotion later.
See, e.g., Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Leisner v. New York Tel. Co., 358
F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
318 Although traditional goals and timetables probably provide the best incentive for em-
ployers to change practices that lead to segregation, some lower courts who have held employers
liable for sex segregation have declined to impose such numerical relief. See, e.g., Catlett v.
Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 126o, 1268-69 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1021 (1988); Jordan v. Wright, 417 F. Supp. 42, 45 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Recent Supreme
Court decisions permit the trial courts to use flexible long-term goals as remedies for proven
patterns of discrimination, but establish relatively high standards that may make it even easier
for trial courts who are so inclined to refuse to grant such relief. See United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149, x67 (1987) (holding numerical relief permissible under the fourteenth amendment
when the employer has engaged in "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate" conduct); Local 28,
Sheet Metal Workers' Intl Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986) (holding numerical relief
permissible under title VII when the employer has engaged in "persistent or egregious discrim-
ination or when necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination").
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redefine the content of entry-level jobs traditionally done by women
in less stereotypically feminine terms. 319
Unfortunately, the courts all too often fail to respond, and in the
process, they reproduce the very rationalizations for the two-tier sys-
tem that keeps so many women in their place. When courts accept
employers' arguments that women in female jobs lack interest in being
promoted, they reinforce the sexist notion that there is something
about womanhood itself that endows women with a penchant for low-
paying, dead-end jobs. By refusing to intervene, they permit employ-
ers to continue to structure career ladders in ways that will encourage
women to develop the depressed aspirations that can later be identified
as "proof" that they preferred to be stuck at the bottom all along.
Through their statements and their actions, these courts undercut
women's ability to form and exercise the very choice they purport to
defend.
2. The Work Cultures of Traditionally Male Jobs. - While sepa-
rate-but-unequal job structures encourage women to lower their work
aspirations, they also imply that segregation is natural in a way that
encourages male workers to adopt proprietary attitudes toward "their"
jobs. These attitudes encapsulate male-dominated jobs in a web of
social relations that are hostile and alienating to women who dare to
upset the "natural" order of segregation. I refer to the entire bundle
of practices and processes through which these relations are created
and sustained as harassment. 320 Overtly sexual behavior is only the
tip of a tremendous iceberg that confronts women in nontraditional
jobs. 321 They face a wide-ranging set of behaviors and attitudes by
319 See, e.g., G. NIELSEN, FROM SKY GIRL TO FLIGHT ATTENDANT: WOMEN AND THE
MAKING OF A UNION 8I-IO3 (1982) (describing how early title VII decisions helped redefine the
flight attendant job in less patronizing, more professional terms).
320 In contrast to my definition of harassment, the legal system focuses on conduct that is
explicitly "sexual" in nature. EEOC guidelines, for example, define harassment in these terms:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature . . . when (I) submission to such conduct is made explicitly
or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment.
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § x604.1i(a) (1989) (emphasis
added). Drawing on the guidelines, legal doctrine recognizes two different types of sexual
harassment: (i) "quid pro quo" harassment, in which women workers are asked to grant sexual
favors at the risk of forfeiting some employment benefit; and (2) "hostile environment harass-
ment," in which conduct by supervisors or co-workers is "sufficiently severe or pervasive, to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive work environment."
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (iith Cir. 1982)); see also C. MACKINNON, supra note 212, at 32-47 (describing these
forms of harassment).
321 For women in male-dominated jobs, harassment is less likely to take the form of super-
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their male supervisors and co-workers that make the culture of non-
traditional work hostile and alienating. 322 The following statement
by a woman welder captures a sense of what is involved:
It's a form of harassment every time I pick up a sledgehammer and
that prick laughs at me, you know. It's a form of harassment when
the journeyman is supposed to be training me and it's real clear to
me that he does not want to give me any information
whatsoever.... It's a form of harassment when the working foreman
puts me in a dangerous situation and tells me to do something in an
improper way and then tells me, Oh, you can't do that! It's a form
of harassment when someone takes a tool out of my hand and said,
Oh, I'm going to show you... and he grabs the sledgehammer from
my hand and proceeded to . . . show me how to do this thing . . .
you know, straighten up a post . . . it's nothing to it, you just bang
it and it gets straight . . . . It's a form of harassment to me when
they call me honey and I have to tell them every day, don't call me
that, you know, I have a name printed right on my thing.... Ah,
you know, it's all a form of harassment to me. It's not right. They
don't treat each other that way. They shouldn't treat me that way.323
Harassment is a structural feature of the workplace that sex seg-
regation engenders. 324 It creates a serious disincentive for women to
enter and remain in nontraditional jobs. Even overtly sexual harass-
visors' demands for sexual favors and more likely to take the form of sexual taunts and other
actions by co-workers that are part of a larger pattern of hostility intended to drive the women
away. Foremen and supervisors usually tolerate or cooperate in the harassment. See Crull,
Searching for the Causes of Sexual Harassment: An Examination of Two Prototypes, in HIDDEN
AsPEcTs OF WOMEN'S WORK, supra note 17, at 225, 228-30; Pollack, Sexual Harassment:
Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 37, 50 n.51 (199o).
322 See M. MARTIN, supra note 271, at io. This broader form of harassment is so much a
part of the "normal" environment of traditionally male-dominated trades that some researchers
do not even attempt to measure it. Mary Walshok observed, for example, that it is "normal"
for men in blue-collar trades
to question the sincerity of the woman's interest and commitment to a man's job, to
wonder about whether or not the woman was going to get married and take off or get
pregnant, to question whether the woman had technical or mechanical competence or
the physical strength and agility to do the job, and to resent women because they
perceived them as taking away a job from one of their own.
M. WALSHOK, supra note 262, at 211. This led Walshok to define "negative work environments"
as those that go beyond this "normal" treatment to involve "actual acts of hostility or sabotage,
withholding of opportunities for information and training, persistent sexual innuendos, and open
harassment." Id. at 211-12. Even using this narrow definition, Walshok found that approxi-
mately half of the women had negative relationships with their supervisors and co-workers
during their first year on the job. See id. at x88, 221.
323 Id. at 221-22.
324 The literature documenting the effects of skewed sex ratios on work groups makes this




ment is widespread.3 25 Furthermore, women in male-dominated oc-
cupations are more likely to be subjected to harassment than are
women in other occupations. 326 Women in female jobs understand
that they will be likely to experience harassment if they attempt to
cross the gender divide;327 they may conclude that the price of devi-
ance is too high. Harassment is also driving the small number of
women in nontraditional jobs away.328 Blue-collar tradeswomen re-
port that women are leaving the trades because they cannot tolerate
the hostile work cultures, 32 9 and there are signs that this is occurring
in male-dominated professions as well. 330
32s This literature is now far too extensive to cite. Some of the earliest surveys documenting
the existence of sexual harassment are described in C. MACKINNON, cited above in note 212,
at 26-30. More recent studies include B. GUTEK, cited above in note 302; U.S. MERIT SYSTEM
PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM?
(198I); and U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE (1988).
326 See, e.g., Gutek & Morasch, supra note i, at 67-68 (finding that women in male-
dominated occupations and jobs were more likely to report harassment and to have experienced
negative consequences from it than women in other work settings); Martin, Sexual Harassment:
The Link Joining Gender Stratification, Sexuality, and Women's Economic Status, in WOMEN:
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 57, 6i (J. Freeman 4 th ed. i989) (citing studies showing that the
greater the proportion of men in a work group, the more likely women were to be harassed).
327 See, e.g., O'Farrell & Harlan, 29 SoC. PROBS. 252, 259 (1982) (finding that half the
women in white-collar, female-dominated occupations who considered moving into blue-collar,
male-dominated occupations expected that they would be subjected to harassment if they did
so).
328 See B. GUTEK, supra note 302, at 119 ("By making insulting comments and touching
women sexually, some men may try to 'make life miserable' for women in the [nontraditional]
jobs, encouraging them to leave. The relatively high turnover rate among women in [these
jobs] suggests that this is a successful strategy to force women out."); Gutek & Morasch, supra
note i, at 68 (finding that 20% of women in nontraditional work quit a job at some point
because of sexual harassment, while only 9% of the larger sample did so).
This research exposes a methodological problem in most surveys attempting to measure the
extent of harassment, particularly among women in male-dominated occupations. Most of the
surveys are not based on longitudinal data and thus do not include women who left because of
harassment. For this reason, they probably underestimate the prevalence of harassment. See
J. JACOBS, supra note i, at 153.
329 See, e.g., M. MARTIN, supra note 271, at ii; Eisenberg, Women Hard Hats Speak Out,
NATION, Sept. 18, 1989, at 272-73; Pollack, supra note 321, at 37-38.
330 A recent newspaper article noted, for example, that a growing number of women engi-
neers have become so discouraged by their discriminatory treatment that they are leaving
engineering to pursue alternative careers. See Arundel, Stagflationfor Female Engineers, N.Y.
Times, Oct. i, x989, at F32. Other studies have documented the disproportionate attrition of
women attorneys from law firms, see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda on
the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAw &
SOC. INQUIRY 289, 307 (1989); Weisenhaus, Still a Long Way To Go for Women, Minorities,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 48, and there is evidence that women leave in part because of
discrimination, see, e.g., Liefland, Career Patterns of Male and Female Lawyers, 35 BUFFALO
L. REv. 6oi, 6og-ii (1986); Quade, Myth v. Ms.: Why Women Leave the Law, 13 BARRISTER
28 (r986).
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One of the most debilitating forms of harassment is conduct that
interferes with a woman's ability to do her job. In nontraditional
blue-collar occupations, virtually all training is acquired informally on
the job. Thus, a woman's ability to succeed depends on the willing-
ness of her supervisors and co-workers to teach her the relevant skills.
Yet women's stories of being denied proper training are legion. 331
Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish inadequate training from
deliberate sabotage of women's work performance, both of which can
endanger a woman's physical safety.332 To the extent that foremen
and co-workers succeed in undermining Women's job performance,
they convert the notion that women are not cut out for nontraditional
work into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In nontraditional white-collar occupations, male workers - in-
cluding elite professionals - also guard their territory against female
incursion. Their conduct, too, runs the gamut from overtly sexual
behavior,333 to discriminatory work assignments and performance
evaluations, to day-to-day .personal interactions that send women the
message that they are "different" and "out of place. '334 The white-
331 In Walshok's study, when the women were asked about the negative aspects of their job
during the first year, the most frequently voiced criticism (expressed by 68% of the women) was
that they felt they were being trained poorly. See M. WALSHOK, supra note 262, at i88.
332 Stories like electrician Sue Eisenberg's are still far too common:
For some men, getting rid of the invaders was a personal mission. Ron, one of my first
foremen, constantly warned me of the ways I might get killed in this dangerous trade:
be electrocuted, have my head severed from my body, be boiled alive by steam. Without
giving any instruction on how to do it safely, he told me one day to open up a 200-foot-
long snake . . . . A snake is a thin piece of steel, used by electricians to pull wires
through pipes. It comes tightly coiled, bound with wire ties, and if not opened carefully,
will spring apart with great force. "I had a Chinese kid open one up," Ron told the
crew, laughing. "He got it caught up his nose and wound up in the hospital. Quit right
after that." I haven't opened up a snake since without remembering how I sweated
through it that first time, while my co-workers hid.
Eisenberg, supra note 329, at 272. For other stories of how-women have been subjected to acts
by foremen or co-workers that threatened them with, or caused them, physical harm, see, for
example, M. MARTIN, cited above in note 271, at 33-34 ("[The men] didn't want the women
to replace them, so they pulled stunts. Someone cut the chain holding up a big motor mount
I was welding. It fell down on me and burned my arm to the bone."); id. at 257 ("I had to
start checking all the parts on my machine because Dick would loosen stuff on it, which could
kill you."); and J. SCHROEDEL, cited above in note 271, at 256-57 (I went in the women's
room, and I cried, because a man pushed me under a machine.... The men admit they think
it's a man's job and a woman has no right out there.").
333 For example, one of Atlanta's most prestigious corporate law firms, King & Spalding,
planned to hold a "wet T-shirt" contest featuring its female summer associates, even while the
firm faced a sex discrimination lawsuit in the Supreme Court. See Burleigh & Goldberg,
Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Law Firms, A.B.A. J., Aug.- 1989, at 46. (The
lawsuit was Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).) After complaints, the firm decided
to hold a swimsuit competition instead. One of the firm's partners later told the Wall Street
Journal that the "winner" of the competition had been offered a job upon graduation, remarking:
"She has the body we'd like to see more of." Burleigh & Goldberg, supra, at 46.
334 In one recent case, for example, the lone female resident in a general surgery program
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collar equivalent of work sabotage may lie in evaluating women's
work by differential and sexist standards, a practice which occurs
even within the upper echelons of professional life. 335
Whatever men's motivations or sources of insecurity,336 harassment
is a central process through which the image of nontraditional work
as "masculine" is sustained. If there are no women in the job, then
the work's content can be described exclusively in terms of the "manly"
personal characteristics of the men who do it. On the other hand, if
women can do the work, it becomes far more difficult to define the
job with reference to stereotypically masculine images.3 37 As one
female pipefitter observed:
For a long time I wasn't allowed to do certain types of jobs ...
Some of the men would take the tools out of my hands. You see it
is just very hard for them to work with me because they're really into
proving their masculinity and being tough. And when a woman comes
was forced to endure sexual advances and touching; sexually explicit drawings of her body and
other pornography in public meeting rooms; her supervisors' refusal to talk to her, permit her
to operate, or assign her work tasks; discriminatory standards for evaluating her performance;
sabotage of her work, including falsification of medical records to make it appear as though she
and another female resident had made an error, see Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 886-94 (1st Cir. 1988), and "a constant verbal attack, one which challenged their
capacity as women to be surgeons, and questioned the legitimacy of their being in the Program
at all," id. at go.
3S' See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, iog S. Ct. 1775 (1989). Ann Hopkins brought
suit against Price Waterhouse, perhaps the nation's most prestigious public accounting firm,
claiming that she was discriminatorily denied partnership. Among other outstanding achieve-
ments, she had helped secure a multimillion dollar contract with the Department of State, an
accomplishment that none of the other candidates for partnership that year had matched. See
id. at 1782. But, when it came time to consider her for partnership, her colleagues evaluated
her by criteria by which no man would be judged:
One partner described her as "macho". . . ; another suggested that she "overcompensated
for being a woman" . . . ; a third advised her to take "a course at charm school" ....
Several partners criticized her use of profanity.... [Another advised her to] "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry."
Id. (citations omitted).
336 Some researchers emphasize that men are motivated by economic incentives, because
they feel that their job security and high wages are threatened by the presence of women. See,
e.g., R. MILxMAN, supra note 148, at 7-8, 158. Other writers have stressed patriarchal motives,
arguing that traditional sex roles "spill over" into the workplace. See, e.g., B. GuTEK, supra
note 302, at 149-5r.
337 See V. BEECHEY & T. PERKINS, supra note 14, at 1o2-19; C. WILLAMS, supra note
266, at 88-13o. These studies show how the cultural constructions of the same job vary
depending upon whether men or women do it. For example, one machine tools company that
employed only men as crane operators explained that women did not want to drive cranes
because "that was hot, heavy, dirty work and women didn't do that sort of work." V. BEEcHEY
& T. PERKINs, supra note 14, at io5. But another such company that employed women defined
the job in feminine terms, and suggested that women were actually better crane operators
because they had a "sensitive touch" learned through knitting. See id. at xo6.
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on a job that can work, get something done as fast and efficiently, as
well, as they can, it really affects them. Somehow if a woman can
do it, it ain't that masculine, not that tough. 338
By driving women out of nontraditional jobs, harassment rein-
forces the idea that women are inferior workers who cannot meet the
demands of a "man's job." More subtly, for women who stay in
nontraditional jobs, harassment exaggerates gender differences to re-
mind them that they are women who are "out of place" in a man's
workworld. By labeling the women as "freaks" or "deviants, ' 33 9 and
simultaneously pressuring them to conform to the dominant culture, 340
men mediate the contradiction posed by the presence of women doing
"masculine" work. Thus, harassing behavior that marks nontradition-
ally employed women workers as exceptions for their gender - yet
still women and therefore never quite as competent or as committed
as the men - enables men to continue to define their work (and
themselves) in masculine terms.
Cynthia Cockburn's study of engineers illustrates this process. 34 1
By defining women as inherently incapable of possessing technological
competence, the men appropriated engineering as a masculine pre-
serve. They viewed the relationship between manhood and technology
in essentialist terms, as a natural affinity between "man" and "ma-
chine.13 42 "In contrast to the way the men [perceived] themselves -
as striving, achieving, engaging in the public sphere of work - they
3383. SCHROEDEL, supra note 271, at 20-2 1; see also C. WILLIAMS, supra note 266, at 61
(noting that the Marine Corps segregates basic training because "[r]egardless of whether training
standards are compromised in fact, the sight of women mastering the feats of basic training
makes it appear that the training is not rigorous enough").
339 One of the tactics men use to make nontraditional women workers feel deviant is "lesbian-
baiting." See M. MARTIN, supra note 271, at 14. Lesbian-baiting is only one extreme example,
however, of behavior intended to divide and alienate women. See Pollack, supra note 321, at
78 & n.178.
340 Kanter discusses how male workers subject token women to "loyalty tests," in which the
women are required to affirm their loyalty to the dominant culture by turning against other
women. Pressuring women to tolerate sexist jokes and comments are examples. See R. KANTER,
supra note 281, at 227-29. Racist jokes and comments are often used in the same manner. The
invitation to participate in racist "humor" is one of the ways white women are often "welcomed
into the club." M. MARTIN, supra note 271, at 23. The pervasive racism of many nontraditional
blue-collar environments makes them particularly difficult for women of color, who often en-
counter a virulent combination of sexual and racial stereotyping. For some of their stories, see
id., at 72-8o, 118-21, 150-55, 187-92; and J. SCHROEDEL, cited above in note 272, at 99-I39.
One of the most shocking stories is police officer Rose Melendez's. One night her partner drove
her to a secluded area and stopped the patrol car. When Melendez asked why they were
stopping, he said he wanted to shoot rats. He then opened his shirt, pulled out a handgun,
and pointed it directly at her, saying; "I just want to see how fast you women cops can run."
M. MARTIN, supra note 272, at 74.
341 See C. CocKBuRN, supra note 24.
342 Id. at 172.
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[viewed] women as static, domestic, private people, as nonworkers." 343
They defined women as "aspect[s] of the decor" who "create a pleasant
atmosphere," 344 as interested in and good at "boring and repetitive
tasks,"345 and as soft, weak creatures who "'couldn't do' the manhan-
dling" required to master technology.346 They exceptionalized the few
women engineers as "performing seals," who must have been "train[ed]
• ..up a bit" by some man behind the scene.3 47 They also created
an occupational culture that was built around "sexual stories, refer-
ences and innuendo that are directly objectifying and exploitative of
women." 348 By creating such a hostile work culture, the men ensured
that few women would try to invade their jobs. They could then
point to the absence of women as evidence that these jobs demand
"masculine" skills and abilities not possessed by women. 349
This analysis of the relationship between harassment and the "mas-
culinity" of nontraditional work makes clear why many women are
reluctant to apply for such work. Women understand that behind the
symbolism of masculinized job descriptions lies a very real force: the
power of men to harass, belittle, ostracize, dismiss, marginalize, dis-
card, and just plain hurt them as workers. The legal system does not
adequately protect women from this harassment and abuse.350 Courts
have erected roadblocks to recovery, abandoning women to cope with
hostile work environments on their own. The general attitude of the
legal system seems to mirror that held by many male workers and
343 Id. at 185.
344 Id.
34S Id. at x86.
346 Id. at ioi (emphasis in original).
347 Id. at 188.
348 Id. at 176.
349 The contradictions within the men's ideological justifications are exposed as the men's
careers unfold. Early in their careers, when they do hands-on machine work, male engineers
defend the masculinity of their jobs in terms of a hard/soft dichotomy that defines "hard,"
physical work as masculine and "soft," intellectual work as feminine. In middle age, however,
many of these same engineers must move on to managerial desk jobs that they once denigrated
as unmanly. Id. at i9g. They then adopt an intellectual/non-intellectual dichotomy that,
ironically, associates masculinity with the intellectual and femininity with the physical. See id.
at 196-97.
3SO It remains unclear, for example, whether hostile but not sexually explicit behavior of the
type so often encountered by nontraditional women workers even falls within the scope of sexual
harassment prohibited by title VII. Compare McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C.
Cir. x985) (holding that acts that are hostile but not sexually explicit may constitute sexual
harassment prohibited by title VII) with Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 8oS F.2d 6x, 619 (6th
Cir. x986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (implicitly refusing to recognize hostile conduct
as harassment when it is not explicitly sexual in nature). For discussions of this issue, see
Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 4x STAN. L. RaV. i, 12-13 (x988); and Pollack, cited above in note 321, at 75 &
n.x64.
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managers: 35 1 if women want to venture into a man's workworld, they
must take it as they find it.35 2
The legal system thus places women workers in a Catch-22 situ-
ation. Women are disempowered from pursuing or staying in higher-
paid nontraditional jobs because of the hostile work cultures. The
only real hope for making those work cultures more hospitable to
women lies in dramatically increasing the proportion of women in
those jobs. Eliminating those imbalances is, of course, what title VII
lawsuits challenging segregation promise. But when women workers
bring these suits, too often the courts tell them that they are under-
represented in nontraditional jobs not because the work culture is
threatening or alienating, but rather because their own internalized
sense of "femininity" has led them to avoid those jobs.
And so the cycle continues. A few women continue to move in
and out the "revolving door," with little being done to stop them from
being shoved back out almost as soon as they enter. The majority of
working women stand by as silent witnesses, their failure to enter
used to confirm that they "chose" all along to remain on the outside.
There is no need for a sign on the door. Women understand that they
enter at their own risk.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE NEW ACCOUNT FOR THE LAW
The new account of the dynamics of gender and work brings us
back full circle to where we began: to the role of interpretation in
creating meaning and power. Judicial interpretations of sex segrega-
tion at work simultaneously flow from and feed back into a larger
351 See, e.g., Collins & Blodgett, Sexual Harassment ... Some See It ... Some Won't, 59
HARv. Bus. REv. 76, go (x98) (noting that a majority of managers responding to a survey said
that women employees should be able to handle on their own whatever sexual harassment comes
their way).
352 The clearest expression of this attitude appears in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Rabidue
v. Osceola Refining Co., 8o5 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. i986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. I041 (1987). The
plaintiff was the only woman with managerial responsibilities over male employees in a refining
company. Despite the fact that the work environment was extremely hostile and degrading to
women, the court held that it was not so offensive as to have interfered with the work
performance, or to have affected seriously the "psychological well-being of a reasonable person."
Id. at 62o. To support this holding, the majority quoted favorably from the following passage
from the district court's opinion:
[I]t cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and language
are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound. Title VII was not meant to - or can - change this. . . . Title VII is the
federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female
workers of America. But . . . Title VII was [not] designed to bring about a magical-
transformation in the social mores of American workers.
Id. at 620-21 (quoting Osceola v. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
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stream of cultural understandings and practices. This dynamic inter-
play occurs in and through both the liability and the remedial phases
of the legal process. In cases raising the lack of interest argument,
legal liability turns on the court's factual determination of whether
women are as "interested" as men in higher-paying, nontraditional
jobs. If the answer to this question is yes, segregation is attributed
to discrimination and the employer is held liable. If the answer to
this question is no, segregation is attributed to women's preferences
and the employer is absolved of responsibility.
Because the evidence does not and cannot reveal a verifiable an-
swer to this question, however, judges are inevitably confronted with
the problem of interpretation. To characterize women's job prefer-
ences and sex segregation itself, judges must draw from larger cultural
assumptions - larger pictures of "reality" - about gender and work
and their interrelation. Once cast, however, the interpretations ex-
pressed in judges' findings of fact affect the very reality they purport
to describe. Whether or not they impose liability, judicial decisions
are a source of interpretive authority that influence the terms in which
sex segregation on the job will be perceived, and bargained over, in
the future. Furthermore, courts have the institutional authority to
back up their decisions with remedies that have the potential to make
their interpretations of sex segregation come true.
By portraying women as naturally "feminine" creatures who ap-
proach the workworld with preordained preferences for suitably "fem-
inine" work, courts validate sexist views of women as inauthentic
workers fit only for the lowest-paying, least-challenging jobs. By
portraying work itself as naturally "masculine" or "feminine," they
legitimate the structures and processes through which employers con-
struct work and work aspirations in gendered terms. By refusing to
intervene, they permit and encourage employers to continue to orga-
nize work and work relations in ways that disempower women work-
ers from claiming the more highly valued nontraditional jobs the law
has promised them. Courts who interpret sex segregation as women's
own choice thus negate the very choice they purport to defend.
I have elaborated a new account of the dynamics of job segregation
in the hope of challenging - but also offering something positive to
replace - the images of women and work that inform this fatalistic
choice explanation. The new account is drawn from the findings of
a number of large-scale empirical studies of women workers. It is a
more accurate explanation for the reality of job segregation - a truer
story about women and work - than the stock of cultural images
judges have used to ground their interpretations in the past.
The central insight of the new account is that working women do
not bring with them to the workworld fixed preferences for tradition-
ally female or traditionally male work. Rather, the workplace is a
central site of development for women's aspirations and identities as
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workers. In a very real sense, employers create women's job prefer-
ences. Once judges realize that women's preferences are unstable and
always potentially in transition depending on work conditions, it will
no longer do to imagine that women have a static set of "true" pref-
erences independent of employer action that courts can discover as a
factual matter and use to ground legal decisionmaking. Indeed, the
notion that women have stable preferences for traditional or nontra-
ditional work becomes a legal fiction that is plausible only by accepting
as given the very structural features of the workplace that women
seek to challenge through the lawsuit.
The new account of gender and work thus exposes the myths
underlying the conservative "choice" explanation. What is more, it
does so in a way that moves beyond, and holds more transformative
potential than, the existing liberal alternative. The new account has
three implications for legal analysis that, taken together, transform
the current judicial framework for interpreting sex segregation.
First, the new account frees courts to reject the conservative
"choice" explanation without resorting to the liberal suppression of
gender difference. Once judges acknowledge that women's early work
preferences remain tentative and temporary, they need not deny the
force of gender in social life to hold employers responsible for sex
segregation in their workforces. Courts may acknowledge that our
society pressures girls to conform to appropriately "feminine" roles,
that it is women who assume the lion's share of the load of caring for
families, and even that it is important to most women to think of
themselves as "feminine," for none of these observations imply that
women will aspire only to the lower-paying, dead-end jobs considered
appropriate for their sex. To put it more positively, courts may ac-
knowledge that women have a distinctive history, culture and identity,
without concluding as a corollary that they are marginal workers
content to do only unremunerative, unchallenging jobs. The new
account thus frees courts to portray "women" and "workers" as in-
volving no contradiction in terms.
Second, the new account demands deeper judicial scrutiny of the
way employers have structured their workplaces. Once the assump-
tion that women approach the labor market with fixed job preferences
is abandoned, it will no longer do to conceptualize discrimination in
terms of whether the employer has erected specific "barriers" that
prevent individual women from exercising their preexisting prefer-
ences. Employers do not simply erect "barriers" to already formed
preferences: they create the workplace structures and relations out of
which those preferences arise in the first place. Thus, in resolving
the lack of interest argument, courts must look beyond whether the
employer has provided women the formal opportunity to enter non-
traditional jobs. Judges should be skeptical about employers' claims
to have made efforts to attract women to nontraditional work. Such
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efforts are likely to be ineffective unless they enlist the participation
of community organizations that serve working women and employ
creative strategies to describe the work in terms that will appeal to
women. Moreover, even extensive recruiting efforts will fail if the
firm manages only to convey an all too accurate picture of organiza-
tional life that serves more as a warning than a welcome to women.
Through its hiring criteria, training programs, performance evaluation
standards, mobility and reward structures, response to harassment,
and its managers' and male workers' day-to-day attitudes and actions,
the firm may have created an organizational culture that debilitates
most women from aspiring to nontraditional jobs. These sorts of work
cultures can be changed, but only if courts recognize that the firm's
practices create a disempowering culture for women.
A demand for closer judicial scrutiny runs counter to strong ideo-
logical currents that have begun to guide judicial action. In recent
years, the courts have shown less willingness to scrutinize, and to
prompt employers to restructure, practices that harm historically dis-
advantaged workers. Across all areas of employment discrimination
law, courts increasingly tend to condemn such reconstructive aims as
undue interference with business prerogatives that lies outside the
scope of proper judicial authority. In cases raising the lack of interest
argument, however, courts have justified their failure to scrutinize
employers' practices by attributing job aspirations and job segregation
to private ordering that occurs in realms beyond the public control of
employers or of the law. The new account of gender and work makes
clear that such a justification is insufficient.
Indeed, the third and most fundamental implication of the new
account is that the judicial system is itself inevitably implicated in
creating women's work preferences. Once we understand that women
form their job preferences in response to employers' practices, it be-
comes clear that courts participate in shaping women's work aspira-
tions all the time. Preference shaping is an unavoidable part of the
job judges do when they decide title VII cases challenging workplace
segregation. Every time a plaintiff brings such a case, the legal system
is confronted with a decision whether to affirm or alter the status quo.
When courts accept the lack of interest argument, they permit em-
ployers to organize their workplaces in ways that disable women from
forming an interest in nontraditional work. When courts impose lia-
bility instead, they prompt employers to restructure their workplaces
in ways that empower women to aspire to nontraditional jobs. Ju-
dicial decisions that reject the lack of interest argument also create a
climate in which it is more likely that employers not involved in
litigation will undertake genuine affirmative action through creative
efforts to dismantle old patterns of sexual hierarchy. That such efforts
can alter women's aspirations is clear from the reports of nontradi-
tional women workers. Thus, judges' decisions are embedded in the
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fabric of organizational life through which women's hopes and dreams
as workers are woven.
The new account of gender and work thus reminds judges that
they, too, are the authors of women's work aspirations. This aware-
ness should bring a new sensitivity to the way judges exercise their
responsibility to resolve the factual determination of whether women
lack interest in nontraditional jobs. If this is a daunting responsibility,
it is one that courts have been assuming since the earliest days of title
VII enforcement. Courts can acknowledge their own constitutive
power and use it to help create a workworld in which the majority
of working women are empowered to choose the more highly rewarded
work that title VII has long been promising them. To create that
world, they must refuse to proclaim that women already have that
choice.
